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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Giuseppe Attanasi (Sapienza University of Rome, Italy; BETA, University of Strasbourg, France; Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Anna Maffioletti (Università degli Studi di Torino); Giulia Papini (Università degli Studi di Torino); Patrizia Sbriglia (Università degli Studi della Campania "Luigi Vanvitelli"); Maria Luigia Signore (Sapienza University of Rome, Italy) |
| Abstract: | The determination of a majority threshold in any voting system can be influenced by voters' attitudes towards uncertainty. Traditionally, a higher majority threshold is associated with a risk-averse attitude, serving as a means to protect against the tyranny of the majority. Moreover, the absence of ex-ante information regarding the likelihood of the voting outcome introduces a further layer of uncertainty, that of ambiguity, which motivates decision-makers to seek increased protection. In this study, we first provide a thorough formalization of this theoretical prediction, relying on a second-order expected utility model with both risk and ambiguity aversion of the voter toward the voting lottery. Second, we experimentally test its predictions by integrating the majority threshold implication into traditional experiments for risk and ambiguity elicitation. Through a series of classroom experiments run on 2020-2023 (about 1, 100 subjects in Italy & France), we analyze how individuals, placed under varying conditions of uncertainty, react to the determination of a barrier threshold. We find a strong correlation between the number of voters and the chosen quorum for a majority: as each subject is only aware of her own voting preference, expanding the electoral base results in a more ambiguous probability about the outcome. This favors more conservative behavior and results in an upward adjustment of the majority threshold. |
| Keywords: | voting lottery, majority threshold, risk and ambiguity attitude, theory-driven experiment |
| JEL: | D72 D81 C91 |
| Date: | 2023–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2023-12&r=cdm |
| By: | Darko Mitrovic |
| Abstract: | A political party can be considered as a company whose value depends on the voters support i.e. on the percentage of population supporting the party. Dynamics of the support is thus as a stochastic process with a deterministic growth rate perturbed by a white noise modeled through the Wiener process. This is in an analogy with the option modeling where the stock price behaves similarly as the voters' support. While in the option theory we have the question of fair price of an option, the question that we ask here is what is a reasonable level of support that the coalition of a major party (safely above the election threshold) and a minor party (under or around the election threshold) should achieve in order the minor party to get one more representative. We shall elaborate some of the conclusions in the case of recent elections in Montenegro (June, 2023) which are particularly interesting due to lots of political subjects entering the race. |
| Date: | 2023–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2310.16424&r=cdm |
| By: | Ethan Bueno de Mesquita; Wioletta Dziuda |
| Abstract: | Electoral incentives may lead policymakers to eschew opportunities for common-interest reform, focusing instead on zero-sum, partisan policymaking. By forgoing opportunities for common-interest reforms, incumbents may convince their constituents that such reforms are rarely feasible, so that policymaking is primarily about zero-sum, partisan conflict. Voters with such beliefs vote based on ideological alignment, rather than factors such as quality or honesty. This is electorally beneficial for incumbents, who are typically ideologically aligned with their constituents. We capture this logic in an infinite horizon model and characterize the resulting dynamics of politics and policymaking. Equilibrium exhibits partisan traps---voters are pessimistic about common-interest opportunities, politicians behave in a purely partisan manner that shuts down voter learning, and ideologically aligned incumbents are consistently reelected. Partisan traps often occur in equilibrium even when common-interest reforms are in fact frequently feasible. The model shows how elite and mass polarization are intertwined, with politicians engaging in strategically polarized and polarizing behavior which leads to pessimistic beliefs among voters, who come to perceive there to be little political common ground. |
| JEL: | D0 P0 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31827&r=cdm |
| By: | Ashani Amarasinghe (School of Economics, University of Sydney and and SoDa Laboratories, Monash University;); Pushkar Maitra (Department of Economics, Monash University); Yuchen Zhong (Melbourne Institute of Applied Economics and Social Research, University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: | Better economic outcomes can prevail when governments at different levels of hierarchy are politically aligned. This often happens because upper level governments are more willing to transfer resources to, and invest in public goods in, aligned constituencies. In this paper we examine whether such political alignment causally affects security. We consider the case of the Naxalite insurgency in India, an issue of significant public safety and security. We focus on close elections and use a regression discontinuity (RD) design, which allows us to examine the causal impact of electing an aligned candidate on security. Our RD estimates show that the election of an aligned candidate leads to a significant reduction in violence. Examining the role of local natural resource activity, i.e., mining, as an underlying mechanism, we find that this negative effect is driven by constituencies close to mining areas. These findings confirm the relevance of political alignment in delivering security within constituencies, and the potential role played by local mining activity. |
| Keywords: | Political alignment, Naxalite insurgency, security, India |
| JEL: | H11 H41 H56 D72 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2023-22&r=cdm |