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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Karim Bekhtiar (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna) |
| Abstract: | In recent decades right-wing populist parties have experienced increased electoral success in many western democracies. This rise of the far-right, which is strongly built on the support of the working class, coincides with a sharp decline of the manufacturing sector. This paper analyzes the contribution of this manufacturing decline to the rise of the Austrian far-right. Overall the decline in manufacturing employment has strongly contributed to this rightward shift in the political landscape, with the manufacturing decline explaining roughly 43% of the observed increase in far-right vote-shares between 1995 and 2017. This effect is entirely driven by increases in natives unemployment rates, which increased considerably due to the manufacturing decline. Regarding the influences of the forces underlying the manufacturing decline, namely international trade and automation technologies, suggests that both forces contributed in roughly equal parts to this development |
| Keywords: | Manufacturing, Trade, Robots, Voting, Populism |
| JEL: | D72 F14 J21 J23 O14 R23 |
| Date: | 2023–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2023-09&r=cdm |
| By: | Roy, Ambika; Mukherjee, Anirban (University of Calcutta) |
| Abstract: | In presence of ethnic voting, violence is often used in India to dissuade ethnic minorities from voting. In this paper, we examine if violence against disadvantaged castes follows a pattern during an electoral cycle. More specifically, we want to see if crimes against the Scheduled Caste population in India is affected by it’s proximity to state assembly elections. For this we construct a district level panel of 466 districts, spread across 18 states from2007 to 2021 on crime and elections in India. Our baseline specification exploits a fixed effects model and finds that election years are marked by a statistically significant fall in caste violence, which is quite high in the year preceding the election. A heterogeneity analysis reveals that the effect is significantly enhanced in districts with a history of caste politics, especially where caste parties have more political power. Our findings also support the claim that an increase in political power leads to a greater degree of confrontation and conflict rather than its prevention. |
| Date: | 2023–09–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:bh2vk&r=cdm |
| By: | Benjamin Enke |
| Abstract: | This article reviews the growing economics literature that studies the politico-economic impacts of heterogeneity in moral boundaries across individuals and cultures. The so-called universalism-versus-particularism cleavage has emerged as a main organizing principle behind various salient features of contemporary political competition, including individual-level and spatial variation in voting, the realignment of rich liberals and poor conservatives, the internal structure of ideology, and the moral content of political messaging. A recurring theme is that the explanatory power of universalism for left-wing policy views and voting is considerably larger than that of traditional economic variables. Looking at the origins of heterogeneity in universalism, an emerging consensus is that cross-group variation is partly economically functional and reflects that morality evolved to support cooperation in economic production. This insight organizes much work on how kinship systems, market exposure, political institutions and ecology have shaped universalism through their impacts on the relative benefits of localized and impersonal interactions. |
| JEL: | D01 D03 D70 |
| Date: | 2023–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:31701&r=cdm |
| By: | Effrosyni Diamantoudi (Concordia University Montreal); Eftichios S. Sartzetakis (Department of Economics, University of Macedonia); Stefania Strantza (Thompson Rivers University) |
| Abstract: | The paper provides a fresh look at the literature on the formation of international environmental agreements by introducing into the classic model emissions and abatement as countries’ separate choice variables. The model’s structure is kept unchanged, assuming a two-stage game in which the internal and external stability conditions define coalition’s stability. We illustrate the way in which each of the three components of countries welfare, benefits from own emissions, damages from aggregate emissions and own abatement costs, interact in determining nonsignatories’ equilibrium choices, which in turn, determine the stable coalition’s size. We show that, ceteris paribus, as abatement becomes cheaper, nonsignatories become more responsive to signatories’ choices, strengthening the signatories’ leadership position, allowing thus, largest stable coalitions to be formed. However, when abatement costs are low the same choices are individually rational, that is, forming a coalition does not add much over the Nash. Furthermore, large stable coalitions are possible under high abatement costs, only if damages are high relative to benefits, but such coalitions require negative net emissions. Finally, in the absence of leadership, only very small coalitions are stable. Therefore, even if the coalition has leadership power in setting abatement and emission targets, the reduction of free-riding incentives is significant, yielding larger stable coalitions, only when it is welfare irrelevant, i.e., when the same targets are individually rational. |
| Keywords: | Coalition Formation, International Environmental Agreements, Size of Stable Coalitions |
| JEL: | D6 Q5 C7 |
| Date: | 2023–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mcd:mcddps:2023_04&r=cdm |