nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2023‒10‒16
four papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Terrorism and Voting: The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Germany By Navid Sabet; Marius Liebald; Guido Friebel
  2. Fairness and inequality in institution formation By Detemple, Julian; Kosfeld, Michael
  3. Corporate Social Responsibility and Voting over Public Goods By Andrew A. Samwick; Sophie Wang
  4. Can low-cost, scalable, online interventions increase youth informed political participation in electoral authoritarian contexts? By Romain Ferrali; Guy Grossman; Horacio Larreguy

  1. By: Navid Sabet; Marius Liebald; Guido Friebel
    Abstract: Can right-wing terrorism increase support for far-right populist parties, and if so, why? Exploiting quasi-random variation between successful and failed attacks across German municipalities, we find that successful attacks lead to significant increases in the vote share for the right-wing, populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party. Our results are predominantly observable in state elections, though attacks that receive high media coverage increase the AfD vote share in Federal elections. These patterns hold even though most attacks are motivated by right-wing causes and target migrants. Using a longitudinal panel of individuals, we find successful terror leads individuals to prefer the AfD more and worry more about migration. Exploiting news reports, we find that successful attacks receive more media coverage from local and regional publishers and that this coverage focuses on Islam and terror. Overall, and in contrast to previous work, we find terrorism is politically consequential in Western, multi-party democratic systems.
    Keywords: terrorism, populism, media, salience, voting
    JEL: D72 K42 L82
    Date: 2023
  2. By: Detemple, Julian; Kosfeld, Michael
    Abstract: A key solution for public good provision is the voluntary formation of institutions that commit players to cooperate. Such institutions generate inequality if some players decide not to participate but cannot be excluded from cooperation benefits. Prior research with small groups emphasizes the role of fairness concerns with positive effects on cooperation. We show that effects do not generalize to larger groups: if group size increases, groups are less willing to form institutions generating inequality. In contrast to smaller groups, however, this does not increase the number of participating players, thereby limiting the positive impact of institution formation on cooperation.
    Keywords: Institution formation, group size, social dilemma, social preferences
    JEL: C92 D02 D63 H41
    Date: 2023
  3. By: Andrew A. Samwick; Sophie Wang
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the total provision of public goods in a framework in which consumers who may make such voluntary contributions to public goods via CSR are also voters who decide on the level of taxes to finance publicly provided public goods. The main result indicates that, relative to an economy in which all public goods are publicly financed, the introduction of CSR lowers the total amount of public goods, as voters rationally anticipate that higher CSR will partially offset the consequences of lower public funding. The results offer a cautionary tale about the promotion of CSR in an economy with heterogeneous preferences for the public good.
    JEL: D72 H41 M14
    Date: 2023–08
  4. By: Romain Ferrali (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Guy Grossman (University of Pennsylvania); Horacio Larreguy (ITAM - Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México)
    Abstract: Young citizens vote at relatively low rates, which contributes to political parties de-prioritizing youth preferences. We analyze the effects of low-cost online interventions in encouraging young Moroccans to cast an informed vote in the 2021 elections. These interventions aim to reduce participation costs by providing information about the registration process and by highlighting the election's stakes and the distance between respondents' preferences and party platforms. Contrary to preregistered expectations, the interventions did not increase average turnout, yet exploratory analysis shows that the interventions designed to increase benefits did increase the turnout intention of uncertain baseline voters. Moreover, information about parties' platforms increased support for the party closest to the respondents' preferences, leading to better-informed voting. Results are consistent with motivated reasoning, which is surprising in a context with weak party institutionalization.
    Date: 2023–06

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