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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Vincent Anesi; Peter Buisseret |
| Abstract: | We study a dynamic principal-agent model in which the principal is a group whose members hold heterogeneous and evolving values from an agreement with the agent. Learning about the agent’s private information reduces the principals’ conflicts over their joint offer, mitigating a principal’s losses if she is not decisive over future offers. As a consequence, a principal in a group prefers to screen the agent more aggressively than a single principal. We study the dynamics of the principals’ collective choice, and obtain conditions under which decisive members of the group successively trade away their decision-making authority, leading inexorably to the concentration of negotiation power in the hands of a single principal. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notnic:2023-01&r=cdm |
| By: | Rim Lahmandi-Ayed (UR MASE - Modélisation et Analyse Statistique et Economique - ESSAIT - Ecole Supérieure de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information - Université de Carthage - University of Carthage); Didier Laussel (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences, where workers and consumers are differentiated respectively by their sensitivity to effort and their intensity of preference for quality. We consider a public monopoly, i.e. which is owned equally by all individuals. The question is under which conditions the firm will be privatized and at which rate/price. The decisions are taken through majority vote in a plurality system. When the firm is controlled by the State, the price is determined through a vote among all the population. Otherwise, the price is the one which maximizes the profit. We prove that, when the maximum disutility of working in the firm is higher than the maximum utility of consuming its output, privatization may emerge as a possible choice of the majority, even if no hypothesis is made on the efficiency of a private management relative to a public one. |
| Keywords: | Democracy, General equilibrium, Privatization, Vertical preferences, Majority vote, Public monopoly |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03702671&r=cdm |
| By: | Benjamin Monnery; Alexandre Chirat |
| Abstract: | In Western democracies, the last decades are characterized by a transformation of the relationship between citizens and their representatives, towards greater accountability, transparency and anti-corruption efforts. However, such evolutions are sometimes suspected of paradoxically fueling populism and reducing political trust. In this article, we investigate to what extent a new public institution in charge of monitoring the integrity of elected officials is likely to attract popular support and restore citizens' trust in democracy. We focus on France and its main anti-corruption agency, the High Authority for the Transparency of Public Life (HATVP), launched in 2013. We run a survey among 3, 000 representative citizens and 33 experts, and augment it with an experimental treatment where we randomly provide simple, concise information on the activity and record of the HATVP. Our results first show a large divergence between the opinions of the average citizen and the much more optimistic views of experts about the state and dynamics of political integrity in France. Second, we find that citizens have highly heterogeneous beliefs and those with high political distrust are not only more likely to vote for populist candidates or abstain, but also the least informed about the anti-corruption agency. Third, our information provision experiment has meaningful, positive impacts on citizens’ perceptions of HATVP, political transparency and representative democracy. Moreover, we show that some of the largest impacts are found among initially distrustful and poorly informed citizens, stressing the potential for communication and information to change the political perceptions and attitudes of disillusioned citizens. |
| Keywords: | integrity ; corruption ; political trust ; populism ; survey experiment |
| JEL: | C99 D72 M48 P37 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2023-11&r=cdm |
| By: | Filipe Campante (Johns Hopkins University); Ruben Durante (ICREA-UPF); Andrea Tesei (Queen Mary University of London) |
| Abstract: | We survey the empirical literature in economics on the impact of media technologies on social capital. Motivated by a simple model of information and collective action, we cover a range of different outcomes related to social capital, from social and political participation to interpersonal trust, in its benign and destructive manifestations. The impact of media technologies hinges on their content ("information" vs "entertainment"), their effectiveness in fostering coordination, and the networks they create, as well as individual characteristics and media consumption choices. |
| Keywords: | Social capital; media; collective action; information; coordination; participation |
| JEL: | D71 D72 D74 D83 D84 Z13 |
| Date: | 2021–09–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:930&r=cdm |