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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Tommaso Giullla (Department of Economics, Universidad de San Andres) |
| Abstract: | The study of ballot design has gained salience in political science. The very procedure voters need to carry out in order to vote affects electoral outcomes, on top of the more direct effects of electoral rules. I focus on a specific channel through which such effects might realise: the order in which parties appear in the voting paper. Exploiting a natural experiment in the 2018 Italian general election, I estimate the electoral gain obtained by parties by virtue of being assigned the first (top-left) position in the voting paper. I use the fact that in Italy the party order in ballots is determined independently for the two elected chambers, thus exposing voters to two different exogenously determined lists. I find that, within a same municipality, parties which are assigned the first position in one chamber obtain a vote share between 0.1 and 0.2 p.p. higher relative to the other chamber. On average, this means that roughly 1 voter every 500 is influenced by the order in which party appears on the voting paper. |
| Keywords: | Electoral Institutions |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sad:ypaper:8&r=cdm |
| By: | Nicola Gennaioli; Guido Tabellini |
| Abstract: | We offer a theory of changing dimensions of political polarization based on endogenous social identity. We formalize voter identity and stereotyped beliefs as in Bonomi et al. (2021), but add parties that compete on policy and also spread or conceal group stereotypes to persuade voters. Parties are historically connected to different social groups, whose members are more receptive to the ingroup party messages. An endogenous switch from class to cultural identity accounts for three major observed changes: i) growing conflict over cultural issues between voters and between parties, ii) dampening of political conflict over redistribution, despite rising inequality, and iii) a realignment of lower class voters from the left to the right. The incentive of parties to spread stereotypes is a key driver of identity-based polarization. Using survey data and congressional speeches we show that - consistent with our model - there is evidence of i) and ii) also in the voting realignment induced by the ”China Shock” (Autor et al. 2020). |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:693&r=cdm |
| By: | Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar; Jorge Bruno; Renaud Foucart; Sonali SenGupta |
| Abstract: | We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where groups of players conditionally cooperate in the hope of influencing further groups. Conditional cooperation implies that each group member is pivotal, so that efficient simultaneous provision within groups is an equilibrium. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2303.10514&r=cdm |
| By: | Andrzej Baranski; Ernesto Reuben (Division of Social Science) |
| Abstract: | Competition for positions of power is a common practice in most organizations where decisions are reached through negotiations. We study theoretically and experimentally how different voting rules affect the incentives to compete for the right to propose a distribution of benefits in a sequential bargaining game. Under the majority rule, players with a high chance of proposing are also more likely to be excluded from a coalition when not proposing, which dampens incentives to compete for proposal rights relative to the unanimity case where no one can be excluded from a coalition. However, when rent-seeking efforts affect proposal rights only in the first bargaining round, equilibrium efforts to secure proposal rights are higher under the majority rule because they no longer affect the likelihood of coalition exclusion. Our experimental findings uncover a novel efficiency trade-off absent in theory: While gridlock is stronger under unanimity, majoritarian bargaining elicits higher competition costs regardless of the durability of efforts in affecting proposal rights, rendering both rules equally efficient. The distribution of benefits is affected by the endogeneity of proposal rights contrary to behavioral expectations as subjects gravitate towards equitable sharing and proposers often do not keep the lion’s share. Further experiments reveal that subject behavior is consistent with myopic reasoning and that our results hold robustly in distinct subject samples. |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nad:wpaper:20220085&r=cdm |
| By: | Ngoc Thao NOET (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Marianne Lefebvre (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement); Serge Blondel (LIRAES (URP_ 4470) - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPCité - Université Paris Cité, GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - Institut Agro Rennes Angers - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement) |
| Abstract: | Through a field experiment based on the prisoner's dilemma, we analyze the determinants of cooperative behavior in the horticultural sector, specifically on the effect of group membership. We focus on the Flowers for Bees Week initiative, a collective action in the supply chain (in particular producers and landscapers). We compare the behaviors of professionals in a repeated prisoner's dilemma game over 5 days, in two treatments: in-group (the players have the same role in the sector) and out-group (one player is a producer and the other a landscaper). The results are threefold. First, cooperation is higher in the in-group treatment compared to the out-group treatment. Second, when they cooperate, it is because they believe that the other will also cooperate. Lastly, the two sectors share the same views on collective actions and cooperation. We suggest levers to encourage collective actions in the sector. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation, Field experiment, In-group Out-group effect, Horticulture, Prisoner's dilemma |
| Date: | 2023–02–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04004727&r=cdm |