nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2023‒03‒27
six papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber
McNeese State University

  1. Cross-State Strategic Voting By Gordon B. Dahl; Joseph Engelberg; Runjing Lu; William Mullins
  2. Human Capital and Climate Change By Noam Angrist; Kevin Winseck; Harry A. Patrinos; Joshua S. Graff Zivin
  3. Why the rich and the poor value freedom and equality differently By Popov, Vladimir
  4. The post-Erdoğan vision of Turkish opposition: Opportunities and limitations By Şar, Edgar
  5. Israel's anti-liberal coalition: The new government is seeking fundamental changes in the political system and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict By Lintl, Peter
  6. Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains By Felix Brand; Patrick Lederer; Sascha Tausch

  1. By: Gordon B. Dahl; Joseph Engelberg; Runjing Lu; William Mullins
    Abstract: We estimate 3% of the U.S. voter population is registered to vote in two states. Which state these double-registrants choose to vote in reflects incentives and costs, being more prevalent in swing states (higher incentive) and states which automatically send out mail-in ballots (lower cost). We call this behavior cross-state strategic voting (CSSV) and estimate there were 317, 000 such votes in the 2020 presidential election. Because both Democrats and Republicans engaged in CSSV, the net effect was small, although it could matter in closer elections (e.g., Florida in 2000) or if one party increased CSSV relative to the other.
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2023–02
  2. By: Noam Angrist; Kevin Winseck; Harry A. Patrinos; Joshua S. Graff Zivin
    Abstract: Addressing climate change requires individual behavior change and voter support for pro-climate policies, yet surprisingly little is known about how to achieve these outcomes. In this paper, we estimate causal effects of additional education on pro-climate outcomes using new compulsory schooling law data across 16 European countries. We analyze effects on pro-climate beliefs, behaviors, policy preferences, and novel data on voting for green parties – a particularly consequential outcome to combat climate change. Results show a year of education increases pro-climate beliefs, behaviors, most policy preferences, and green voting, with voting gains equivalent to a substantial 35% increase.
    JEL: D72 H41 I20 I28 P16 Q01 Q5
    Date: 2023–03
  3. By: Popov, Vladimir
    Abstract: This paper aims at providing additional explanations of the shift in electoral preferences studied by Piketty (2018) – in the post-war period rich and educated voters in Western countries shifted from right-oriented to left-oriented political parties. It is argued that high income individuals develop leftist views (in favor of redistribution, i.e. with preferences for equality relative to freedom), when they feel that income inequalities pose a danger to social stability and trust the government to carry out redistribution measures. The World Value Survey (WVS) data allow to measure the freedom versus equality preferences of the rich and poor respondents. It turns out that in countries with high income and wealth inequalities, high murder rate and high trust in the government, the rich tend to have more pro-equality and less pro-freedom preferences. The pattern for the poor respondents is similar, but less pronounced than for the rich. There are two groups of countries/territories, where the rich respondents are more pro-equality and less pro-freedom oriented than the poor – high inequalities and murder rates group (mostly Latin America, where the trust to the government is low) and high trust to the government group (mostly East Asia and Middle East and North Africa, where inequalities and murder rates are low). The latter group may constitute a case of good equilibrium with the long term political stability, whereas the former group is better characterized as moving from bad to good equilibrium.
    Keywords: Inequalities, redistribution, left and right political spectrum, equality versus freedom preferences of the rich and the poor, trust in the government.
    JEL: D61 D63 D72 N30
    Date: 2023–03–01
  4. By: Şar, Edgar
    Abstract: Nearly a year after its formation, the Nation Alliance, consisting of six opposition parties ("Table of Six"), finally started to act like a full-fledged electoral alliance against the ruling bloc under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The six opposition leaders have long been criticised for failing to take concrete steps towards embodying a viable political alternative to the People's Alliance of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) since they publicly signed the joint manifesto for Turkey's transition into the "Strengthened Parliamentary System" in February 2022. Although the alliance has yet to announce its joint presidential candidate, it has manifested an unprecedentedly comprehensive joint platform in nine policy areas, including the rule of law, public administration, social policy, economy, and foreign policy. The 200-page joint document provides a comprehensive overview of what changes Turkey can be expected to go through in the short and medium terms should the Nation Alliance manage to defeat President Erdoğan's ruling bloc in the upcoming elections, which will probably take place on 14 May 2023. Even though it would not immediately offer a solution to various issues in Turkey-EU relations, a possible opposition victory could bring bilateral relations back to an institutional framework, whereby both parties can cooperate in a productive way to work out their problems and focus on common interests.
    Keywords: Turkey, elections, Nation Alliance, "Table of Six", Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Justice and Development Party (AKP), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), European Union (EU)
    Date: 2023
  5. By: Lintl, Peter
    Abstract: The new government in Israel is politically further to the right than any other before it. The success of the radical right parties and their inclusion in the government are the results of a long-term transformation of Israel's political landscape. One characteristic of this development is the genesis of a right-wing majority, accompanied by a shift to the right of the mainstream, and the political legitimisation of the most radical segment of Israeli society. The common denominator of this government is its anti-liberal impetus, which amounts to a reorganisation of the state. The government intends to weaken democratic mechanisms, especially the system of checks and balances, the status of the Supreme Court, and that of fundamental rights. Instead, majoritarian principles are to be strengthened, placing few limits on government majorities. This disruptive approach also applies to the conflict with the Palestinians. Here, victory is sought: The integration of the West Bank into the legal territory of the state of Israel is to be made irreversible.
    Keywords: Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, Betzalel Smotrich, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Michael Ben-Ari, Likud, Israel Beitenu, Religios Zionism, Otzma Yehudit, Noam, ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas, Haredim, United Tora Judaism, majoritarian democracy, West Bank, annexation, halacha
    Date: 2023
  6. By: Felix Brand; Patrick Lederer; Sascha Tausch
    Abstract: One of the central economic paradigms in multi-agent systems is that agents should not be better off by acting dishonestly. In the context of collective decision-making, this axiom is known as strategyproofness and turns out to be rather prohibitive, even when allowing for randomization. In particular, Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem shows that only rather unattractive social decision schemes (SDSs) satisfy strategyproofness on the full domain of preferences. In this paper, we obtain more positive results by investigating strategyproof SDSs on the Condorcet domain, which consists of all preference profiles that admit a Condorcet winner. In more detail, we show that, if the number of voters $n$ is odd, every strategyproof and non-imposing SDS on the Condorcet domain can be represented as a mixture of dictatorial SDSs and the Condorcet rule (which chooses the Condorcet winner with probability $1$). Moreover, we prove that the Condorcet domain is a maximal connected domain that allows for attractive strategyproof SDSs if $n$ is odd as only random dictatorships are strategyproof and non-imposing on any sufficiently connected superset of it. We also derive analogous results for even $n$ by slightly extending the Condorcet domain. Finally, we also characterize the set of group-strategyproof and non-imposing SDSs on the Condorcet domain and its supersets. These characterizations strengthen Gibbard's random dictatorship theorem and establish that the Condorcet domain is essentially a maximal domain that allows for attractive strategyproof SDSs.
    Date: 2023–02

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