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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Sakib Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad (BLDT, University of Winchester); Bruno, Jorge (BLDT, University of Winchester); SenGupta, Sonali (Queens Management School, Queen’s University Belfast.) |
| Abstract: | We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups’ position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players simultaneously and independently, and the groups’ total contribution is made sequentially. We try to capture both inter and intra-group behaviors and analyze different situations where players observe partial history about total contributions of their predecessor groups. Given this framework, we show that even when players observe a history of defection (no contribution), a cooperative outcome is achievable. This is particularly interesting in the situation when players observe only their immediate predecessor groups’ contribution, where we observe that players play an important role in motivating others to contribute. |
| Keywords: | Social Dilemmas ; Public Goods ; Position Uncertainty ; Voluntary Contributions ; Fundraising ; Groups JEL codes: C72; D82; H41 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wcreta:75&r=cdm |
| By: | Gong, Da; Hammar, Olle |
| Abstract: | Gethin, Martínez-Toledano and Piketty (2022) analyze the long-run evolution of political cleavages using a new database on socioeconomic determinants of voting from approximately 300 elections in 21 Western democracies between 1948 and 2020. They find that, in the 1950s and 1960s, voting for the "left" was associated with lower-educated and low-income voters. After that, voting for the "left" has gradually become associated with higher-educated voters, while highincome voters have continued to vote for the "right". In the 2010s, there is a disconnection between the effects of income and education on voting. In this replication, we first conduct a computational reproduction, using the replication package provided by the authors. Second, we do a robustness replication testing to what extent the original results are robust to i) restricting the sample to "core" left and right parties, ii) analyzing the top 80% versus bottom 20%, iii) weighting by population, iv) dropping control variables, and v) using country fixed effects. The main results of the paper are found to be largely replicable and robust. |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:19&r=cdm |
| By: | Gabriele Gratton (UNSW Business School); Barton E. Lee (UNSW Business School) |
| Abstract: | We study a model of popular demand for anti-elite populist reforms that drain the swamp: replace experienced public servants with novices that will only acquire experience with time. Voters benefit from experienced public servants because they are more effective at delivering public goods and more competent at detecting emergency threats. However, public servants’ policy preferences do not always align with those of voters. This tradeoff produces two key forces in our model: public servants’ incompetence spurs disagreement between them and voters, and their effectiveness grants them more power to dictate policy. Both of these effects fuel mistrust between voters and public servants, sometimes inducing voters to drain the swamp in cycles of anti-elite populism. We study which factors can sustain a responsive democracy or induce a technocracy. When instead populism arises, we discuss which reforms may reduce the frequency of populist cycles. |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2023-02&r=cdm |
| By: | Giacomo Lemoli; Gloria Gennaro |
| Abstract: | Under what conditions can legacies of past violence shape political behaviour? We propose a theory of how war victimization defines attitudes over the long run, and how these can be activated by changes in the political environment. We argue that exposure to violence by members of a different ethnic group generates hostility that spills over other outgroups; this latent hostility resonates with nationalist appeals to ingroup (national) identity against non-nationals. |
| Keywords: | Political economy, War, Violence, Nationalism |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2023-22&r=cdm |