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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Rafat Beigpoor Shahrivar; Duesterhoeft, Ilka; Rogna, Marco; Vogt, Carla |
| Abstract: | Public good games in coalitional form, such as the ones depicting international environmental agreements for the reduction of a global pollutant, generally foresee scarce levels of cooperation. The incentive to free ride, that increases for higher levels of cooperation, prevents the formation of stable coalitions. The introduction of other-regarding preferences, in the form of Fehr and Schmidt utility functions, enlarges cooperation, but still at suboptimal levels. The present paper considers a further possibility, namely the introduction of a mechanism through which the contributions of players to the public good are proportional to the average contribution of the other players abiding to the mechanism: proportional contributions. The mechanism is therefore rooted into reciprocity. By applying it to a standard abatement game parameterized on the RICE model, we show that the mechanism is in fact able to increase cooperation both under standard and under F&S preferences. Stability of the grand coalition is never reached, but potential internally stable grand coalitions are achieved under F&S preferences. The attainment of higher cooperation comes at the expense of the level of global abatement that is lower when proportional contributions are in place. |
| Keywords: | Coalitional game, cooperation, F&S preferences, public good, reciprocity |
| JEL: | C72 D63 H41 Q54 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:990&r=cdm |
| By: | A. Arda Gitmez; James A. Robinson; Mehdi Shadmehr |
| Abstract: | Institutional constraints to counter potential abuses in the use of political power have been viewed as essential to well functioning political institutions and good public policy outcomes in the Western World since the time of ancient Greece. A sophisticated intellectual tradition emerged to justify the need for such constraints. In this paper we identify a new puzzle: such an intellectual tradition did not exist in the Islamic world, even if the potential for abuse was recognized. We develop a model to explain why such ideas might not have emerged. We argue that this is due to the nature of Islamic law (the Sharia) being far more encompassing than Western law, making it easier for citizens to identify abuses of power and use collective action to discipline them. We study how the relative homogeneity and solidarity of Islamic society fortified this logic. |
| JEL: | D70 D72 D78 H11 |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30916&r=cdm |
| By: | Jirjahn, Uwe (University of Trier); Le, Thi Xuan Thu (University of Trier) |
| Abstract: | Research on the consequences of works councils has been dominated by economic aspects. Our study provides evidence that works councils have nonfinancial consequences for civic society that go beyond the narrow boundaries of the workplace. Using panel data from a large sample of male workers, the study shows that works councils have an influence on workers' party preferences. The presence of a works council is negatively associated with preferences for extreme right-wing parties and positively associated with preferences for the Social Democratic Party and The Left. These results holds in panel data estimations including a large set of controls and accounting for unobserved individual-specific factors. Our findings fit the notion that workplace democracy increases workers' generalized solidarity and their awareness of social and political issues. |
| Keywords: | workplace democracy, worker participation, political spillover, party identification |
| JEL: | D72 J51 J52 J58 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15879&r=cdm |