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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Herrade Igersheim (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg); François Durand (Nokia Bell Labs); Aaron Hamlin (The Center for Election Science, Redding); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents data from a survey leading up to the 2016 US presidential elections. Participants were asked their opinions about the candidates and were also asked to vote according to three alternative voting rules, in addition to plurality: approval voting, range voting, and instant runoff voting. The participants were split into two groups, one facing a set of four candidates (Clinton, Trump, Johnson, and Stein) and the other a set of nine candidates (the previous four plus Sanders, Cruz, McMullin, Bloomberg, and Castle). The paper studies three issues: (1) How do US voters use these alternative rules? (2) What kinds of candidates, in terms of individual preferences, are favored by which rule? (3) Which rules empirically satisfy the independence of eliminated alternatives? Our results provide evidence that, according to all standard criterion computed on individual preferences, be there utilitarian or of the Condorcet type, the same candidate (Sanders) wins, and that evaluative voting rules such as approval voting and range voting might lead to this outcome, contrary to direct plurality and instant runoff voting (that elects Clinton) and to the official voting rule (that elected Trump). |
| Keywords: | US Presidential election., Approval voting, range voting, instant runoff, strategic voting |
| Date: | 2022–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03926997&r=cdm |
| By: | Gustavo Bergantiños (ECOSOT, Universidade de Vigo); Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide) |
| Abstract: | We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity. Then, we decentralize the problem letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. Nevertheless, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just replacing anonymity by equal treatment of equals) majority equilibrium does exist. |
| Keywords: | Resource allocation, broadcasting problems, voting, majority, anonymity. |
| JEL: | D63 C71 Z20 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:23.02&r=cdm |
| By: | Jon X. Eguia (Michigan State U.); Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft); Steven P. Lalley (U. Chicago); Katrina Ligett (Hebrew U.); Glen Weyl (Microsoft); Dimitrios Xefteris (U. Cyprus) |
| Abstract: | Consider the following collective choice problem: a group of budget constrained agents must choose one of several alternatives. Is there a budget balanced mechanism that: i) does not depend on the specific characteristics of the group, ii) does not require unaffordable transfers, and iii) implements utilitarianism if the agents' preferences are quasilinear and their private information? We study the following procedure: every agent can express any intensity of support or opposition to each alternative, by transferring to the rest of the agents wealth equal to the square of the intensity expressed; and the outcome is determined by the sums of the expressed intensities. We prove that as the group grows large, in every equilibrium of this quadratic-transfers mechanism, each agent's transfer converges to zero, and the probability that the efficient outcome is chosen converges to one. |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2301.06206&r=cdm |
| By: | Robert Germeshausen; Sven Heim; Ulrich Wagner |
| Abstract: | The rise of societal goals like climate change mitigation and energy security calls for rapid capacity growth in renewable electricity sources, yet citizens’ support is put to a test when such technologies emit negative local externalities. We estimate the impact of wind turbine deployment on granular measures of revealed preferences for renewable electricity in product and political markets. We address potentially endogenous siting of turbines with an IV design that exploits quasi experimental variation in profitability induced by subsidies. We find that wind turbines significantly reduce citizens’ support locally, but this effect quickly fades with distance from the site. We assess policy instruments for enhancing citizens’ support for renewable energy in light of our results |
| Keywords: | Renewable Energy, Wind Power, Public Support, Elections, Externalities |
| JEL: | D12 D72 Q42 Q48 Q50 |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_390&r=cdm |