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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Aruguete, Natalia; Calvo, Ernesto; Scartascini, Carlos; Ventura, Tiago |
| Abstract: | Recent increases in political polarization in social media raise questions about the relationship between negative online messages and the decline in political trust around the world. To evaluate this claim causally, we implement a variant of the well-known trust game in a survey experiment with 4,800 respondents in Brazil and Mexico. Our design allows to test the effect of social media on trust and trustworthiness. Survey respondents alternate as agents (politicians) and principals (voters). Players can cast votes, trust others with their votes, and cast entrusted votes. The players rewards are contingent on their preferred “candidate” winning the election. We measure the extent to which voters place their trust in others and are themselves trustworthy, that is, willing to honor requests that may not benefit them. Treated respondents are exposed to messages from in-group or out-group politicians, and with positive or negative tone. Results provide robust support for a negative effect of uncivil partisan discourse on trust behavior and null results on trustworthiness. The negative effect on trust is considerably greater among randomly treated respondents who engage with social media messages. These results show that engaging with messages on social media can have a deleterious effect on trust, even when those messages are not relevant to the task at hand or not representative of the actions of the individuals involved in the game. |
| Keywords: | Trust;Social media;Trustworthiness;Political polarization |
| JEL: | D72 D83 D91 |
| Date: | 2021–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:idb:brikps:11385&r=cdm |
| By: | Blumenthal, Benjamin |
| Abstract: | I consider a series of models of political agency with moral hazard and adverse selection, in which politicians allocate resources to voters. Within these models combining electoral accountability and distributive politics, I ask: is more information good for voters? With homogeneously informed electorates, I first show how and when less information can benefit voters, through the interaction of both partial control and partial screening effects. Building on this mechanism, I subsequently consider heterogeneously informed electorates and ask: how can voters’ welfare be affected by the informational advantage of a few voters? Is it better to be among the more informed few or the less informed many? I show that the ability of more informed voters to communicate with less informed voters and the nature of their informational advantage can play a significant role in affecting voters’ welfare by influencing politicians’ incentives to allocate resources to specific voters |
| Date: | 2022–12–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:r7w4m&r=cdm |
| By: | David Desmarchelier; Thomas Lanzi |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes to adapt a simple disease spread model for political persuasion. More precisely, we observe how a policy presented by a leader prevails into a population divided in two groups: subscribers and resistants. At each date, agents from the two groups meet and influence each other due to the leaderís persuasion force. If the leader's persuasion force dominates (is dominated), then some resistants (subscribers) become subscribers (resistants). Moreover, agents can also change their opinions simply because of the attractive force of each groups (intrinsic attraction). In the long run, it appears that a high attractive force can compensate a lack of persuasion force to ensure that more than half members subscribe to the policy presented by the leader. Such a situation is stable. Conversely, a high persuasion force, when the attractive force of the leader's group is relatively low, can generate the occurrence of a two-period cycle through a flip bifurcation such that the leader looses the majority from a period to another. |
| Keywords: | Flip bifurcation, Opinion dynamics, Political persuasion, SIS models. |
| JEL: | C61 D72 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2022-33&r=cdm |
| By: | Amirapu, Amrit (University of Kent); Clots-Figueras, Irma (University of Kent); Rud, Juan Pablo (Royal Holloway, University of London) |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of extreme temperature shocks on political participation using data from Indian elections between 2009 and 2017. Taking advantage of localized, high-frequency data on land surface temperatures, we find that areas with greater cumulative exposure to extreme temperatures experience an increase in voter turnout and a change in the composition of the pool of candidates who stand for election. As a consequence, electoral outcomes are affected. We provide evidence that our results are driven by the negative effect of climate change on agricultural productivity. First, we show that the results are strongest in areas with a larger rural population. Second, we show that there is a non-monotonic relationship between temperatures and turnout which closely mirrors the relationship between temperatures and agricultural productivity. We also find that, following temperature shocks, winning candidates are more likely to have an agricultural background. Finally, we show that politicians with an agricultural background invest more in irrigation, which mitigates the effects of high temperatures, on both agricultural production and on turnout. Our paper provides new evidence about the ways in which political agents in developing countries (including both voters and candidates) may respond to climate change via political channels. |
| Keywords: | climate change, political economy, voter turnout |
| JEL: | O13 P48 Q54 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15764&r=cdm |
| By: | Mintel, Julina; von Ondarza, Nicolai |
| Abstract: | In the debate on how to strengthen the European Union's (EU) capacity to act, calls for an extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) are growing louder. The Council of the EU is currently discussing using the so-called passerelle clauses in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). With these clauses, more decisions by QMV could be introduced without a major treaty change or a convention. However, abolishing national vetoes in this way would first require unanimity as well as, in some cases, additional national approval procedures. Such unanimity is currently not in sight, as resistance is prevailing in smaller and medium-sized member states, which fear that they could be regularly outvoted. What is needed, therefore, is an institutional reform package in which decisions by QMV are extended with the aim of facilitating further enlargement of the EU and are accompanied by emergency clauses to protect core national interests. |
| Keywords: | EU decisions,qualified majority voting (QMV),passerelle clause,Treaty on European Union (TEU),EU Commission,Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:612022&r=cdm |
| By: | Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UA - Université des Antilles) |
| Abstract: | In committee selection setting, we introduce the Condorcet Loser Committee (CLC) which when it exists, is a committee such that each of its members is defeated in pairwise comparisons by any outside candidate. It turns out that most popular committee selection rules can elect the CLC when it exists. From the perspective of the Condorcet majority criterion, the election of the CLC is simply not acceptable. We identify the few rules that will never elect the CLC when it exists. We show among others that the k-Borda rule is the only k-scoring committee rule that never select the CLC. This also holds with k-iterative Borda rule, Nanson rule, Kemeny rule, Copeland rule. As a corollary, it appeared that the Chamberlin-Courant rule can elect the CLC when it exists. |
| Keywords: | Committee, Condorcet, Scoring, Borda |
| Date: | 2022–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03880064&r=cdm |
| By: | Titeca, Kristof; Malukisa Nkuku, Albert |
| Abstract: | This paper discuss the politics of football in Kinshasa, with a particular focus on the ways this manifested itself during the regime of Joseph Kabila. The literature on the politics of football shows how the sports can play both a hegemonic and counter-hegemonic role: whereas the former primarily happens by financing football clubs, and reputation building for individual politicians; the latter happens through collective action by soccer fans, which – for example through riots – are able to contest political regimes. Similar dynamics play out in Kinshasa. On the one hand, soccer clubs constate an important way to build political capital for the regime(s) in power: many regime politicians involve themselves with soccer clubs, in a way which allows them to improve – or launder – their reputation. This primarily happens through financial support, and was particularly important for the Kabila regime, which was largely unpopular in the capital. On the other hand, football also is a space for political opposition in Kinshasa. For example, in a situation of escalating repression under the Kabila regime, football stadiums offered the possibility to voice opposition to the regime, through the singing of anti-Kabila songs. That being said, this political agency remained confined within a structural context of a much more powerful authoritarian state. |
| Keywords: | Kinshasa, football |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iob:wpaper:2022.07&r=cdm |
| By: | Esen, Berk |
| Abstract: | In a remarkable development for Turkish politics, six opposition parties signed a joint manifesto at a public ceremony on 28 February. The document outlines plans to abolish the executive presidential system and restore rule of law and civil liberties under a "strengthened parliamentary system". The successive concentration of power in President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's hands has culminated in a hyper-presidential system without meaningful institutional checks. The opposition parties are determined to reverse this process by offering the electorate an alternative political platform supported by a single presidential candidate. If their cooperation generates a pre-electoral alliance for the upcoming elections, the opposition camp dubbed the "Table of Six" has a reasonable chance of defeating Erdoğan and his governing bloc. |
| Keywords: | opposition alliance,Turkey,Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,Justice and Development Party (AKP),National Action Party (MHP),presidential elections |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:522022&r=cdm |
| By: | KAWAMURA Kazunori |
| Abstract: | In Japan, elections continue to be held despite the spread of the new coronavirus. Although infection prevention requires the avoidance of the “three Cs†(Closed spaces with poor ventilation, Crowded places, Close-contact settings such as close-range conversations), these circumstances are likely to occur during the electoral process. Most municipal electoral commissions (ECs) have worked on infection prevention and implemented measures for vulnerable voters when conducting elections. This paper, using a mail survey conducted on municipal electoral offices, examines electoral governance in Japan during the COVID-19 pandemic. The survey data shows that 88% of the ECs reviewed the layout of polling stations as a measure to prevent infection in the new Corona disaster. 79% of the ECs called for the use of advance voting in order to avoid congestion. Several ECs also voluntarily implemented measures for vulnerable voters. Special postal ballots for COVID-19 patients were used less frequently. In addition, the study found that most electoral officials were in favor of using digital technology, but were concerned about problems with the equipment and systems. |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:rdpsjp:22040&r=cdm |
| By: | Charles Efferson; Helen Bernhard; Urs Fischbacher; Ernst Fehr |
| Abstract: | Repeated interactions provide a prominent but paradoxical hypothesis for human cooperation in one-shot interactions. Intergroup competitions provide a different hypothesis that is intuitively appealing but heterodox. We show that neither mechanism reliably supports the evolution of cooperation when actions vary continuously. Ambiguous reciprocity, a strategy generally ruled out in models of reciprocal altruism, completely undermines cooperation under repeated interactions, which challenges repeated interactions as a stand-alone explanation for cooperation in both repeated and one-shot settings. Intergroup competitions do not reliably support cooperation because groups tend to be similar under relevant conditions. Moreover, even if groups vary, cooperative groups may lose competitions for several reasons. Although repeated interactions and group competitions do not support cooperation by themselves, combining them often triggers powerful synergies because group competitions can stabilise cooperative strategies against the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a one-shot behavioural experiment in Papua New Guinea fit exactly this pattern. They thus indicate neither an evolutionary history of repeated interactions without group competition nor a history of group competition without repeated interactions. Our results are only consistent with social motives that evolved under the joint influence of both mechanisms together. |
| Keywords: | evolution of cooperation, reciprocity, intergroup competition, social dilemma |
| JEL: | C60 C70 C90 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10133&r=cdm |
| By: | Esen, Berk |
| Abstract: | Millions of Turkish voters are geared up for the twin (parliamentary and presidential) elections that are scheduled to take place in June 2023 at the latest. After nearly 20 years in power, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule may seem unassailable to many observers of Turkish politics. However, owing to the economic downturn and rifts in his ruling party, this will be the first election in which Erdoğan is not the clear favourite. Six opposition parties of different ideological origins have come together to pick a joint presidential candidate to stand against Erdoğan and to offer a common platform for restoring parliamentary democracy. Although the opposition alliance has reasonable chances of defeating Erdoğan's ruling bloc, their victory would not guarantee a smooth process of transition to parliamentary democracy. If the opposition can defeat Erdoğan, the new government would need to undertake the arduous tasks of establishing a meritocratic bureaucracy, restructuring Turkey's diplomatic course and economic policy, and switching back to parliamentary rule. Due to the opposition alliance's diverse composition, accomplishing these goals may be as difficult as winning the elections. |
| Keywords: | Turkey,parliamentary and presidential elections,Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,Justice and Development Party (AKP),Nationalist Movement Party (MHP),Nation Alliance,Future Party (GP),Ahmet Davutoğlu,Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA),Ali Babacan |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:552022&r=cdm |