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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Ennio Bilancini (IMT School for Advanced Studies); Leonardo Boncinelli (University of Florence); Alessandro Tampieri (University of Florence) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the role of strategy assortativity for the evolution of parochial- ism. Individuals belonging to different groups are matched in pairs to play a prisoner dilemma, conditioning their choice on the identity of the partner. Strategy assortativ- ity implies that a player is more likely to be matched with someone playing the same strategy. We find that, if the degree of strategy assortativity is sufficiently high, then parochialism (i.e., cooperate with your own group and defect with others) spreads over a group, while egoism (i.e., defect with everyone) emerges otherwise. Notably, parochialism is more likely to emerge in a smaller group. |
| Keywords: | prisoner dilemma; cooperation; in-group favoritism; cultures; asymptotic stability. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 Z10 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:22-14&r=cdm |
| By: | Matias Iaryczower; Santiago Oliveros; Parth Parihar |
| Abstract: | We study the ability of multi-group teams to undertake binary projects in a decentralized environment. The equilibrium outcomes of our model display familiar features in collaborative settings, including inefficient gradualism, inaction, and contribution cycles, wherein groups alternate taking responsibility for moving the project forward. Expected delay grows more than proportionally with project size, and some welfare-enhancing projects are not completed, even as agents become arbitrarily patient. A team composed of two equally large groups can complete larger projects than a fully homogenous team, even as the difference in preferences for completion among the two groups is arbitrarily small. Moreover, if the project is sufficiently large, the two-group team always completes the project strictly faster. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30656&r=cdm |
| By: | Kärnä, Anders (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Öhberg, Patrik (University of Gothenburg) |
| Abstract: | Normative theories of representative democracy imply that politicians should be better informed of the consequences of a policy than ordinary voters. However, in real life, politicians can have strong convictions that risk blinding them to arguments against their positions. Policy engagement can lead politicians into motivated reasoning whereby they dismiss voters’ preferences and resist information counter to their own policy position. In this paper, we argue that Sweden’s generous migration policy is an example of a case where politicians’ policy engagement led them to motivated reasoning and to a rather optimistic view of the implications of welcoming a large influx of refugees. We show that Swedish politicians favoured a much more generous policy towards accepting refugees than their own voters. Despite limited evidence that a generous refugee policy is economically favourable in the long run, politicians on average held that belief. |
| Keywords: | Political Misrepresentation; Immigration Policy; Moral Psychology; Political Failure |
| JEL: | O15 P16 P35 |
| Date: | 2022–11–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1445&r=cdm |
| By: | Marta Crispino (Bank of Italy); Matteo Alpino (Bank of Italy) |
| Abstract: | Many studies exploit close elections in a regression discontinuity framework to identify partisan effects, i.e. the effect of having a given party in office on the outcome. We argue that, when conducted on single-member districts, such analysis may identify a compound effect: the partisan effect, plus the majority status effect, i.e. the effect of being represented by a member of the legislative majority. We provide a simple strategy to disentangle the two effects, and test it with simulations. Finally, we show the empirical relevance of this issue using real data. |
| Keywords: | partisan effect, single-member districts, regression discontinuity design |
| JEL: | C21 D72 |
| Date: | 2022–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_1391_22&r=cdm |
| By: | Andersson, Tommy (Department of Economics, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | In most real-life binary referendums, there are several alternatives that potentially can challenge the status quo alternative. Depending on which alternative that is selected, the voters are also differently likely to caste their vote on it. The fact that there are several potential challenger alternatives also means that there may exist Condorcet cycles that only can be identified by taking into account the alternatives that not are listed on the ballot. We analyse such "hidden" cycles in a simple theoretical framework where Condorcet cycles cannot exist, but may emerge when taking into account that voters often experience a reluctance to abandon the status quo alternative. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of hidden Condorcet cycles are derived and a Monte Carlo simulation finds (in different scenarios) that the probability is roughly one percent. |
| Keywords: | binary referendum; hidden Condorcet cycles; non-trivial referendums; Monte Carlo study |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2022–11–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2022_020&r=cdm |
| By: | Kolcava, Dennis; Smith, E. Keith; Bernauer, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Effectively governing environmental and social externalities throughout the global economy poses challenges for democratic policy-makers in the court of public opinion. Following the median voter model, as the stringency of policy proposals increases, support rises amongst some citizens and falls amongst others. We argue informational disclosure-based governance presents a potential strategy to mitigate this zero-sum logic as citizens discount policy costs while expecting substantive benefits. We focus on political efforts to increase sustainability throughout global supply chains, drawing on two original survey experiments with representative samples in the 12 largest high-income importing economies (N=24,000). Indeed, at higher levels of policy stringency, citizens expect greater benefits than costs. Further, we find that expected benefits are more strongly associated with support than costs. Lastly, we note how policy stringency promotes convergence of expected benefits across the political ideological spectrum. Hence, our findings provide insights into public preference formation towards the globalization-sustainability nexus. |
| Date: | 2022–11–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:2hez9&r=cdm |
| By: | Raouf Boucekkine (Rennes School of Business); Carmen Camacho (Paris School of Economics & CNRS); Weihua Ruan (Purdue University Northwest); Benteng Zou (Université du Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | We consider a group of players initially members of a coalition managing cooperatively a public bad, in this case, the stock of pollution. Countries are technologically heterogeneous but the pollution damage is uniform. We essentially attempt to characterize the conditions under which a country may eventually split and when it splits within an infinite horizon multi-stage differential game. In contrast to the existing literature, we do not assume that after splitting, the splitting player and the remaining coalition will adopt Markovian strategies. Instead, we assume that the latter will remain committed to the collective control of pollution and play open-loop, while the splitting player plays Markovian. Within a full linear-quadratic model, we characterize the optimal strategies. We later compare with the outcomes of the case where the splitting player and the \remaining" coalition play both Markovian. We highlight several interesting results in terms of the implications for long- term pollution levels and the duration of coalitions with heterogenous strategies. |
| Keywords: | Coalition splitting; environmental agreements; differential games; multistage optimal control, precommitment vs Markovian. |
| JEL: | C61 C73 D71 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:22-13&r=cdm |