nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2022‒11‒28
seven papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Cash Transfers and Voter Turnout By Alexander James; Nathaly Rivera; Brock Smith
  2. Multiparty Democracy in Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO): Evidence from MakerDAO By Xiaotong Sun; Xi Chen; Charalampos Stasinakis; Georgios Sermpinis
  3. The role of information in collective decisions By Nicolás Figueroa; José-Alberto Guerra; Francisco Silva
  4. Group Representation Concerns and Network formation By Melguizo, Isabel
  5. Workplace segregation and electoral success of right wing identity politics in India By Mukherjee, Anirban; Paul, Soham Kumar
  6. Political Regimes, Party Ideological Homogeneity and Polarization By Micael Castanheira; Benoit S Y Crutzen
  7. Shaping inequality? Property rights, landed elites and public lands in Colombia By Juan David Torres

  1. By: Alexander James (Department of Economics, University of Alaska Anchorage); Nathaly Rivera (Department of Economics, University of Chile); Brock Smith (Agricultural Economics and Economics, Montana State University)
    Abstract: We estimate the effect of cash transfers on voter turnout, leveraging a large-scale natural experiment, the Alaska Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) program, which provides residents with a check of varying size one month before election day. We find that transfers cause people to vote, especially in gubernatorial elections in which a 10% increase in cash ($180) causes a 1.4 percentage point increase in turnout. Effects are concentrated among racial minorities, theÊyoung, and poor. There is little evidence that transfers reduce logistical costs of voting, but rather operate by reducing voter apathy among the low-income electorate.
    Keywords: Voter Turnout, Civic Engagement, Cash Transfers, Natural-Field Experiment, Democratic Institutions
    JEL: D72 H31 H70 I38
    Date: 2022–10
  2. By: Xiaotong Sun; Xi Chen; Charalampos Stasinakis; Georgios Sermpinis
    Abstract: Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) provides a decentralized governance solution through blockchain, where decision-making process relies on on-chain voting and follows majority rule. This paper focuses on the most influential DAO, namely MakerDAO, and we find voters fall into different 'voting parties' after applying clustering algorithm to voting history. The significant voting power controlled by voting parties is a signal of governance centralization in DAO, and voting parties have complicated influence on Maker protocol, which is governed by MakerDAO. This paper presents empirical evidence of multiparty democracy in DAO and further contributes to the contemporary debate on whether decentralized governance is possible.
    Date: 2022–10
  3. By: Nicolás Figueroa; José-Alberto Guerra; Francisco Silva
    Abstract: In this paper, we study collective information acquisition in groups that make decisions using majority rule. We argue both theoretically and experimentally that the median voter theorem does not apply; in general, the level of information acquired by the group is not equal to the level of information a median voter would like to acquire individually, despite agents having single peaked preferences over information. We find t hat g roups o veracquire o r underacquire information relative to what would have been predicted by the median voter theorem depending on the levels of disagreemnent among the group members both before and after information is acquired. We also discuss the impact of the failure of the median voter theorem on efficiency.
    Keywords: collective learning, median voter theorem, laboratory experiment
    JEL: D71 D83 C92
    Date: 2022–09–30
  4. By: Melguizo, Isabel
    Abstract: This paper studies processes of integration and segregation using a connections model in which individuals form valuable links that also entail a cost. Individuals belong to two different groups and care about whether their own group represents a sufficient fraction in their neighborhood. Concerns for representation promote the segregation of societies as even for small linking costs individuals do not link to different others because of the threat that their group become under-represented. For certain cost ranges, concerns for representation also determine efficient networks because forming links with members of the opposite group entails a utility loss due to under-representation.
    Keywords: integration, segregation, representation concerns, homophily, welfare, pairwise stability
    JEL: D6 D85 Z13
    Date: 2022–02–08
  5. By: Mukherjee, Anirban (University of Calcutta); Paul, Soham Kumar
    Abstract: In this paper we examine the role of social segregation on the electoral success of the right wing, Hindu nationalist platform in Indian politics. Existing studies have looked at the effect of social segregation on Hindu-Muslim riots and their findings indicate both possibilities; while some studies found segregated societies are more riot prone, some other studies found the opposite. We, using a state level panel data, examine the effect of Hindu-Muslim segregation at the workplace on the vote share for the right wing political party (Bharatiya Janata Party) . We find that workplace segregation in general is positively associated with the right wing vote share. But as proportion of Muslim population increases in a state, the relationship gets reversed.
    Date: 2022–10–21
  6. By: Micael Castanheira (Université Libre de Bruxelles); Benoit S Y Crutzen (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
    Abstract: e develop a model of elections in which parties choose their ideological position and the ideology of their candidates. Tighter candidate selection reduces policy uncertainty for voters. We show that weak institutional constraints, as in a Presidential regime, induce parties to allow their candidates to be ideologically heterogeneous. Tighter constraints or reduced voter polarization induces them to choose an ideologically homogeneous set of candidates. This highlights a multiplier effect of intraparty candidate selection: the parties’ best responses amplify institutional and socio-economic changes. These effects rationalize why mainstream parties look so different across the two sides of the Atlantic. Around the middle of the nineteenth century, when facing similar organizational challenges, parties made opposite choices that still apply to this day: the introduction of direct primaries in the US, which decentralized candidate selection, versus the tightening and centralization of selection in Victorian England.
    Keywords: parties as brands, political regime, intraparty candidate selection, ideology, polarization
    Date: 2022–11–13
  7. By: Juan David Torres
    Abstract: How does the enforcement of property rights affects land accumulation by landed elites? Using a unique classification of the local agricultural workforce and a differencein- difference framework I show how landed elites, relative to landless peasants, benefited from Colombian land reform during the late 1930s through the appropriation of large land allocations. This is explained by a feature of the reform: lower enforcement of property rights, which reduced the costs of further accumulation. I provide evidence on the elite investments in de facto political power that drive this empowerment: competition for resources in local elections and collective action embodied in landowner associations. This, in a context of tension between good-intended progressive policies and a general process of collective action pushed forward by landowners toward the defense of property, in which commitments for targeted democratization of land were hardly accomplished. My findings shed light on a possible equilibrium between democracy and high inequality in which economic elites exploit institutional features empowering themselves to preserve certainty regarding their own property rights.
    Keywords: Land reform, property rights, public land allocations, landed elites, collective action
    JEL: P48 N56 D72
    Date: 2022–10–26

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