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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Benoit S Y Crutzen (Erasmus University Rotterdam); Nicolas Sahuguet (HEC Montréal) |
| Abstract: | Politicians respond to incentives when they decide how to allocate their campaigning time and effort. The literature suggests electoral rules impact politicians’ incentives. We argue that the candidate selection process is an equally important source of incentives. We develop a two-stage model in which parties select candidates before the election. Elections are under first past the post (FPTP) or closed list proportional representation (PR). Selection is competitive or non-competitive. When selection is not competitive, effort is higher under FPTP. With competitive selection, effort is higher under PR as, under PR, competition motivates candidates to exert effort to be selected(as under FPTP) and to be ranked higher on the list. The results point to a causal relationship between electoral rules and how parties porganize. They suggest empirical studies comparing electoral rules should consider how parties organize. |
| Keywords: | electoral rule, candidate selection process, moral hazard |
| Date: | 2022–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20220073&r= |
| By: | Simone Moriconi; Giovanni Peri; Riccardo Turati |
| Abstract: | We analyze whether second-generation immigrants have different political preferences relative to observationally identical children of citizens in the host countries. Using data on individual voting behavior in 22 European countries between 2001 and 2017, we characterize each vote on a left-right scale based on the ideological and policy positions of the party receiving the vote. In the first part of the paper, we characterize the size of the "left-wing bias" in the vote of second-generation immigrants after controlling for a large set of individual characteristics and origin and destination country fixed effects. We find a significant left-wing bias of second-generation immigrants, comparable in magnitude to the left-wing bias associated with living in urban (rather than rural) areas. We then show that this left-wing bias is associated with stronger preferences for inequality-reducing government intervention, internationalism and multiculturalism. We do not find that second-generation immigrants are biased towards or away from populist political agendas. |
| JEL: | J61 P16 Z1 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30523&r= |
| By: | Edda Torsdatter Solbakken (Statistics Norway) |
| Abstract: | Previous literature has found that extending the suffrage to both females and poorer voters increases the supply of public goods. This paper investigates whether the difference in voting between men and women can be explained by differences in income alone, or if there exist gender specific differences in preferences. I exploit two key features of the expansion of suffrage in municipality elections in early 20th century Norway. First, the time at which people gained the right to vote depended on both their gender and their household income. Second, the income threshold for suffrage was set nationally, creating variation across municipalities in the share of new voters following each extension of the suffrage. This variation allows me to estimate separate effects for the change in supply of health personnel following the extension of suffrage to poor men, rich women, and poor women, respectively. I find that the enfranchisement of both poor men and rich women increases the supply of doctors relative to when only rich men had the right to vote. These results are consistent with gender specific preferences for health services to the community. |
| Keywords: | Enfranchisement; women’s suffrage; public goods; welfare state |
| JEL: | P16 H42 D72 J16 N24 N44 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssb:dispap:988&r= |
| By: | Felix Kersting (HU Berlin) |
| Abstract: | Can autocratic governments gain support by implementing a welfare reform and a repressive law? This paper studies a famous case – Bismarck’s policies of social insurance and the antisocialist law in late 19th century Germany. The socialist party, I find, increases its vote share in constituencies more affected by Bismarck’s policies. For identification, I exploit local and industry-specific variation in treatment intensity due to ex-ante existing local healthcare and detailed lists on forbidden socialist organizations. This variation allows me to use a flexible difference-in-differences as well as a shift-share approach. As mechanisms, I highlight that the socialist party evaded the repression by reallocating their activity and gained from the social insurance by claiming the credits for the welfare reform and providing a local cooperative alternative. |
| Keywords: | welfare reform, repression, social democracy, opposition, voting, autocracy |
| JEL: | D74 N44 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hes:wpaper:0227&r= |
| By: | Cipullo, Davide (Universit`a Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Reslow, André (Payments Department, Central Bank of Sweden) |
| Abstract: | This paper documents the existence of electoral cycles in GDP growth forecasts released by governments. In a theoretical model of political selection, we show that governments release overly optimistic GDP growth forecasts ahead of elections to increase the reelection probability. The bias arises from lack of commitment if voters are rational and from manipulation of voters’ beliefs if they do not expect the incumbent to be biased. Using high-frequency forecaster-level data from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Sweden, we document that governments overestimate short-term real GDP growth by 0.1–0.3 percentage points. |
| Keywords: | Electoral Cycles; Political Selection; Voting; Macroeconomic Forecasting |
| JEL: | D72 D82 E37 H68 |
| Date: | 2022–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0415&r= |