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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Umut Keskin (Istanbul Bilgi University); M. Remzi Sanver (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); H. Berkay Tosunlu (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | A voting rule is monotonic if a winning candidate never becomes a loser by being raised in voters' rankings of candidates, ceteris paribus. Plurality with a runoff is known to fail monotonicity. To see how widespread this failure is, we focus on French presidential elections since 1965. We identify mathematical conditions that allow a logically conceivable scenario of vote shifts between candidates that may lead to a monotonicity violation. We show that eight among the ten elections held since 1965 (those in 1965 and 1974 being the exceptions) exhibit this theoretical vulnerability. To be sure, the conceived scenario of vote shifts that enables a monotonicity violation may not be plausible under the political context of the considered election. Thus, we analyze the political landscape of these eight elections and argue that for two of them (2002 and 2007 elections), the monotonicity violation scenario was plausible within the conjuncture of the time. |
| Keywords: | French presidential elections,plurality with a runoff,monotonicity |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03767264&r= |
| By: | Niclas Boehmer; Robert Bredereck; Piotr Faliszewski; Rolf Niedermeier |
| Abstract: | Contributing to the toolbox for interpreting election results, we evaluate the robustness of election winners to random noise. We compare the robustness of different voting rules and evaluate the robustness of real-world election winners from the Formula 1 World Championship and some variant of political elections. We find many instances of elections that have very non-robust winners and numerous delicate robustness patterns that cannot be identified using classical and simpler approaches. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2208.13760&r= |
| By: | Mariam Sy (MARBEC); Charles Figuières (Axi-Marseille Université, AMSE); Hélène Rey-Valette (Université de Montpellier, CEE-M); Richard Howarth (Dartmouth College, Environmental Program); Rutger De Wit (CNRS, MARBEC) |
| Abstract: | This paper describes an empiric study of aggregation and deliberation – used during citizens' workshops – for the elicitation of collective preferences over 20 different ecosystem services (ESs) delivered by the Palavas coastal lagoons located on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea close to Montpellier (S. France). The impact of deliberation is apprehended by comparing the collectives preferences constructed with and without deliberation. The same aggregation rules were used before and after deliberation. We compared two different aggregation methods, i.e. Rapid Ecosystem Services Participatory Appraisal (RESPA) and Majority Judgement (MJ). RESPA had been specifically tested for ESs, while MJ evaluates the merit of each item, an ES in our case, in a predefined ordinal scale of judgment. The impact of deliberation was strongest for the RESPA method. This new information acquired from application of social choice theory is particularly useful for ecological economics studying ES, and more practically for the development of deliberative approaches for public policies. |
| Keywords: | Services écosytémiques, Délibération, Agrégation, , |
| JEL: | Q57 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fae:wpaper:2022.05&r= |
| By: | Baskaran, Thushyanthan (University of Siegen); Hessami, Zohal (Ruhr University Bochum); Khasanboev, Temurbek (Ruhr University Bochum) |
| Abstract: | Do voters place their trust in tried and tested leaders when uncertainty is high or do they prefer a new slate of leaders who are arguably more competent? To study this question, we make use of hand-collected data on 402,385 candidates who competed in open-list local council elections (1996-2020) in Bavaria. The 2020 elections took place at the dawn of the Covid-19 pandemic, a time of high uncertainty about the future course of events. Using local heterogeneity in Covid-19 outbreaks and related school/daycare closures to proxy the degree of perceived uncertainty across Bavarian municipalities, we show with a difference-in-differences design that councilors' incumbency advantage declined more in exposed municipalities. This decrease in the incumbency advantage is limited to male and non- university educated incumbents, resulting in shifted patterns of political selection. Overall, we conclude that voters select more competent politicians when they face uncertainty about the future. |
| Keywords: | political selection, council elections, incumbency, Bavaria, COVID-19, uncertainty |
| JEL: | D72 D78 H70 J13 J16 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15509&r= |
| By: | KAMEI Kenju |
| Abstract: | This study conducts a novel laboratory experiment that shows, for the first time, that the state of people’s self-regulatory resources influences their reliance on the formal enforcement of norms in a social dilemma. The experimental subjects’ self-regulatory resources are rigorously manipulated using well-known depletion tasks. On the one hand, when their resources are not depleted, most decide to govern themselves through monitoring and decentralized, peer-to-peer punishment in a public goods dilemma, and then successfully achieve high cooperation norms. On the other hand, when the amount of their resources is limited, the majority vote to enact a costly formal sanctioning institution and then construct deterrent punishment toward free riders; backed by formal punishment, groups achieve strong cooperation. A supplementary survey on the Covid-19 pandemic was conducted to enhance the external validity of the findings, generating a similar pattern. Self-control and commitment preference theories, combined with inequity aversion, can explain these patterns, because they predict that those with limited self-regulatory resources are motivated to remove temptations in advance as a commitment device, thus avoiding a large self-control cost. This underscores the role of commitment in the context of a social dilemma. |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:22084&r= |
| By: | Zilla, Claudia |
| Abstract: | In their Coalition Agreement 2021-2025, the parties that form the current German government agreed to pursue a "Feminist Foreign Policy" (FFP). The German Foreign Office is now committed to do so, while the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development seeks to pursue a "feminist development policy". FFP will also be a discussion topic in Germany's first National Security Strategy. Germany is thus following a trend, as ever more governments commit to FFP or at least seek to realise certain elements. Yet what the FFP approach actually means in theory and practice remains vague and contentious: what preconditions it requires, in what contexts it applies and what implications it involves. This openness provokes debates across politics, civil society and academia. Although the national implementations of FFP only very partially realised feminist demands, the mere fact of official policy referencing feminism challenges traditional ways of thinking and political patterns, encourages reassessment of political priorities and their coherence, and can potentially promote political innovation. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:482022&r= |
| By: | Gilli, Mario; Giorgini, Filippo |
| Abstract: | Citizens political participation to protests is a crucial issue for any political system, whether democratic or autocratic. Political systems have different ways of dealing with citizens’ protests, determining cost and benefit of public dissent, responding to public requests and allowing different degree of transparency in public information. Also the social characteristics of a country, such as citizens’ diversity and radicalization, matter for citizens political participation. The aim of this paper is to analyze causes and consequences of citizens’ protests, focusing on how private and public information affect citizens’ opinion and political behavior, and on how they depend on sociopolitical factors as well as on the political regime. In Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs, Bueno de Mesquita proposed a seminal model to study why revolutionary vanguards might use violence to mobilize citizens against a regime. We claim that the model can be used more generally to investigate citizens’ protest. We refer to his model to understand citizens’ political behavior, studying the relationship between the model’s structural parameters and the causes and consequences of citizens’protests, adopting a partially different approach and extending his results. |
| Keywords: | Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods |
| Date: | 2022–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemwp:324668&r= |
| By: | Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham); Starmer, Chris (University of Nottingham); Tufano, Fabio (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We introduce "group cohesion" to study the economic relevance of social relationships in team production. We operationalize measurement of group cohesion, adapting the "oneness scale" from psychology. A series of experiments, including a pre-registered replication, reveals strong positive associations between group cohesion and performance assessed in weak-link coordination games, with high-cohesion groups being very likely to achieve superior equilibria. In exploratory analysis, we identify beliefs rather than social preferences as the primary mechanism through which factors proxied by group cohesion influence group performance. Our evidence provides proof-of-concept for group cohesion as a useful tool for economic research and practice. |
| Keywords: | social relationships, group cohesion, oneness, coordination, weak-link game, experiments, real groups |
| JEL: | C92 D91 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15512&r= |
| By: | Jäger, Simon (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Noy, Shakked (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Schoefer, Benjamin (University of California, Berkeley) |
| Abstract: | We give an overview of the "German model" of industrial relations. We organize our review by focusing on the two pillars of the model: sectoral collective bargaining and firm-level codetermination. Relative to the United States, Germany outsources collective bargaining to the sectoral level, resulting in higher coverage and the avoidance of firm-level distributional conflict. Relative to other European countries, Germany makes it easy for employers to avoid coverage or use flexibility provisions to deviate downwards from collective agreements. The greater flexibility of the German system may reduce unemployment, but may also erode bargaining coverage and increase inequality. Meanwhile, firm-level codetermination through worker board representation and works councils creates cooperative dialogue between employers and workers. Board representation has few direct impacts owing to worker representatives' minority vote share, but works councils, which hold a range of substantive powers, may be more impactful. Overall, the German model highlights tensions between efficiency-enhancing flexibility and equity-enhancing collective action. |
| Keywords: | unions, bargaining, industrial relations, codetermination, Germany |
| JEL: | J5 J4 |
| Date: | 2022–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15500&r= |