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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Jean-Victor Alipour; Valentin Lindlacher |
| Abstract: | We study how shocks to voting costs affect electoral turnout. Individuals whose polling place is relocated face changes to their cost of voting in person due to altered distance and unfamiliarity with the new polling place. Using address-level and precinct-level data, we find that polling place relocations depress turnout by 0.5–0.6 percentage points (p.p.): in-person turnout declines by 0.8–1.1 p.p. and is only partly compensated by a 0.3–0.5 p.p. increase in mail-in voting. However, the drop in turnout is only transitory as mail-in votes balance the decline in in-person votes in subsequent elections. This finding is consistent with inattentiveness to relocations, causing individuals to miss the deadline for requesting mail-in ballots. Some inattentive voters forgo voting today but turn to mail-in voting in ensuing elections. Our results are in line with rational choice models of voting and incompatible with the hypothesis that voting is habit forming. |
| Keywords: | voter turnout, habit formation, elections, election administration, precincts, polling places |
| JEL: | D72 D73 D83 R41 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9759&r= |
| By: | Franz Dietrich (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Paris School of Economics, CNRS); Kai Spiekermann (London School of Economics (LSE)) |
| Abstract: | Does pre-voting group deliberation increase majority competence? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Simulations and theoretic arguments confirm this. But there are five systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing failure (1). Our analysis recommends deliberation that is 'participatory', 'even', but possibly 'unequal', i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but possibly privileges some persons |
| Keywords: | jury theorems; group deliberation; social choice theory; majority voting |
| JEL: | D70 D71 D8 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mse:cesdoc:22011&r= |
| By: | Huihui Ding (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université); Marcus Pivato (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université) |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of deliberation on epistemic social choice, in two settings. In the first setting, the group faces a binary epistemic decision analogous to the Condorcet Jury Theorem. In the second setting, group members have probabilistic beliefs arising from their private information, and the group wants to aggregate these beliefs in a way that makes optimal use of this information. During deliberation, each agent discloses private information to persuade the other agents of her current views. But her views may also evolve over time, as she learns from other agents. This process will improve the performance of the group, but only under certain conditions; these involve the nature of the social decision rule, the group size, and also the presence of "neutral agents" whom the other agents try to persuade. |
| Keywords: | Multiplicative pooling,Probabilistic belief aggregation,Condorcet Jury Theorem,Epistemic social choice,Deliberation |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03637874&r= |
| By: | Zilla, Claudia |
| Abstract: | Regional and local elections are to be held in Venezuela on 21 November. After several years of election boycotts opposition forces are taking part in the elections again. In addition, since August this year they have participated in a dialogue with envoys of President Nicolás Maduro in Mexico. While many Venezuelans are struggling to merely survive, the two conflict parties are seeking to extend their room for manoeuvre. The international community should support the dialogue and election process and dose pressure on and incentives for the Maduro regime giving priority to the needs of society. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:542021&r= |
| By: | Serrano-Alarcon, Manuel; Mckee, Martin; wang, Yuxi; Kentikelenis, Alexander; Stuckler, David |
| Abstract: | Far-right politicians in several countries have been vocal opponents of COVID-19 vaccination. But does this matter? We take advantage of repeated cross-sectional surveys with samples of around 3,800 individuals across Spain conducted monthly from December 2020 to January 2022 (n = 51,294) to examine any association between far-right politics and vaccine hesitancy. Consistent with prior data, we found that far-right supporters were almost twice as likely to be vaccine-hesitant than the overall population in December 2020, before vaccines became available. However, with a successful vaccine roll out, this difference shrank, reaching non-significance by September 2021. From October 2021, however, vaccine hesitancy rebounded among this group at a time when the leadership of the far-right promoted a “freedom of choice” discourse common among anti-vax supporters. By the latest month analyzed (January 2022) far-right voters had returned to being twice as likely to be vaccine-hesitant and 7 percentage points less likely to be vaccinated than the general population. Our results are consistent with evidence that far-right politicians can encourage vaccine hesitancy. Nonetheless, we show that public attitudes towards vaccination are not immutable. Whereas a rapid and effective vaccine rollout can help to overcome the resistance of far-right voters to get vaccinated, they also seem to be susceptible to their party leader's discourse on vaccines. |
| Date: | 2022–04–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:cvq78&r= |
| By: | Baranski, Andrzej; Geraldes, Diogo; Kovaliukaite, Ada; Tremewan, James |
| Abstract: | Women are underrepresented in political and business decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. First, we find that inclusive splits and unanimous agreement rates are highest in all-female groups and lowest in all-male groups suggesting that female representation increases fairness. Second, we document a robust gender gap in earnings, driven largely by the exclusion of women from coalitions rather than differential shares within coalitions. Interestingly, we find that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes: While gender-biased outcomes are sometimes caused by outright discrimination, they can also be driven by more complex dynamics related to gender differences in bargaining strategies. These different dynamics manifest in mixed-gender coalitions being less stable when the excluded party is male rather than female. |
| Keywords: | multilateral bargaining, gender gap, lab experiment |
| JEL: | C72 J16 J31 |
| Date: | 2022–04–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113063&r= |
| By: | Berno Buechel (University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science); Lydia Mechtenberg (University of Hamburg); Alexander F. Wagner (University of Zurich - Department of Banking and Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swiss Finance Institute) |
| Abstract: | There is an ongoing debate about how proxy advisory firms affect corporate decisions. A major concern is that shareholders seeking to save costs use a proxy advisor's vote recommendation as substitute for own research, thereby reducing efficiency of shareholder decision-making. We show that the opposite effect -- complementarity between a proxy advisor's recommendation and shareholders' research effort -- occurs if two conditions are met: (i) the board of directors is sufficiently well informed; and (ii) shareholders can condition their investment in research on the proxy advisor's recommendation. Then, a proxy advisor with information quality sufficiently close to that of the board's strictly improves corporate decisions, while a proxy advisor with a more diverging information quality leaves corporate decisions unaffected. |
| Keywords: | Proxy advisors, strategic voting |
| JEL: | G23 D72 D83 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2247&r= |