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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - UA - Université des Antilles - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Preference Approval Voting (PAV) and Fallback Voting (FV) are two voting rules that combine approval and preferences. They were first introduced by Brams and Sanver (2009). Under PAV, voters rank the candidates and indicate which ones they approve of; with FV, they rank only those candidates they approve of. In this paper, we supplement the work of Brams and Sanver (2009) by exploring some other normative properties of FV and PAV. We show among other that FV and PAV satisfy and fail the same criteria; they possess two properties that AV does not: Pareto optimality and the fact of always electing the absolute Condorcet winner when he exists. For threecandidate elections and a very large electorate, we compare FV and PAV to other voting rules by evaluating the probabilities of satisfying the Condorcet majority criteria. We find that PAV performs better than the Borda rule. We also find that in terms of agreement, FV and PAV are closer to scoring rules than to Approval voting. Our analysis is performed under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption. |
| Keywords: | Approval Voting,Rankings,Condorcet,Properties,Impartial and Anonymous Culture |
| Date: | 2022–03–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03614585&r= |
| By: | Balles, Patrick (University of Basel); Matter, Ulrich (University of Basel); Stutzer, Alois (University of Basel) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the role of local TV market structure in US congressional politics, exploiting variation in the overlaps of political markets and TV markets. Local TV stations are hypothesized to report relatively more per US House representative in less populous markets (where the number of House districts covered is smaller), leading to better informed voters and more accountable representatives. We find that smaller markets are indeed associated with (i) higher coverage of representatives, and (ii) a higher level of voters' knowledge about their representatives. However, (iii) representatives of smaller and more congruent markets are only more likely to decide aligned with their constituents' policy preferences in highly competitive districts. This evidence suggests that local political news coverage on TV serves as a complement rather than a substitute in holding members of the US Congress accountable. |
| Keywords: | political accountability, market congruence, media coverage, TV markets, legislative voting, US Congress, voter knowledge, campaign finance |
| JEL: | D72 L82 |
| Date: | 2022–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15277&r= |
| By: | Ahmad Awde (FEMTO-ST - Franche-Comté Électronique Mécanique, Thermique et Optique - Sciences et Technologies (UMR 6174) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] - ENSMM - Ecole Nationale Supérieure de Mécanique et des Microtechniques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UTBM - Université de Technologie de Belfort-Montbeliard); Mostapha Diss (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]); Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - UA - Université des Antilles - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Julien Yves Rolland (LMB - Laboratoire de Mathématiques de Besançon (UMR 6623) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE] - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UB - Université de Bourgogne); Abdelmonaim Tlidi (MAE2D - Laboratory MAE2D, University of Abdelmalek Essaadi) |
| Abstract: | A candidate is said to be socially acceptable if the number of voters who rank her among the most preferred half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her among the least preferred half (Mahajne and Volij, 2018). For every voting profile, there always exists at least one socially acceptable candidate. This candidate may not be elected by some well-known voting rules, which may even lead in some cases to the election of a socially unacceptable candidate, the latter being a candidate such that the number of voters who rank her among the most preferred half of the candidates is strictly less than the number of voters who rank her among the least preferred half. In this paper, our contribution is twofold. First, since the existence of a socially unacceptable candidate is not always guaranteed, we determine the probabilities of the existence of such a candidate. Then, we evaluate how often the Plurality rule, the Negative Plurality rule, the Borda rule and their two-round versions can elect a socially unacceptable candidate. We perform our calculations under both the Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Culture, |
| Keywords: | Voting,Social Unacceptability,Scoring Rules,Probability |
| Date: | 2022–03–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03614587&r= |
| By: | Matias Iaryczower; Santiago Oliveros |
| Abstract: | We consider dynamic processes of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics and politics, including a lobbyist seeking to pass a bill, an entrepreneur setting up a start-up, or a firm seeking the approval of corrupt bureaucrats. We show that when the principal’s willingness to pay is high, strengthening the bargaining position of the agents generates delay and reduces agents’ welfare. This occurs in spite of the lack of informational asymmetries or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents prefer to give up considerable bargaining power in favor of the principal. |
| JEL: | C78 D7 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29984&r= |
| By: | Benjamin Enke; Mattias Polborn; Alex Wu |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a theory of political behavior in which moral values are a luxury good: the relative weight that voters place on moral rather than material considerations increases in income. This idea both generates new testable implications and ties together a broad set of empirical regularities about political polarization in the U.S. The model predicts (i) the emergence of economically left-wing elites; (ii) that more rich than poor people vote against their material interests; (iii) that within-party heterogeneity is larger among Democrats than Republicans; and (iv) widely-discussed realignment patterns: rich moral liberals who swing Democrat, and poor moral conservatives who swing Republican. Assuming that parties set policies by aggregating their supporters’ preferences, the model also predicts increasing social party polarization over time, such that poor moral conservatives swing Republican even though their relative incomes decreased. We relate these predictions to known stylized facts, and test our new predictions empirically. |
| JEL: | D03 D72 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:30001&r= |
| By: | Stephan A. Schneider; Sven Kunze |
| Abstract: | Allocation decisions are vulnerable to political influence, but it is unclear in which situations politicians use their discretionary power in a partisan manner. We analyze the allocation of presidential disaster declarations in the United States, exploiting the spatiotemporal randomness of hurricane strikes from 1965–2018 along with changes in political alignment. We show that decisions are not biased when disasters are unambiguously strong or weak. Only in ambiguous situations, after medium-intensity hurricanes, do areas governed by presidents’ co-partisans receive up to twice as many declarations. This political bias explains 10 percent of total relief spending, totaling USD 450 million per year. |
| Keywords: | disaster relief, distributive politics, hurricanes, natural disasters, nonlinearity, party alignment, political favouritism, political economy, situational ambiguity |
| JEL: | D72 H30 H84 P16 Q54 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9710&r= |
| By: | Bouke Klein Teeselink; Georgios Melios |
| Abstract: | Do mass mobilizations bring about social change? This paper investigates the impact of the Black Lives Matter protests that erupted after George Floyd’s death on the 2020 presidential election. Using local precipitation as an exogenous source of protest variation, we document a marked shift in support for the Democratic candidate in counties that experienced more protesting activity. We use a spatial two-stage least squares estimator, and show that conventional TSLS estimators overestimate the effect size by a factor three. Ancillary analyses show that the effect cannot be explained by changes in turnout. Instead, protests shifted people’s attitudes about racial disparities. |
| Keywords: | Collective Action; Black Lives Matter; Presidential Elections; Protests; IV |
| JEL: | D72 J15 |
| Date: | 2022–05–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/343818&r= |
| By: | Raouf Boucekkine (Rennes School of Business); Carmen Camacho (Paris School of Economics & CNRS); Weihua Ruan (Purdue University Northwest); Benteng Zou (DEM, Université du Luxembourg) |
| Abstract: | We use a parsimonious two-stage differential game setting where the duration of the first stage, the coalition stage, depends on the will of a particular player to leave the coalition through an explicit timing variable. By specializing in a standard linear-quadratic environmental model augmented with a minimal constitutional setting for the coalition (payoff share parameter), we are able to analytically extract several nontrivial findings. Three key aspects drive the results: the technological gap as an indicator of heterogeneity across players, the constitution of the coalition and the intensity of the public bad (here, the pollution damage). We provide with a full analytical solution to the two-stage differential game. In particular, we characterize the intermediate parametric cases leading to optimal nite time splitting. A key characteristic of these nite-time-lived coalitions is the requirement of the payoff share accruing to the splitting country to be large enough. Incidentally, our two-stage differential game setting reaches the conclusion that splitting countries are precisely those which use to benefit the most from the coalition. Constraining the payoff share to be low by Constitution may lead to optimal everlasting coalitions only provided initial pollution is high enough, which may cover the emergency cases we are witnessing nowadays. |
| Keywords: | Coalition splitting ; multistage optimal control ; differential game |
| JEL: | C61 C73 D71 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:luc:wpaper:22-05&r= |