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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju; Tabero, Katy |
| Abstract: | Teams are known to be more cognitively able, and accordingly behave more efficiently, than individuals. This paper provides the first experimental evidence of the so-called “individual-team discontinuity effect” in an institutional setting. In a finitely repeated public goods game where sanctioning institutions are available, teams sustain cooperation surprisingly better than individuals. The superiority of teams is driven by their effective use of punishment. Given an opportunity to construct a formal sanction scheme in their groups, teams enact deterrent schemes by voting much more frequently than individuals. When peer-to-peer punishment is possible, teams inflict costly punishment more frequently on low contributors than individuals, thereby reducing the relative frequency of “misdirected” punishment among teams. These results underscore the effectiveness of having teams as a decision-making unit in organizations in mitigating collective action dilemmas. |
| Keywords: | institution, public goods, experiment, punishment, discontinuity effect |
| JEL: | C92 D02 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2021–11–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:112106&r= |
| By: | De Groote, Olivier; Gautier, Axel; Verboven, Frank |
| Abstract: | We analyze the political impact of a generous solar panel subsidization program. Subsidies far exceeded their social benefit and were partly financed by new taxes to adopters and by electricity surcharges to all consumers. We use local panel data from Belgium and find a decrease in votes for government parties in municipalities with high adoption rates. This shows that the voters’ punishment for a costly policy exceeded a potential reward by adopters who received the generous subsidies. Further analysis indicates that punishment mainly comes from non-adopters, who change their vote towards anti-establishment parties. |
| Keywords: | financing climate policy; photovoltaic systems; retrospective voting, buying votes |
| JEL: | C23 D72 H23 Q48 |
| Date: | 2022–04–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:126863&r= |
| By: | Nikolaj Broberg; Vincent Pons; Clemence Tricaud |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of campaign finance rules on electoral outcomes. In French departmental and municipal elections, candidates competing in districts above 9,000 inhabitants face spending limits and are eligible for public reimbursement if they obtain more than five percent of the votes. Using an RDD around the population threshold, we find that these rules increase competitiveness and benefit the runner-up of the previous race as well as new candidates, in departmental elections, while leaving the polarization and representativeness of the results unaffected. Incumbents are less likely to get reelected because they are less likely to run and obtain a lower vote share, conditional on running. These results appear to be driven by the reimbursement of campaign expenditures, not spending limits. We do not find such effects in municipal elections, which we attribute to the use of a proportional list system instead of plurality voting. |
| JEL: | D72 K16 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29805&r= |
| By: | Anselm Hager (Humboldt University); Lukas Hensel (Guanghua School of Management); Johannes Hermle (University of California, Berkeley and IZA); Christopher Roth (University of Cologne, ECONtribute, briq, CESifo, Cage) |
| Abstract: | How does a citizen’s decision to participate in political activism depend on the partic-ipation of others? We conduct a nationwide natural field experiment in collaboration with a major European party during a recent national election. In a party survey, we randomly provide canvassers with true information about the canvassing intentions of their peers. When learning that more peers participate in canvassing than previously believed, canvassers significantly reduce both their canvassing intentions and behavior. An additional survey among party supporters underscores the importance of free-riding motives and reveals that there is strong heterogeneity in motives underlying supporters’ behavioral responses. |
| Keywords: | Political activism, natural field experiment, strategic behavior, beliefs, motives |
| JEL: | D8 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:158&r= |
| By: | Doleac, Jennifer (Texas A&M University); Eckhouse, Laurel (Metropolitan State University of Denver); Foster-Moore, Eric (Metropolitan State University of Denver); Harris, Allison (Yale University); Walker, Hannah (University of Texas at Austin); White, Ariel (MIT) |
| Abstract: | Millions of people in the US are eligible to vote despite past criminal convictions, but their voter participation rates are extraordinarily low. In this study, we report the results of a series of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of mail-based interventions aimed at encouraging people with criminal records to register to vote in North Carolina. We use a novel approach to identify and contact this population, using a combination of administrative data and data from a commercial vendor. In our main experiment, conducted in the fall of 2020, we find that, on average, our mailers increased voter registration by 0.8 percentage points (12%), and voter turnout in the general election by 0.5 percentage points (11%). By contrast, our treatment has no effect on a comparison group of people without criminal records who live in the same neighborhoods. We find suggestive evidence that treatment effects vary across demographic groups and with the content of mailers. For instance, effects were smaller for Black recipients, and smaller when extra "civil rights framing"cwas added to the mailer text. Overall, we demonstrate that it is possible to identify, contact, and mobilize a marginalized group that is not effectively targeted by existing outreach efforts. Our results speak to how organizations can increase voter registration and turnout among people with criminal records, without necessarily changing laws to broaden eligibility. |
| Keywords: | criminal justice reform, civic engagement, voting, crime |
| JEL: | K42 K16 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15121&r= |
| By: | François Facchini (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | This article is an update and extension of the electoral forecasting model of Lafay, Facchini and Auberger (2007) for the French presidential elections of 2022. Lafay and al. argued that the Socialist Party's rating was a good way to predict the vote split in the second round of elections between the left and the right. Socialist Pary's rating, nonetheless, cannot explain Emmanuel Macron's victory in the 2017 elections. This does not mean that party ratings are not a good predictor of the 2022 elections, if a number of adjustments are made. Based on party ratings the indicators proposed in this article argue that the scores in the first round of the April 2022 elections should be as follows: 30.5% for Emmanuel Macron, 22.7% for Valérie Pécresse (all the candidates of right wing), 18,7% for Marine Le Pen and 24.7% for the left and far left. The second round Macron - Pécresse is favorable to Emmanuel Macron, but depends fundamentally on the vote transfers between the left and the outgoing President. If the left abstains and Marine Le Pen's election rallies to the candidate of the right (LR), then Valérie Pécresse can win with a score of 51% against 49%. |
| Date: | 2022–03–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-03624729&r= |