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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Lockwood, Ben (University of Warwick); Le, Minh (University of Warwick); Rockey, James (University of Birmingham) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the implications of voter loss-aversion and imperfect recall for the dynamics of electoral competition in a simple Downsian model of repeated elections. We first establish a benchmark result: when the voters’ reference point is forward-looking, there are a continuum of rational expectations equilibria (REE). When voters are backward-looking i.e. the reference point is last period’s recalled policy, interesting dynamics only emerge when voters have imperfect recall about that policy. Then, the interplay between the median voter’s reference point and political parties’ choice of platforms generates a dynamic process of polarization (or de-polarization). Under the assumption that parties are risk-neutral, platforms monotonically converge over time to a long-run equilibrium, which is always a REE. When parties are risk-averse, dynamic incentives also come into play, and generally lead to more policy moderation, resulting in equilibria that are more moderate than the most moderate REE JEL Classification: D72 ; D81 |
| Keywords: | electoral competition ; repeated elections ; loss-aversion ; imperfect recall ; advantage |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1399&r= |
| By: | Youssef Allouah; Rachid Guerraoui; L\^e-Nguy\^en Hoang; Oscar Villemaud |
| Abstract: | Many modern Internet applications, like content moderation and recommendation on social media, require reviewing and score a large number of alternatives. In such a context, the voting can only be sparse, as the number of alternatives is too large for any individual to review a significant fraction of all of them. Moreover, in critical applications, malicious players might seek to hack the voting process by entering dishonest reviews or creating fake accounts. Classical voting methods are unfit for this task, as they usually (a) require each reviewer to assess all available alternatives and (b) can be easily manipulated by malicious players. This paper defines precisely the problem of robust sparse voting, highlights its underlying technical challenges, and presents Mehestan, a novel voting mechanism that solves the problem. Namely, we prove that by using Mehestan, no (malicious) voter can have more than a small parametrizable effect on each alternative's score, and we identify conditions of voters comparability under which any unanimous preferences can be recovered, even when these preferences are expressed by voters on very different scales. |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.08656&r= |
| By: | Kara Reynolds |
| Abstract: | The recent backlash against globalization is often tied to the rise in populism over the past decade. This paper studies the degree to which an increase in populist rhetoric on the part of nation’s leaders can increase the support for trade protection among constituents using data from the International Social Survey Program’s (ISSP) National Identity module and the Global Populism Database between 1995 and 2013. I find evidence that support for protection does increase with the level of leftward-leaning populist rhetoric, or that which focuses on economic cleavages in society, by the country’s leaders. As one might expect, this increase in support is particularly strong among voters that identify with political parties on the left. |
| Keywords: | Populism, Trade Preferences |
| JEL: | F13 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2022-03&r= |
| By: | JOE, Dong-Hee (KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP)) |
| Abstract: | Even while we are suffering from the COVID-19 pandemic, cyclical events arrive mercilessly as scheduled. While some of them are held virtually (i.e., online), some cannot be completely virtualized, at least as of now, including national elections. A major risk in holding an election during a pandemic is the increase of contagion due to the gathering of people in polling stations and campaign events. The opposite direction of causality, that is, from contagion to voter turnout, is another serious, but much less recognized, risk, because voters may refrain from voting due to health concerns. This Brief reviews some of the empirical studies on the relation between the prevalence of COVID-19 and voter turnout in recent elections in Europe and Korea. It also discusses their implications for election administration during pandemic. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19; Voter Turnout; Europe; Korea; election; polling |
| Date: | 2022–02–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2022_006&r= |
| By: | Oihane Gallo; Bettina Klaus |
| Abstract: | We consider a set of agents, e.g., a group of researchers, who have claims on an endowment, e.g., a research budget from a national science foundation. The research budget is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions and coalitional funding is proportional to the sum of the claims of its members, except for singleton coalitions which receive no funding. We analyze the structure of stable partitions when coalition members use well-behaved rules to allocate coalitional endowments, e.g., the well-known constrained equal awards rule (CEA) or the constrained equal losses rule (CEL).For continuous, (strictly) resource monotonic, and consistent rules, stable partitions with (mostly) pairwise coalitions emerge. For CEA and CEL we provide algorithms to construct such a stable pairwise partition. While for CEL the resulting stable pairwise partition is assortative and sequentially matches up lowest-claims pairs, for CEA the resulting stable pairwise partition is obtained sequentially by matching up in each step either a highest-claims pair or a highest-lowest-claims pair.More generally, we also assume that the minimal coalition size to have a positive endowment is larger or equal to two. We then show how all results described above are extended to this general case. |
| Keywords: | Winner-take-all market, Market entry game, Excess entry, Cumulative Prospect Theory, Probability weighting, Experiment |
| JEL: | C71 C78 D63 D71 D74 |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:22.03&r= |