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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| Abstract: | This is the last of four papers devoted to the 2021 German federal elections continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013 and 2017 Bundestag elections. It is shown that the policy representation by the Bundestag could be improved using the alternative Third Vote election method. Under the Third Vote, electors cast no votes for parties by name. The electoral ballot consists of questions on topical policy issues ('General speed limit on motorways?'-Yes/No, 'Germany should increase its defense spending?'-Yes/No, etc.), and the parties answer to these questions before the elections - as required by the Wahl-O-Mat, the German voting advice applications. However, the Third Vote is not concerned with individual advices or individual voting intermediation. The electoral ballots are processed to construct the electorate's policy profile with balances of public opinion on all the issues. Then the matching of the parties' profiles with the electorate's profile is measured using the parties' indices of popularity (average percentage of electors represented on all the issues) and universality (percentage of questions when a majority is represented). These indices of representativeness are used instead of the conventional index 'number of votes received' to define the party quotas in the Bundestag. This method is hypothetically applied to reallocate the Bundestag seats to the eligible parties, resulting in a considerable gain in the Bundestag's representativeness. Finally, we discuss mixed election procedures combining the Third Vote with the conventional voting by party name and analyze possible implications. |
| Keywords: | Representative democracy,elections,theory of voting,proportional representation |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:154&r= |
| By: | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| Abstract: | This is the first out of four papers devoted to the 2021 German federal elections continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013 and 2017 Bundestag elections by the methods of the mathematical theory of democracy. This one estimates the policy representation ability of the 39 parties that participated in the 2021 elections and the Bundestag. For this purpose, the positions of the parties on 38 topical issues are compared with the results of recent public opinion polls. Then the parties' indices of popularity (the average percentage of the population represented) and universality (frequency in representing a majority) are constructed. Assuming that the Bundestag's position on the 38 issues is determined by the Bundestag majority, the Bundestag's indices of popularity and universality are estimated as well. The main conclusion is that the representativeness of the Bundestag parties and the Bundestag (before coalition-formation) has significantly increased since 2017. In particular, the election winner, the SPD, is now ranked 4 instead of 22 in 2017, having the mean index (popularity + universality) / 2 = 65% instead of 52 % in 2017. The Bundestag's mean index is now equal to 61% instead of former 40%. As for the ruling 'Traffic light coalition', SPD+GRUNE+FDP, its compatibility is as low as 45% and the representativeness is not the best either. |
| Keywords: | Policy representation,representative democracy,direct democracy,elections,coalitions |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:151&r= |
| By: | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| Abstract: | This is the third of four papers devoted to the 2021 German federal elections continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013 and 2017 Bundestag elections. Currently, only China has a parliament larger than the German Bundestag, which still grows due to the increasing number of overhang mandates. The unfettered growth of the Bundestag - caused by allotting too many direct mandates to parties that received too few second votes - can be prevented by relaxing the principle of 'one man-one vote' and introducing adjustable vote weights of Bundestag members. Such a practice could make numerous adjustment (leveling) seats unnecessary and the basic 598 Bundestag seats sufficient under most circumstances. For this purpose, the members of the overrepresented parties (because they receive too many direct mandates) should have vote power = 1 and the members of other parties should have adjustment vote weights > 1. We explain the adjustment vote weights using the example of the 2021 Bundestag. The second point discussed is the incomplete compliance of the Sainte-Lague/Schepers method, which dates back to 1832 and is used to apportion the Bundestag, with the mathematical standards of the 21st century. This method results in apportionments that are often not the best ones found by discrete optimization. |
| Keywords: | Representative democracy,elections,theory of voting,proportional representation |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:153&r= |
| By: | Francesco Armillei; Enrico Cavallotti |
| Abstract: | In September 2020 Italy held a constitutional referendum. On the same election days, many municipalities and some regions held municipal and regional elections. We exploit this unique occasion, caused by the unexpected Covid-19 crisis, to obtain a causal estimate of the effects of the overlap of concurrent elections on the referendum results. When the referendum overlaps with either municipal or regional elections, we find a positive effect on turnout and on the proportion of blank and null votes. We also find a quantitatively small but statistically significant effect on the referendum preferences. We interpret the results through the use of the calculus of voting model, exploiting a slightly modified version of the most widespread one in the literature. Our findings are relevant from a policy-making standpoint, with respect to both fostering turnout and reducing election organizational costs. |
| Keywords: | Concurrent elections, Voting behaviour, Referendum, Calculus of voting |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp21164&r= |
| By: | Tanguiane, Andranick S. |
| Abstract: | This is the second out of four papers devoted to the 2021 German federal elections continuing our analysis of the 2009, 2013 and 2017 Bundestag elections. This paper arranges the contesting parties into a 'spectrum' that reflects the spatial proximity of their policy profiles. The latter are 38-dimensional vectors of the parties' answers to 38 policy questions from the 2021 Wahl-O-Mat, the German voting advice application (VAA). Applying Principal component analysis (PCA), we construct a contiguous party ordering where the neighboring parties have close policy profiles. The ordering fits to the left-right ideological axis rolled up in a circumference, which can be unfolded by splitting it at one of its largest gaps. Rigorously speaking, we obtain a horseshoe-shaped left-right axis with the far-left and far-right ends approaching each other. For comparisons, alternative party orderings are constructed using four other models. Finally, the 2013, 2017 and 2021 German political spectra are compared. |
| Keywords: | Policy representation,representative democracy,political spectrum,left-right ideological axis |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:152&r= |
| By: | Chitralekha Basu (University of Cologne); Carles Boix (Princeton University, IPErG (Universitat de Barcelona)); Sonia Giurumescu (Stockholm University); Paulo Serôdio (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | We develop a theory of democratization that integrates both electoral calculations and economic incentives to explain the institutional choices of political actors. Left-leaning (liberal) politicians, who, given their location in the policy space, are more likely to receive the support of newly enfranchised voters, favor a broader franchise than conservative ones. Their preferences are conditional on the distributional effects of the franchise: when inequality is higher, policymakers are more reluctant to expand it because it is harder to reconcile the policy demands of existing and new voters. We evaluate this theory by estimating the franchise preferences of British MPs based on their votes on franchise-related parliamentary divisions between 1830 and 1918, and linking these preferences to their personal and constituency characteristics. Our results, which are consistent with our theory, show that declining inequality and the First World War were crucial factors in the democratization of Britain in this period. |
| Keywords: | Democratization; Franchise extension; British political development; Electoral competition |
| JEL: | D72 N43 |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:139&r= |
| By: | Luca Vitale |
| Abstract: | This paper documents a strong relationship between populist strategy and commitment to simple policies during the electoral campaign by U.S. Congress candidates. Using data from U.S. Congress elections of 2018 and 2020, I provide evidence that an increase in commitment is associated with an increase in populist rhetoric in candidates' platforms. Moreover, populists seem to keep their promises after the elections. Analysing texts from 2019 Congressional records' shows that legislators who chose a populist strategy during the electoral campaign present policies systematically more similar to their campaign speeches compared to non-populist legislators. The results confirm the predictions of theoretical models present in the literature, emphasising the simplistic and unrealistic character of populist politicians. |
| Keywords: | populism, text analysis, electoral campaigns, commitment dictionary |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp22175&r= |
| By: | Anselm Hager (Humboldt University); Lukas Hensel (Peking University); Christopher Roth (University of Cologne); Andreas Stegmann (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a natural field experiment with a major European party to test whether giving party supporters the opportunity to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the party’s electoral campaign. In our experiment, the party asked a random subset of supporters for their opinions on the importance of different topics. Giving supporters more opportunities to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the campaign as measured using behavioral data from the party’s smartphone application. Survey data reveals that our voice treatments also increase other margins of campaign effort as well as perceived voice. Our evidence highlights that parties can increase their supporters’ investment in the democratic process by implementing policies that increase their voice. |
| Keywords: | Political engagement, Inclusion, Voice, Agency, Natural Field Experiment,Canvassing JEL Classification:D8, P16 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:601&r= |
| By: | Philippos Louis (UCY - University of Cyprus); Matias Nunez (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Dimitrios Xefteris (UCY - University of Cyprus) |
| Abstract: | Collective choice mechanisms are used by groups to reach decisions in the presence of diverging preferences. But can the employed mechanism affect the degree of post-decision actual agreement (i.e. preference homogeneity) within a group? And if so, which are the features of the choice mechanisms that matter? Since it is difficult to address these questions in natural settings, we employ a theory-driven experiment where, after the group collectively decides on an issue, individual preferences can be properly elicited. We find that decision mechanisms that promote consensual behaviour generate substantially higher levels of post-decision actual agreement compared to outcome-wise identical procedures that incentivize subjects to exaggerate their differences. |
| Date: | 2021–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03324190&r= |
| By: | Laurent Bouton (GU - Georgetown University [Washington], NBER - National Bureau of Economic Research [New York] - NBER - The National Bureau of Economic Research, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR); Aniol Llorente-Saguer (QMUL - Queen Mary University of London, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR); Antonin Macé (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Dimitrios Xefteris (UCY - University of Cyprus) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the informational e¢ ciency of voting mechanisms in shareholder meetings. When the management cannot a¤ect the proposal being voted on, we show that voting mechanisms are more e¢ cient when their ballot space is richer. Moreover, e¢ ciency requires full divisibility of the votes. When the management has agenda power, we uncover a novel trade-o¤: more e¢ cient mechanisms provide worse incentives to select good proposals. This negative e¤ect can be large enough to wash out the higher voting e¢ ciency of even the most e¢ cient mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Information Aggregation,Strategic Voting,Shareholder Meetings,Corporate Governance,One-person-one-vote,One-share-one-vote |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-03519689&r= |
| By: | Kailthya, Subham (Department of Economics, University of Warwick); Kambhampati, Uma (Department of Economics, University of Reading) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we examine the causal effect of political competition on public provision of healthcare. Specifically, we investigate whether the effect of political competition on more visible public goods (e.g. health centre access) differs from its impact on less visible public goods (e.g. health centre capacity such as doctors, medical supplies, etc.). Using granular data from three recent waves of the Indian District Level Household Survey (DLHS) during 2002-2013 and an instrumental variable approach, we find that incumbents respond to electoral competition, measured as the effective number of parties (ENP), by trading-off less visible health centre capacity for more visible access to health centres. We provide suggestive evidence that focusing on more visible health centres boosts the incumbent party’s re-election prospects providing a clear motive for incumbent’s action. In addition, we examine the effect of election-year cycles and the role of political alignment in healthcare provision and find compelling evidence of a political economic mechanism at work. By contrast, political competition has no measurable impact on key health outcomes. We conduct several robustness checks to ensure that our estimates are reliable. Thus, our results suggest that electoral competition must be accompanied by strong checks on accountability to improve health outcomes. |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1396&r= |
| By: | Massoc, Elsa Clara |
| Abstract: | Are we in a new "Polanyian moment"? If we are, it is essential to examine how "spontaneous" and punctual expressions of discontent at the individual level may give rise to collective discourses driving social and political change. It is also important to examine whether and how the framing of these discourses may vary across political economies. This paper contributes to this endeavor with the analysis of anti-finance discourses on Twitter in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK between 2019 and 2020. This paper presents three main findings. First, the analysis shows that, more than ten years after the financial crisis, finance is still a strong catalyzer of political discontent. Second, it shows that there are important variations in the dominant framing of public anti-finance discourses on social media across European political economies. If the antagonistic "us versus them" is prominent in all the cases, the identification of who "us" and "them" are, vary significantly. Third, it shows that the presence of far-right tropes in the critique of finance varies greatly from virtually inexistent to a solid minority of statements. |
| Keywords: | finance,opinion,social media,discourse analysis |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:lawfin:30&r= |