nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2022‒02‒14
ten papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University


  1. How does group identification affect redistribution in representative democracies? An Experiment By Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap; Emma Manifold; Konstantinos Matakos; Dimitrios Xefteris
  2. The Financial Drivers of Populism in Europe By Luigi Guiso; Massimo Morelli; Tommaso Sonno; Helios Herrera
  3. Does commonness fill the common fund? Experimental evidence on the role of identity for public good contributions in India By Konda, Bruhan; Dietrich, Stephan; Nillesen, Eleonora
  4. The Political Economy of Open Borders: Theory and Evidence on the role of Electoral Rules By Matteo Gamalerio; Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri
  5. Corruption and Extremism By Attila Gaspar; Tommaso Giommoni; Massimo Morelli; Antonio Nicolò
  6. Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining By Andrzej Baranski; D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes; Ada Kovaliukaite; James Tremewan
  7. Who Cares? Measuring Preference Intensity in a Polarized Environment By Cavaillé, Charlotte; Chen, Daniel L.; Van Der Straeten, Karine
  8. "Social partnership revival"? The framing of the Covid-19-crisis in the German metal sector By Hopp, Marvin; Kiess, Johannes; Menz, Wolfgang; Seeliger, Martin
  9. Political polarization and the impact of internet and social media use in Brazil By Giuberti Coutinho, Lorena
  10. Feed the children By Laurens Cherchye; Pierre-André Chiappori; Bram De Rock; Charlotte Ringdal; Frederic Vermeulen

  1. By: Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap; Emma Manifold; Konstantinos Matakos; Dimitrios Xefteris
    Abstract: We test in the laboratory four mechanisms whereby group identification might affect redistribution in representative democracies. For voters, group identification can give rise to a preference for own-group payoffs, for electing an own-group candidate, and could be used to assess candidate-sincerity. For candidates, identity might affect the optimal campaign platform. There is evidence to support all four. The influence of own-group pay-offs has been studied before, but the other mechanisms have not. These new mechanisms combine to make redistribution depend on a hitherto unrecognized factor: the political representation of the minority group.
    Keywords: Identity; Inequality; Redistribution; Minority Representation; Representative Democracy; Voting Experiment
    JEL: C91 D63 D72 D90
    Date: 2022–02–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:02-2022&r=
  2. By: Luigi Guiso; Massimo Morelli; Tommaso Sonno; Helios Herrera
    Abstract: This paper argues that the financial crisis was a watershed in the burst of populism both on the demand side (voters behaviour) and on the supply side (political parties behaviour). On the demand side, we provide novel results on the causal effect of the financial crisis on trust, turnout and voting choices via its effects on voters economic insecurity. Economic insecurity peaks during the financial crisis and extends to segments of the population untouched by the globalization and robotization shocks. To establish causality, we use a pseudo-panel analysis and instrument the economic insecurity of different cohorts leveraging on a new methodology designed to highlight the different sensitivity to financial constraints for people in different occupations. On the supply side, we trace from manifestos the policy positions of old and new parties showing that the supply of populism had the largest jump right after the financial crisis. The size of the jump is largest in countries with low fiscal space and for parties on the left of the political spectrum. We provide a formal rationalization for the key role of fiscal space, showing how the pre-financial crisis shocks enter the picture as sources of a shrinking fiscal space.
    Keywords: Demand and Supply of Populism; Financial Crisis; Fiscal Space; Age-Earning Profiles
    JEL: D72 D78 D14 H30
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp21166&r=
  3. By: Konda, Bruhan (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University); Dietrich, Stephan (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University); Nillesen, Eleonora (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University)
    Abstract: We examine how the type of common identity affects voluntary contribution to public goods in groups that differ in their social image. We conjecture that groups with perceived high-status identity engage in higher levels of collective action compared to groups with perceived low-status identity. We study this using a lab-in-the-field experiment in rural India with members from the top and bottom of the caste hierarchy. Using a 2-person public good game, we empirically test (i) whether a caste gap in contributions emerges when group identities are made salient (ii) whether these differences are driven by the presence of punishment, and (iii) whether exogenously boosting caste identities by a role model prime diminishes the caste gap. Our results show that stereotyped groups fail to act collectively to provide public goods, possibly due to lack of trust towards their own group members. This gap disappears after the role model priming treatment and reaffirms the role of social identity in explaining the difference in contributions between groups that differ in the social image.
    Keywords: Common identity, Caste, Public goods, Lab-in-the-field experiment
    JEL: C91 D64 D91 H41
    Date: 2021–10–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2021037&r=
  4. By: Matteo Gamalerio; Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri
    Abstract: Institutions matter for the political choice of policies, and hence the consideration of the median voter's preferences should not be considered sufficient. We study theoretically and empirically how different electoral systems affect the level of openness of a country or city, zooming on the labor market as the main source of heterogeneous economic preferences towards immigration. The general result is that a polity is more open to immigration the less likely it is that policy making can be supported by a plurality of voters who do not constitute the absolute majority. There is evidence for this result at all levels in terms of correlations, and we establish causality via regression discontinuity design for the Italian case.
    Keywords: Electoral Rules, Immigration, Occupational Choice
    JEL: D72 J24 J61 R23
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp21157&r=
  5. By: Attila Gaspar; Tommaso Giommoni; Massimo Morelli; Antonio Nicolò
    Abstract: This paper shows that corruption generates extremism, but almost exclusively on the opposition side. When the majority has greater ability to use corruption to obtain her favorite policy outcome from the minority, then the minority group has an incentive to select a more extreme representative because it is more unlikely that such a type will accept a bribe. On the majority side, on the other hand, the perception of more likely use of the corruption tool does not create any distortion in the choice of political representatives. We provide strong causal evidence for these novel predictions using two different types of corruption signals, in Indonesia and Brazil.
    Keywords: Corruption, Extremism, Delegation, elections
    JEL: D72 D73
    Date: 2021
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp21163&r=
  6. By: Andrzej Baranski; D.J. da Cunha Batista Geraldes; Ada Kovaliukaite; James Tremewan
    Abstract: Does the gender composition of committees affect negotiations in majoritarian bargaining? We report the results of an experiment in which subjects are placed in triads to negotiate the division of a sum of money under majority rule and the gender composition of the group is manipulated, ranging from all female (FFF), female majority (FFM), male majority (MMF), to all male (MMM). Results show that men are more likely to make the opening offer, and contrary to our hypothesis, agreements are reached fastest in MMM and slowest in FFF. The proportion of grand coalitions is increasing in the number of females while minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) increase monotonically in the number of males. MWCs are disproportionately more likely to be same-gender in MMF, which leads to a gender gap in earnings compared to FFM. When provisional MWCs form prior to a final agreement, excluded men are more proactive than excluded women in attempting to break the coalition by making alluring offers, which partially explains why mixed gender MWCs are less frequent in MMF compared to FFM. Notably, some females adopt male-type behavior in MMF regarding their initial proposals and aggressiveness when left out from a MWC.
    Keywords: Unstructured bargaining, gender differences, experiment
    Date: 2021–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:use:tkiwps:2102&r=
  7. By: Cavaillé, Charlotte; Chen, Daniel L.; Van Der Straeten, Karine
    Abstract: Many questions in political science require knowing not only what voters want (pref-erence orientation) but also how much they want it (preference intensity). In this paper, we assess two methods for measuring individual differences in preference intensity. One method — issue importance items — asks respondents to self-report how important a given set of policy proposals is to them personally. Another — Quadratic Voting for Survey Research (QVSR) — gives respondents a fixed budget to ‘buy’ votes in favor of (against) these policy proposals, with the price for each vote increasing quadratically. We provide theoretical arguments explaining why, in a polarized environment where some respondents may feel pressured to pay lip service to the party norms, one should expect QVSR to offer a better measure of preference intensity. Using Likert items as the benchmark, we find that QVSR more consistently differentiates between intense and weak preferences, as proxied by respondents’ behavior on simplified real-world tasks. Revisiting debates on the determinants of policy preferences, or the congruence between mass opinions and the policy status quo, we show that conclusions reached when using Likert items alone change once differences in preference intensity are bet-ter accounted for.
    Date: 2022–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:126566&r=
  8. By: Hopp, Marvin; Kiess, Johannes; Menz, Wolfgang; Seeliger, Martin
    Abstract: This paper examines how the collective bargaining parties of the German metal and electrical industry, Gesamtmetall and IG Metall, portrayed the Corona crisis in the public sphere. The empirical basis consists of press releases, guest contributions by the chairpersons and press interviews. The framing perspective adopted by this study promises to shed light on how the collective bargaining parties assess the social partnership's ability to act and what priorities they set. Social partnership is also coming under increasing pressure in the core areas of the German economic model. This is also reflected in our analysis: While at first glance there is a coalition of interests in the description of the crisis and the call for state aid to support the economy and safeguard employees, this is characterized by a strong imbalance. It is not just a matter of purely strategic cooperation on specific issues. The employer-side also insists on wage restraint and leaves unanswered union calls for a more farreaching joint assumption of responsibility. Particularly against the backdrop of further effects of the pandemic on the labor market, this weakens the unions' bargaining power and puts further pressure on the institutional pattern of social partnership.
    Date: 2022
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:iawsch:322022&r=
  9. By: Giuberti Coutinho, Lorena (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht)
    Abstract: Influential scholars have pointed to the Internet and social media as a reason for the recent political divide in many countries. Greater exposure to imbalanced information in these environments would reinforce previous political positions leading voters to develop more extreme positions or greater animosity towards candidates of the opposing political group, a phenomenon known as affective polarization. This study investigates the impact of Internet and social media use on Brazil's recent affective polarization, exploring the historical peculiarities in the layout of pre-existing infrastructure that causes exogenous variation in Internet and social media usage. There is no empirical evidence that access to this new media environment explains affective polarization within the population under this study. Findings are consistent with the strand of literature suggesting that the recent phenomena of political polarization in some countries cannot be attributed to Internet and social media use
    Keywords: political polarization, broadband internet, Brazil
    JEL: D12 D72 L82 L86
    Date: 2021–08–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:unumer:2021032&r=
  10. By: Laurens Cherchye (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven); Pierre-André Chiappori (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Columbia University); Bram De Rock (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Université libre de Bruxelles); Charlotte Ringdal (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Frederic Vermeulen (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University of Leuven)
    Abstract: To understand the household decision-making process regarding food expenditures for children in poor households in Nairobi, we conduct an experiment with 424 married couples. In the experiment, the spouses (individually and jointly) allocated money between themselves and nutritious meals for one of their children. First, we ?nd strong empirical support for individual rationality and cooperative behavior. Second, our results suggest that women do not have stronger preferences for children’s meals than men. Third, the spouses’ respective bargaining positions derived from consumption patterns strongly correlate with more traditional indicators. Finally, we document signi?cant heterogeneity both between individuals and intra-household decision processes.
    Date: 2021–10–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:21/32&r=

This nep-cdm issue is ©2022 by Stan C. Weeber. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.