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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Alessandra Casella (Columbia University [New York]); Antonin Macé (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others' votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling - the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions - to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions. |
| Keywords: | bundling,quadratic voting,vote trading,storable votes,logrolling,Vote markets,Storable votes,Vote trading,Logrolling,Quadratic voting,Bundling,vote markets |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02922012&r= |
| By: | Matthew Lowe; Donghee Jo |
| Abstract: | Nearly all legislatures segregate politicians by party. We use seating lotteries in the Icelandic Parliament to estimate the effects of seating integration on bipartisanship. When two politicians from different parties are randomly assigned to sit together, they are roughly 1 percentage point more likely to vote alike. Despite this effect, other-party neighbors do not affect general bipartisan voting, as measured by the likelihood that a politician deviates from their party leader’s vote. Furthermore, the pair-level similarity effect is temporary, disappearing the following year. The pattern of results support cue-taking and social pressure as mechanisms for the effects of proximity. |
| Keywords: | polarization, integration, intergroup contact, voting |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9452&r= |
| By: | Pickard, Harry (Newcastle University Business School); Efthyvoulou, Georgios (University of Sheffield); Bove, Vincenzo (Department of Politics and International Studies and CAGE (Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy)) |
| Abstract: | Does radical right political violence favour or hinder public support for right-wing stances? Numerous existing studies have demonstrated that Islamic terrorism provokes a conservative shift, increases nationalism and induces negative sentiments towards immigration. However, little is known about the consequences of far-right terrorism, despite its incidence in Western societies. We leverage four waves of the British Election Study (BES) and use a quasi-experimental design to analyse individual political orientations shortly before and after terrorist attacks. We find that respondents distance themselves from the ideology associated with the perpetrator and shift away from ideological positions at the right end of the political spectrum. Furthermore, respondents are less likely to report nationalistic attitudes and immigration skepticism, core tenets of extremist right-wing political ideologies. Our findings suggest that the characteristics of the perpetrators and their driving goals are crucial factors shaping the impact of terrorism on public sentiments |
| Keywords: | Far-right extremism ; terrorist attacks ; political opinion ; political ideology ; quasi-experimental design. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wqapec:06&r= |
| By: | Bernhardt, Dan (University of Illinois and University of Warwick); Krasa, Stefan (University of Illinois); Mehdi Shadmehr (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the susceptibility of Democracy to demagogues, studying tensions between representatives who guard voters’ long-run interests and demagogues who cater to voters’ short-run desires. Parties propose consumption and investment. Voters base choices on current-period consumption and valence shocks. Younger/poorer economies and economically-disadvantaged voters are attracted to the demagogue’s dis-investment policies, forcing far-sighted representatives to mimic them. This electoral competition can destroy democracy: if capital falls below a critical level, a death spiral ensues with capital stocks falling thereafter. We identify when economic development mitigates this risk and characterize how the death-spiral risk declines as capital grows large. |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wqapec:05&r= |
| By: | Antoine Auberger (CRED - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this article is to build a model that explains and forecasts the result of the firstround vote of the French legislative elections and the results in seats after the second round per department and at the national level. This model highlights the influence of a popularity rating between the Left and the Right; and the economic conditions (the unemployment rate, the GDP growth rate, the inflation rate with more ambiguous results) to account for the first-round vote for the Left in the French legislative elections. Its forecasts for the elections of the past (1986-2007) are satisfactory and we make ex ante forecasts in vote and seats for the 2012 French legislative elections. We make some preliminary ex ante forecast in vote and in seats for the 2017 French legislative election. |
| Abstract: | L'objectif de cet article est de construire un modèle qui explique et prévoit le résultat du premier tour du vote aux élections législatives françaises and les résultats du second tour en sièges par département et au niveau national. |
| Keywords: | vote functions,legislative elections,election forecasting,popularity functions,panel data JEL Classification: C23,C53,D72 |
| Date: | 2021–12–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03480853&r= |
| By: | Stefan Ambec (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Philippe de Donder (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - Université Fédérale Toulouse Midi-Pyrénées - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | We analyze environmental policy in a model where some consumers (dubbed green) derive warm glow from buying a good of a higher environmental quality, and where green firms differentiate products on their environmental quality to enjoy market power. For any given pollution level, emission taxes turn out to be less cost-effective than an emission standard because taxation always induces a higher wedge between the environmental qualities of products. By stark contrast, consumers prefer taxes to standards when the warm glow intensity is not too large. Also, the ability of green firms to exert market power makes the tax less attractive to green consumers. When the pollution level is endogenized via majority voting, both neutral and green consumers vote in favor of laxer standards and therefore pollution is higher compared to the case of nondifferentiated products. By contrast, the majority chosen tax induces the efficient level of pollution. Green consumerism reduces environmental protection with standards but not with taxes. |
| Keywords: | political economy,green label,standard,tax,product differentiation,green consumerism,corporate social responsibility,environmental regulation |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03429506&r= |