nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2021‒11‒15
eight papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Political Competition with Endogenous Party Formation and Citizen Activists By Emanuel Hansen
  2. Marginal Productivity and Coalition Formation with Distributive Norms By Hideaki Goto
  3. Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules By Haris Aziz; Alexander Lam
  4. Does Labor Protection Increase Support for Immigration? Evidence from Switzerland By Mirjam Bächli; Teodora Tsankova
  5. Clubs and Networks By Ding, S.; Dziubinski, M.; Goyal, S.
  6. Investing in Influence: How Minority Interests Can Prevail in a Democracy By Stergios Skaperdas; Samarth Vaidya
  7. Stability in Matching with Externalities: Pairs Competition and Oligopolistic Joint Ventures By Kenzo Imamura; Hideo Konishi; Chen-Yu Pan
  8. The Effectiveness of Committee Quotas; The Role of Group Dynamics By José J. Domínguez

  1. By: Emanuel Hansen
    Abstract: This paper studies the effects of endogenous party formation on political platforms. It develops a model in which parties allow like-minded citizens to, first, share the cost of running in a public election and, second, coordinate on a policy platform. The paper characterizes the set of political equilibria with two competing parties and with one uncontested party. In two-party equilibria, the distance between both platforms is always positive but limited, in contrast to the median voter model and the citizen candidate model. In one-party equilibria, the median voter can be worse off than in all equilibria with two competing parties.
    Keywords: elections, party formation, platform choice, electoral uncertainty
    JEL: D71 D72
    Date: 2021
  2. By: Hideaki Goto (IUJ Research Institutey, International University of University)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes coalition formation under constant, decreasing, and increasing marginal productivity when the total surplus jointly produced by individuals with heterogeneous abilities can only be distributed to its members in egalitarian or meritocratic ways. When marginal productivity is decreasing or constant, the results are simple, as no coalition with multiple members is included in a stable coalition structure when marginal productivity is decreasing, whereas individuals are indifferent to which meritocratic coalition they belong, including singletons, in the case of constant marginal productivity. In contrast, if marginal productivity is increasing, stable structures differ considerably from those obtained by other models. A procedure to identify stable structures is proposed, finding that multiple egalitarian coalitions can exist, each of which is always consecutive, but there is, at most, only one meritocratic coalition, which may or may not be consecutive, in stable structures. Moreover, the grand egalitarian coalition is only stable under certain conditions, whereas the grand meritocratic coalition is always stable.
    Keywords: Coalition formation; Egalitarianism; Meritocracy; Marginal productivity.
    JEL: C71 D71 D63 D30
    Date: 2021–11
  3. By: Haris Aziz; Alexander Lam
    Abstract: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability that was proposed by Troyan and Morrill (2020). We identify several classes of voting rules that satisfy this notion. We also show that several voting rules including k-approval fail to satisfy this property. We characterize conditions under which voting rules are obviously manipulable. One of our insights is that certain rules are obviously manipulable when the number of alternatives is relatively large compared to the number of voters. In contrast to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, many of the rules we examined are not obviously manipulable. This reflects the relatively easier satisfiability of the notion and the zero information assumption of not obvious manipulability, as opposed to the perfect information assumption of strategyproofness. We also present algorithmic results for computing obvious manipulations and report on experiments.
    Date: 2021–11
  4. By: Mirjam Bächli; Teodora Tsankova
    Abstract: What affects native support for immigration? At a time of rising anti-immigration sentiments, this is a question raised by both academics and policy makers. We study the role of labor protection in shaping native preferences over migration policies. We look at Swiss national votes which took place from 2000 to 2014. Our results show that a higher immigrant exposure reduces pro-immigration vote shares in municipalities with a relatively low-skilled native population. The negative response is mitigated under higher levels of labor protection as measured by collective bargaining coverage. We look at labor market outcomes to understand mechanisms at play and find some suggestive evidence that collective agreements mitigate negative wage responses among low-skilled natives. Overall, the analysis suggests that labor protection affects vote outcomes by improving in addition other labor market conditions or by alleviating existing fears among the native population.
    Keywords: immigration, popular votes, collective bargaining
    JEL: D72 F22 J52 J61
    Date: 2021
  5. By: Ding, S.; Dziubinski, M.; Goyal, S.
    Abstract: A recurring theme in the study of society is the concentration of influence and power that is driven through unequal membership of groups and associations. In some instances these bodies constitute a small world while in others they are fragmented into distinct cliques. This paper presents a new model of clubs and networks to understand the sources of individual marginalization and the origins of different club networks. In our model, individuals seek to become members of clubs while clubs wish to have members. Club value is increasing in its size and in the strength of ties with other clubs. We show that a stable membership profile exhibits marginalization of individuals and that this is generally not welfare maximizing. Our second result shows that if returns from strength of ties are convex (concave) then stable memberships support fragmented networks with strong ties (small worlds held together by weak ties). We illustrate the value of these theoretical results through case studies of inter-locking directorates, boards of editors of journals, and defence and R&D alliances.
    Date: 2021–10–25
  6. By: Stergios Skaperdas; Samarth Vaidya
    Abstract: How can the West’s economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various levels of government leads to systematic deviations of policies from those desired by the majority. Implemented policies diverge from the majority position despite centripetal forces that induce interest groups to select positions closer to that majority position. Resources, organization, and cognitive biases can induce one-sided outcomes. When we allow for long-term lobbying infrastructure investments in a simpli_ed tax-and-spend model, the deviations between majority desires and implemented policies are even larger than those in the absence of long-term investments.
    Keywords: interest groups, lobbying, polarization, persuasion, regulatory capture
    JEL: D72 D73 D78 H20
    Date: 2021
  7. By: Kenzo Imamura (University of Tokyo Market Design Center); Hideo Konishi (Boston College); Chen-Yu Pan (National Chengchi University, Taiwan)
    Abstract: This paper presents one-to-one matching and assignment problems with externalities across pairs such as pairs figure skating competition and joint ventures in oligopolistic markets. In these models, players care not only about their partners but also which and how many rival pairs are formed. Thus, it is important for a deviating pair to know which matching will realize after it deviates from a matching (an effectiveness function) in order to define pairwise stable matching. Using a natural effectiveness function for such environments, we show that the assortative matching is pairwise stable. We discuss two generalizations of our model including intrinsic preferences on partners and pair-specific match qualities to see how our stability concept performs in these generalized models.
    Keywords: one-to-one matching, matching with externalities, pairwise stable matching, coalition formation, group contest, joint ventures, myopia, farsightedness.
    JEL: C7 D71 D72
    Date: 2021–11–04
  8. By: José J. Domínguez (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)
    Abstract: Committee quotas have been introduced during the last years for combatting the underrepresentation of women in male-stereotyped environments. However, the unclear effect of evaluators’ gender and the gender differences in group dynamics in mixed-gender committees question the effectiveness of the policy. I provide experimental evidence in both directions; a) how the gender composition of the committees affects the probability of female candidates of being recruited in a hiring process, and b) how men and women behave in group dynamics as a mechanism explaining the outcome of the policy. I designed a laboratory experiment in which groups of three subjects have to jointly select two candidates in a pool of six to perform a task. The probability of success of female candidates does not improve as the number of women in the committee increases. I found that malemajority committees were the most beneficial for female candidates. In these groups, men and women exhibited a similar level of voice and influence during deliberations, proposing male and female candidates for recruitment. Female-majority groups were, in contrast, the most detrimental for female candidates. Women in female-majority groups presented a higher level of voice but men, who proposed only male candidates as a modal proposal, were more influential, what limited the contribution of women. The paper suggests that more women in the committee do not necessarily benefit female candidates and examines some reasons that question the effectiveness of this policy.
    Keywords: Committee Quotas; Gender Gap; Group Dynamics; Laboratory Experiment.
    JEL: D03 C92 J71
    Date: 2021–11–02

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