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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Lucas B\"ottcher; Georgia Kernell |
| Abstract: | Condorcet's jury theorem states that the correct outcome is reached in direct majority voting systems with sufficiently large electorates as long as each voter's independent probability of voting for that outcome is greater than 0.5. Yet, in situations where direct voting systems are infeasible, such as due to high implementation and infrastructure costs, hierarchical voting systems provide a reasonable alternative. We study differences in outcome precision between hierarchical and direct voting systems for varying group sizes, abstention rates, and voter competencies. Using asymptotic expansions of the derivative of the reliability function (or Banzhaf number), we first prove that indirect systems differ most from their direct counterparts when group size and number are equal to each other, and therefore to $\sqrt{N_{\rm d}}$, where $N_{\rm d}$ is the total number of voters in the direct system. In multitier systems, we prove that this difference is maximized when group size equals $\sqrt[n]{N_{\rm d}}$, where $n$ is the number of hierarchical levels. Second, we show that while direct majority rule always outperforms hierarchical voting for homogeneous electorates that vote with certainty, as group numbers and size increase, hierarchical majority voting gains in its ability to represent all eligible voters. Furthermore, when voter abstention and competency are correlated within groups, hierarchical systems often outperform direct voting, which we show by using a generating function approach that is able to analytically characterize heterogeneous voting systems. |
| Date: | 2021–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2110.02298&r= |
| By: | Kaustav Das (University of Leicester); Atisha Ghosh (University of Warwick); Pushkar Maitra (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | Voters are assumed to be irrational if they respond to shocks beyond the control of politicians. What if the politicians can respond to such shocks? Using a theoretical model, where shocks can either be responsive (allowing politicians to respond) or nonresponsive, we show that voters are irrational if non-responsive shocks affect electoral outcomes. We test this using data from the 1991 Indian parliamentary elections. In the middle of the election, the leader of the opposition was assassinated. We find that this affected the electoral outcomes indicating irrationality on the part of Indian voters. |
| Keywords: | Voter rationality, Responsive shock, Non-Responsive Shock, Election Outcomes. |
| JEL: | P16 D72 H12 |
| Date: | 2021–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2021-13&r= |
| By: | Gerald Eisenkopf; Torben Kölpin |
| Abstract: | We provide a parsimonious model of leadership in social dilemma situations and test it with a meta-analysis of experimental studies. We focus on studies with treatments that allow for sequential contributions to a public good (as in Güth et al. (2007)). The group members observe the contribution of a leader before contributing themselves. We compare the results with simultaneous contribution treatments from the same studies. Our results confirm that the establishment of a leader indeed leads to persistently higher and more coordinated contributions. As predicted, the aggregate effect remains stable over time and increases in group size even though leaders and followers have more divergent contribution patterns in larger groups. We also find empirical support for an explanation of the observed 'leader’s curse'. |
| Keywords: | Leading-by-Example, Cooperation, Meta-analysis, Voluntary contribution |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:twi:respas:0125&r= |
| By: | Richard Bluhm; Roland Hodler; Paul Schaudt |
| Abstract: | We investigate how changes in the administrative-territorial structure affect ethnic voting. We present an event study design that exploits the 2010 constitutional reform in Kenya, which substantially increased the number of primary administrative regions. We find (i) strong evidence for a reduction in ethnic voting when administrative regions become less ethnically diverse and (ii) weak evidence for such a reduction when ethnic groups become less fragmented across regions. These results suggest that ‘ethnofederal’ reforms (leading to administrative borders that more closely follow ethnic boundaries) can mitigate ethnic politics in diverse countries. |
| Keywords: | ethnofederalism, decentralization, territorial structure, ethnic divisions, ethnic voting, ethnic politics, Kenya |
| JEL: | D02 D72 H77 J15 O55 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9314&r= |
| By: | Julia Cage (Département d'économie); Edgard Dewitte (Département d'économie) |
| Abstract: | We study electoral campaigns over the long run, through the lens of their spending. In particular, we ask whether changing media technologies and electoral environments impacted patterns of spending and their correlation with electoral results. To do so, we build a novel exhaustive dataset on general elections in the United Kingdom from 1857 to 2017, which includes information on campaign spending (itemized by expense categories), electoral outcomes and socio-demographic characteristics for 69, 042 election-constituency candidates. We start by providing new insights on the history of British political campaigns, in particular the growing importance of advertising material, including via digital means, to the detriment of paid staff and electoral meetings. We then show that there is a strong positive correlation between expenditures and votes, and that overall the magnitude of this relationship has strongly increased since the 1880s, with a peak in the last quarter of the 20th century. We link these transformations to changes in the conduct of campaigns, and to the introduction of new information technologies. We show in particular that the expansion of local radio and broadband Internet increased the sensitivity of the electoral results to differences in campaign spending. These results encourage greater contextualization in the drafting of campaign finance regulations. |
| Keywords: | Elections; Campaign finance; Electoral expenditures; Information technologies |
| JEL: | D72 P48 H7 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/1dp7827s4n8ht8fk3qhmeuvd0o&r= |
| By: | Davis, John B. (Department of Economics Marquette University) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: This paper is a contribution to the Erasmus Journal of Economics and Philosophy symposium on Dasgupta and Goyal’s “Narrow Identities†(2019) that models how individuals develop social identities. They do not distinguish categorical and relational social identities, model only social group social identities, minimize intersectionality (having multiple social group identities), and ignore inter-relational, social role social identities. In a club theory-like analysis, they portray the world as locked into polarized social group rivalries, where democracy matters little compared to social group loyalty. A problem with explaining social identity only in terms of social group identity is that the ‘identify with’ basis of social group loyalty undermines saying people are distinct individuals. Dasgupta and Goyal use the standard circular preferences conception of what makes people distinct individuals, so they cannot say individuals do not disappear into social groups. However, a relational social roles-based social identity analysis offers a way of explaining how people can be distinct individuals and have social identities, particularly where social group identities are connected to social role identities. This analysis is outlined using a distinction between relatively closed and relatively open behavioral domains. |
| Keywords: | social identity, social groups, social roles |
| JEL: | B41 B50 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mrq:wpaper:2021-08&r= |