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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Dragan Filipovich; Miguel Niño-Zarazúa; Alma Santillán Hernández |
| Abstract: | Voter coercion is a recurrent threat to pro-poor redistribution in young democracies. In this study we focus on Mexico's paradigmatic Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera (POP) programme. We investigate whether local mayors exploited POP to coerce voters, and if so, what effect these actions had on the municipal incumbent's vote. |
| Keywords: | Voting, Clientelism, Conditional cash transfers, Rural poverty, Mexico |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2021-141&r= |
| By: | Laurens Cherchye; Pierre-André Chiappori; Bram De Rock; Charlotte Ringdal; Frederic Vermeulen |
| Abstract: | To understand the household decision-making process regarding food expenditures for children in poor households in Nairobi, we conduct an experiment with 424 married couples. In the experiment, the spouses (individually and jointly) allocated money between themselves and nutritious meals for one of their children. First, we find strong empirical support for individual rationality and cooperative behavior. Second, our results suggest that women do not have stronger preferences for children’s meals than men. Third, the spouses’ respective bargaining positions derived from consumption patterns strongly correlate with more traditional indicators. Finally, we document significant heterogeneity both between individuals and intra-household decision processes. |
| Keywords: | collective model, intra-household allocation, experiment, Kenya, children |
| Date: | 2021–08–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:679644&r= |
| By: | Shenoy, Ajay; Zimmermann, Laura V. |
| Abstract: | Local politicians can function as crucial intermediaries between voters and party bosses in a clientelistic network. We study their role by matching data on 300 million welfare payments in the Indian state of West Bengal to village-level election returns. Local politicians systematically misallocate resources based on party loyalty and successfully deliver votes to their national co-partisans. Politicians are compensated for successful mobilization through a performance bonus immediately after the national election. The (promise of) increased compensation from government funds induces opposition candidates to switch to the ruling party in strategically important local councils, bringing them under its control. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H53 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:916&r= |
| By: | Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University); Jian Song (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study a non-exclusive group contest in which contestants actively participate in multiple groups simultaneously. We compare the results of this contest to those of an exclusive group contest in which each contestant belongs to a single group. In contrast to theoretical predictions, we find that the non-exclusive group contest generates less aggregate effort than the equivalent exclusive group contest. We hypothesize that groups in the non-exclusive group contest are less responsive to their rival group’s effort than those in the exclusive group contest. Likewise, on the individual level, players in the non-exclusive group contest are more likely to free-ride on their group members’ contributions. Our data indicate that non-free-riders in the non-exclusive group contest are more likely, over time, to allocate their effort toward a single group. This finding is consistent with previous findings that players facing a complex strategy space tend to focus on specific winning combinations. Moreover, given that players are affected by their group members’ contributions, they tend to exert their effort primarily toward a single group. Taken together, our findings suggest that a non-exclusive group contest may evolve, over time, into an exclusive group contest. |
| Keywords: | Group contest, Non-exclusive, Inter-group competition, Free-rider, Effort allocation |
| JEL: | C9 D7 |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1083&r= |
| By: | Pandey, Siddhi Gyan (Jindal School of Liberal Arts and Humanities, O.P. Jindal Global University) |
| Abstract: | Situations that require individuals to mutually cooperate are often analysed as coordination games. This paper proposes a model of cooperative network formation where the network is formed through the process of the coordination game being played between multiple agents. Additionally, network effects are modelled in by the fact that the benefit to any agent from a mutually cooperative link is enhanced, over a base value, by a factor of her trustworthiness or reputation as observed by her partner in that link. Within this framework, evolution of cooperative networks is analysed in the presence of altruistic agents, through repeated interaction between myopically best responding agents in a finite population. Properties of networks that sustain as Nash equilibrium are also analysed. |
| Keywords: | coordination game ; network formation ; game theory ; social networks |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:npf:wpaper:21/346&r= |
| By: | Dripto Bakshi; Indraneel Dasgupta |
| Abstract: | We examine how cross-community cost or benefit spillovers, arising from the consumption of group-specific public goods, affect both inter-group conflicts over the appropriation of such goods and decentralized private provision for their production. Our model integrates production versus appropriation choices, vis-Ã -vis group-specific public goods, with their decentralized voluntary supply, against a backdrop of such cross-community consumption spillovers. Our flexible and general formulation of consumption spillovers incorporates earlier specifications as alternative special cases. We show that stronger negative (or weaker positive) consumption spillovers across communities may reduce inter-group conflict and increase aggregate income (and consumption) in society under certain conditions. Thus, stronger negative consumption spillovers may have socially beneficial consequences. We also identify conditions under which their impact will be both conflict-augmenting and income-compressing. Our general theoretical analysis offers a conceptual structure within which to organize investigation of feedback loops linking ethnic conflict and natural resource degradation in developing country contexts. |
| Keywords: | Production versus appropriation, Rent-seeking; Public good contest; Public bad; Natural resource conflict |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcre:21/05&r= |