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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Henning, Christian H. C. A.; Diaz, Daniel; Petri, Svetlana |
| Abstract: | In democratic systems, elections are considered a mechanism to ensure that efficient policies seeking the wellbeing of the population are implemented by the government, although the reality often reflects the opposite. Governments usually act inefficiently due to problems of government performance such as capture and low accountability. In the African continent, the republic of Senegal is considered an example of a stable democracy. Electoral processes in the country have been considered relatively fair. However, the decline in the voter turnout over the past elections suggests that the party system is failing to engage voters. This study assesses influencing factors both in voting behavior in Senegal and in the decision to abstain. We estimated nested multinomial logit models including the alternative Abstention to determine the importance of the non-voters group in the policy making process. We found that even though people in general make their decision more non-policy oriented, abstainers, compared to those who cast a vote, tend to choose more retrospectively oriented and less policy and nonpolicy oriented. Furthermore, our findings show that this group of non-voters hold the government more accountable and have a higher political weight for the incumbent party. Thus, they could incentive the government to choose and implement more efficient policies. [...] |
| Keywords: | probabilistic voter model,capture,accountability,agricultural policy,Senegal,Africa |
| JEL: | Q18 C31 C35 C38 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cauapw:wp202012&r= |
| By: | Wesley H. Holliday; Eric Pacuit |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate A' who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between A and A'). We call this principle Stability for Winners (with Tiebreaking). Stable Voting satisfies this principle while also having a remarkable ability to avoid tied outcomes in elections even with small numbers of voters. |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2108.00542&r= |
| By: | Henning, Christian H. C. A.; Petri, Svetlana; Diaz, Daniel |
| Abstract: | Electoral competition is considered a control mechanism to guarantee a good performance of the government. However, in real life it often leads to a distorted policy implementation due to Government Capture and low Government Accountability. Therefore, the analysis of voter behavior is a key factor to understand government performance. More specifically, if voters choose more policy and retrospectively oriented, the government has greater incentives to implement efficient policies. In this sense, if voters have more information on politics, they are more likely to base their decision on policy issues. To assess changes in voter behavior, we carried out a political experiment, where information about the performance of the Senegalese government was delivered to a randomly selected group of voters. Then, based on election surveys data collected before and after the information signal, a probabilistic voter model with latent class using a panel data set was developed. Additionally, to evaluate changes in the relative importance of the three voting motives (policy, non-policy and retrospective), marginal effects and relative marginal effects were estimated. As expected, after the information signal, the relative importance of the policy and the retrospective components increased significantly. [...] |
| Keywords: | probabilistic voter model,capture,accountability,agricultural policy,Senegal,Africa |
| JEL: | Q18 C33 C35 C38 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cauapw:wp202011&r= |
| By: | \'Alvaro Romaniega |
| Abstract: | Condorcet Jury Theorem or Miracle of Aggregation are frequently invoked to ensure the competence of some aggregate decision-making processes. In this article we explore an estimation of the prior probability of the thesis predicted by the theorem (if there are enough voters, majority rule is a competent decision procedure). We use tools from measure theory to conclude that, prima facie, it will fail almost surely. To update this prior either more evidence in favor of competence would be needed or a modification of the decision rule. Following the latter, we investigate how to obtain an almost sure competent information aggregation mechanism for almost any evidence on voter competence (including the less favorable ones). To do so, we substitute simple majority rule by weighted majority rule based on some weights correlated with epistemic rationality such that every voter is guaranteed a minimal weight equal to one. |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2108.00733&r= |
| By: | Bauer, Michal (Charles University, Prague); Cahlíková, Jana (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance); Chytilová, Julie (Charles University, Prague); Roland, Gerald (University of California, Berkeley) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides experimental evidence showing that members of a majority group systematically shift punishment on innocent members of an ethnic minority. We develop a new incentivized task, the Punishing the Scapegoat Game, to measure how injustice affecting a member of one's own group shapes punishment of an unrelated bystander ("a scapegoat"). We manipulate the ethnic identity of the scapegoats and study interactions between the majority group and the Roma minority in Slovakia. We find that when no harm is done, there is no evidence of discrimination against the ethnic minority. In contrast, when a member of one's own group is harmed, the punishment "passed" on innocent individuals more than doubles when they are from the minority, as compared to when they are from the dominant group. These results illuminate how individualized tensions can be transformed into a group conflict, dragging minorities into conflicts in a way that is completely unrelated to their behavior. |
| Keywords: | punishment, minority groups, inter-group conflict, discrimination, scapegoating, lab-in-field experiments |
| JEL: | C93 D74 D91 J15 |
| Date: | 2021–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14608&r= |
| By: | Henning, Christian H. C. A.; Diaz, Daniel; Lendewig, Andrea; Petri, Svetlana |
| Abstract: | Even in countries with well functioning democracies, not all people with the right to vote in a presidential election decide to cast a vote. In order to study the importance of abstention in presidential elections in Africa and Latin America, data from Senegal and Honduras was analyzed. These countries have experienced a decline in the voter turnout over the past elections, which means that the party systems are somehow failing to engage voters in recent years. The purpose of this paper is to understand how people choose a certain party or candidate, as well as, how they decide to either vote or abstain. Moreover, we are looking to determine whether non-voters could motivate the governments to design and implement efficient policies. To achieve this, we estimated nested multinomial logit models including the alternative Abstention. Then, to evaluate government performance, we derived indicators for accountability and capture. Also, to determine the optimal policy positions for the governmental parties, First Order Condition (FOC) and Second Order Condition (SOC) were estimated for different issues. |
| Keywords: | probabilistic voter model,capture,accountability,agricultural policy,Africa,Latin America |
| JEL: | Q18 C31 C35 C38 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cauapw:wp202013&r= |
| By: | Lia Q. Flores (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto); Miguel A. Fonseca (Department of Economics, University of Exeter) |
| Abstract: | Psychologists have long identified the tendency of humans to overestimate their skill relative to their peers (overplacement). We investigate whether this phenomenon is exacerbated by group affiliation: social identity theory predicts people evaluate in-group members more positively than out-group members, and we hypothesized that this differential treatment may result in greater overplacement when interacting with an out-group member. We tested this hypothesis with 301 US voters affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic party in the run-up to the 2020 Presidential election, a time when political identities were salient and highly polarized. We found there is a higher tendency for overplacement when faced with an out-group opponent than with an in-group opponent. Decomposition analysis suggests this difference is due to underestimating the opponent, as opposed to overestimating one's own performance to a higher degree. Moreover, any tendency to incur in overplacement is mitigated when faced with an opponent with the same political-identity relative to one with a neutral one. While group affiliation biases initial priors, such effect is unchanged when participants are asked to update their beliefs. |
| Keywords: | overconfidence, belief updating, motivated beliefs, overplacement, social identity, political affiliation, competition |
| JEL: | D18 D91 Z1 C9 |
| Date: | 2021–08–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exe:wpaper:2103&r= |