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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Daniel L. Chen (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Moti Michaeli (University of Haifa [Haifa]); Daniel Spiro (Uppsala University) |
| Abstract: | In many settings of political bargaining over policy, agents care not only about getting their will but also about having others approve the chosen policy thus giving it more weight. What is the effect on the bargaining outcome when agents care about such legitimacy of the policy? We study this question theoretically and empirically. We show that the median-voter theorem holds in groups that are ideologically very cohesive and in groups with extreme ideological disagreement. However, in groups with intermediate ideological disagreement, the median-voter theorem does not hold. This is since, on the individual level, ideological disagreement with the median has a non-monotonic effect on the policy. We test our model in a natural experimental setting—U.S. appeals courts—where causal identification is based on random assignment of judges into judicial panels, each consisting of three judges who rule on a case. Here judges care about legitimacy of the policy they write because a norm of consensus prevails and because increased legitimacy reduces the likelihood of the judicial case to be heard by the Supreme Court. The predicted pattern of how policies depend on the participants' ideologies are corroborated by our empirical tests. |
| Keywords: | Judicial decision making,Group decision making,Legitimacy,Ideology,Bargaining |
| Date: | 2021–03–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03186882&r= |
| By: | Alessandra Casella; Jeffrey Guo; Michelle Jiang |
| Abstract: | Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions. |
| JEL: | C92 D7 D72 K16 |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28674&r=all |
| By: | José J. Bercoff; Osvaldo Meloni; Juan Manuel Tabuenca |
| Abstract: | A few years after the democracy was restored in 1983, Argentina has witnessed one of the most intense periods of political reforms with the proclaimed objective of modernizing the electoral system and extended political rights to province’s constituencies. Reforms included various critical items such as modifications in the electoral system which ended up changing the political game. This paper provides empirical evidence on the role played by the Double Simultaneous Voting System (DSVS), that performs simultaneously primaries and general elections, and its variations, grouped under the heading of Apparentment lists (ALs), that includes the so –called “Colectoras”, “Acoples” and “Adhesiones”, on the political competition of subnational districts for the period 1987 – 2015. DSVS was in force in 14.5% of the gubernatorial, 20.6% of the legislative and 23.8% of the mayoral elections. Likewise, the ALs were used in 33.9% of local legislative elections. Results from a panel data of eight gubernatorial elections and all 24 subnational jurisdictions show that DSVS and ALs diminish the effective number of parties, increase the margin of victory of the incumbent party and diminish the probability of party alternation and improve the probability of reelection of the incumbent governor. |
| Keywords: | Political competition; electoral systems; subnational politics; Argentina |
| JEL: | D72 P16 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aep:anales:4375&r=all |
| By: | Bredtmann, Julia |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the effects of the 2015 mass inflow of refugees to Germany on electoral outcomes. Specifically, using unique data on refugee populations and their type of accommodation, I analyze how local exposure to refugees affects the outcomes of the March 2016 state election - an election that was characterized by a strong surge in the electoral success of right-wing parties. For identification, I exploit quasi-random variation in the allocation of refugees across municipalities. The results show that an increase in the population share of refugees increases the vote share of right-wing parties and decreases the vote share of the incumbent federal government parties. The electoral effects, however, are solely driven by refugees living in centralized accommodation, and particularly by municipalities that host reception centers for refugees. These findings have important implications for the design of public policies in handling future receptions of refugees, as they reveal that an earlier transfer of refugees from centralized to decentralized accommodation could attenuate a growing support for right-wing parties. |
| Keywords: | Immigration,refugees,political economy,voting |
| JEL: | D72 F22 J15 R23 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:886&r= |
| By: | Damien, Besancenot (Université de Paris Descartes); Radu, Vranceanu (ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from a two-person "pledge and give" experiment. Each persons endowment is private information available only to him. In the first stage, each agent informs the other about the amount he intends to give, or makes a pledge. In the second stage, each agent makes a contribution to the joint donation. A simple theoretical model shows that in this game the equilibrium pledge function is linear in the endowment of each agent. Furthermore, if agents have a strong taste for conformity, the optimal gift is positively related to one's own endowment and to the pledge of his partner. Data from the lab experiment show that, indeed, subjects pledge approximately 60% of their endowment. Also, pledges have an important social influence role: an agent will increase his donation by 20 cents on average if his partner pledges one more euro. |
| Keywords: | Charity giving; Conformity; Strategic pledges; Social influence |
| JEL: | C92 D64 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–06–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-19007&r= |
| By: | Andreas Kleiner; Benny Moldovanu |
| Abstract: | We study how parliaments and committees select one out of several alternatives when options cannot be ordered along a "left-right" axis. Which voting agendas are used in practice, and how should they be designed? We assume preferences are single-peaked on a tree and study convex agendas where, at each stage in the voting process, the tree of remaining alternatives is divided into two subtrees that are subjected to a Yes-No vote. We show that strategic voting coincides with sincere, unsophisticated voting. Based on inference results and revealed preference arguments, we illustrate the empirical implications for two case studies. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2021_289&r= |
| By: | Gulzar, Saad; Khan, Muhammad Yasir |
| Abstract: | How can we motivate `good' politicians -- those that will carry out policy that is responsive to citizens' preferences -- to enter politics? In a field experiment in Pakistan, we vary how political office is portrayed to ordinary citizens. We find that emphasizing pro-social motives for holding political office instead of personal returns -- such as the ability to help others versus enhancing one's own respect and status -- raises the likelihood that individuals run for office and that voters elect them. It also better aligns subsequent policies with citizens' preferences. The candidacy decisions are explained by social influence, and not information salience -- we find that social versus personal messaging matters only when randomly delivered in a public setting but not in private. Results also show that changes in political supply, not citizen preferences or behavior, explain policy alignment. Taken together, the results demonstrate that non-financial motivations for political entry shape how politicians perform in office. |
| Date: | 2021–04–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:z9d3f&r= |
| By: | Michael Foley; Rory Smead; Patrick Forber; Christoph Riedl |
| Abstract: | Can egalitarian norms or conventions survive the presence of dominant individuals who are ensured of victory in conflicts? We investigate the interaction of power asymmetry and partner choice in games of conflict over a contested resource. We introduce three models to study the emergence and resilience of cooperation among unequals when interaction is random, when individuals can choose their partners, and where power asymmetries dynamically depend on accumulated payoffs. We find that the ability to avoid bullies with higher competitive ability afforded by partner choice mostly restores cooperative conventions and that the competitive hierarchy never forms. Partner choice counteracts the hyper dominance of bullies who are isolated in the network and eliminates the need for others to coordinate in a coalition. When competitive ability dynamically depends on cumulative payoffs, complex cycles of coupled network-strategy-rank changes emerge. Effective collaborators gain popularity (and thus power), adopt aggressive behavior, get isolated, and ultimately lose power. Neither the network nor behavior converge to a stable equilibrium. Despite the instability of power dynamics, the cooperative convention in the population remains stable overall and long-term inequality is completely eliminated. The interaction between partner choice and dynamic power asymmetry is crucial for these results: without partner choice, bullies cannot be isolated, and without dynamic power asymmetry, bullies do not lose their power even when isolated. We analytically identify a single critical point that marks a phase transition in all three iterations of our models. This critical point is where the first individual breaks from the convention and cycles start to emerge. |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2104.08636&r= |
| By: | David Szakonyi (George Washington University) |
| Abstract: | Incumbents have many tools to tip elections in their favor, yet we know little about how they choose between strategies. By comparing various tactics, this paper argues that electoral malpractice centered on manipulating institutions offers the greatest effectiveness while shielding incumbents from public anger and criminal prosecution. To demonstrate this, I focus on one widespread institutional tactic: preventing candidates from accessing the ballot. First, in survey experiments, Russian voters respond less negatively to institutional manipulations, such as rejecting candidates, than to blatant fraud, such as ballot-box stuffing. Next, using evidence from 25,935 Russian mayoral races, I show that lower societal and implementation costs enable incumbents to strategically reject candidacies from credible challengers and then reduce their electoral vulnerability. In all, the technology behind specific manipulations helps determine when and how incumbents violate electoral integrity. |
| Keywords: | electoral fraud, authoritarianism, Russia, public opinion |
| JEL: | D7 H40 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2020-23&r= |
| By: | Sutan, Angela (University Bourgogne Franche-Comte, Burgundy School of Business-); Vranceanu, Radu (ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School) |
| Abstract: | This paper reports the results from a lab experiment in which subjects playing the manager role can implement either an efficient / inegalitarian allocation or an inefficient / egalitarian allocation of payoffs. The experiment simulates a stylized managerial context by allowing the manager to manipulate information and select the decision process and by allowing the stakeholders to retaliate against the manager given different choices in the decision process. We found that the inefficient allocation is often selected and that this choice depends on whether the employees can retaliate against the manager and on whether the manager can hide information about the payoffs. The social preferences of the manager also explain the choice of the option. However, the decision process and the managerial style based on self-reported attitudes have little influence on the choice of allocation. This is consistent with employee satisfaction essentially depending on the payoff and not being sensible to the process. |
| Keywords: | Management style; Managerial decision; Decision process; Asymmetric information; Communication strategy |
| JEL: | C92 D39 M12 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-19010&r= |