|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Changxia Ke; Florian Morath; Anthony Newell; Lionel Page |
| Abstract: | In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask for a renegotiation of the initial split. We predict that, in such situations, a player can suffer from being “too strong”. Our experimental results confirm that, when the actual split of the prize is delayed, a player’s strength can turn into a strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly powerful at the stage when a split is determined. This result is relevant to many real world situations where “too strong” players find it paradoxically hard to partner with weaker players to win the game. |
| Keywords: | Shapley Value, (non) binding agreement, balance of power, communication |
| JEL: | C71 C92 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8980&r=all |
| By: | Butz, Britta (RWTH Aachen University); Guillen Alvarez, Pablo (University of Sydney); Harbring, Christine (RWTH Aachen University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effect of a donation incentive tied to contributions to a public good when group members can decide on the size of the donation to be made. An up to 20 % donation of the public good was implemented either exogenously or endogenously by group members. In the Vote treatment, groups could either decide in favor of or against a donation of 20 % of the public good; in the Vote Share treatment, subjects could decide on a donation share of between 0 % and 20 %. Results show that a large percentage of the participants vote in favor of implementing a donation share in both treatments. Voting in favor of a 20 % donation share or endogenously implementing a high donation share in the Vote Share treatment has positive effects on contributions to the public good compared to an exogenously implemented donation share. |
| Keywords: | donations, decision right, public good game, team incentives, laboratory experiment, charitable giving |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D64 D70 J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14242&r=all |
| By: | Sanjeev Goyal (emlyon business school); Penélope Hernández; Guillem Martínez-Cánovas; Frederic Moisan; Manuel Muñoz-Herrera; Angel Sánchez |
| Abstract: | We study a setting where individuals prefer to coordinate with others but they differ on their preferred action. Our interest is in understanding the role of link formation with others in shaping behavior. So we consider the situation in which interactions are exogenous and a situation where individuals choose links that determine the interactions. Theory is permissive in both settings: conformity (on either of the actions) and diversity (with different groups choosing their preferred actions) are both sustainable in equilibrium. We conduct an experiment to understand how link formation affects equilibrium selection. Our experiment reveals the powerful effect of linking on equilibrium selection: with an exogenous complete network, subjects choose to conform on the majority's preferred action. By contrast, with endogenous linking—irrespective of the costs of linking—subjects always opt for diversity of actions. |
| Keywords: | networks,equilibrium selection,Social coordination,experiment |
| Date: | 2020–09–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03188210&r=all |
| By: | Cloos, Janis; Greiff, Matthias |
| Abstract: | The achievement of collective climate targets is hampered by a large number of factors. Most obvious is the conflict between self-interest and group interest at both the intra- and intergenerational level. Several experimental studies examine the effects of factors such as wealth heterogeneity, varying thresholds, or time discounting on the probability of achieving a collective climate target. In these experiments, participants act as a group and can invest money in a collective group account over a fixed number of rounds. If the group account is below a threshold after the last round, the members of a group usually lose a large proportion of their potential assets. However, in the real world, agents can not only invest in public goods, but also exploit them. We therefore study cooperation dynamics in a threshold climate change experiment in which group members can not only contribute money into their group account, but also take money out of it. We induce endowment heterogeneity by simulating the contribution decisions in the first rounds of the experiment and vary the loss rate between treatments. Our results show no significant differences between give and give-take treatments. Consistent with the results of previous studies, we find that with a lower loss rate, less groups reach the threshold. |
| Keywords: | climate change, experiment, public goods game, threshold public goods game, exploitation |
| JEL: | C92 D74 D81 H41 Q54 |
| Date: | 2021–04–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:107144&r=all |
| By: | Do Won Kim |
| Abstract: | This study examines how the UK political space, party competition and voting behaviour have changed with the recent rise of populism. First, this paper identifies the changes in UK dimensionality by conducting factor analyses on British Election Study data. Then, it maps parties and their supporters on the identified space to explore the changes in party competition and voter-party congruence. Finally, this study runs an OLS regression to analyse to what extent voter-party congruence influences voter’s party preference. This study finds that UK political space has become multidimensional as issues related to populism have become salient enough to form an independent dimension. After Brexit, however, the main contents of this new dimension have changed from EU-related immigration issues to Brexit negotiation. Meanwhile, party competition and voter preferences have revolved around and placed more emphasis on the salient dimension. |
| Keywords: | Multidimensionality, populism, voter-party congruence |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eiq:eileqs:160&r=all |
| By: | Kai A. Konrad; Florian Morath |
| Abstract: | We study the long-run stochastic stability properties of volunteering strategies in finite populations. We allow for mixed strategies, characterized by the probability that a player may not volunteer. A pairwise comparison of evolutionary strategies shows that the strategy with a lower probability of volunteering is advantaged. However, in the long run there are also groups of volunteering types. Homomorphisms with the more volunteering types are more frequent if the groups have fewer members, and if the benefits from volunteering are larger. Such homomorphisms with volunteering cease to exist if the group becomes infinitely large. In contrast, the disadvantage of volunteering disappears if the ratio of individual benefits and costs of volunteering becomes infinitely large. |
| Keywords: | Volunteering, stochastic stability, finite populations, mixed strategies, collective action |
| JEL: | C73 D62 H41 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2020-15&r=all |
| By: | Karakostas, Alexandros; Kocher, Martin; Matzat, Dominik; Rau, Holger A.; Riewe, Gerhard |
| Abstract: | We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the team allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good and can distribute them among team members. These team allocator games are intended to capture natural asymmetries in hierarchical teams facing social dilemmas, such as those that exist in work teams. Our results show that the introduction of a team allocator leads to pronounced cooperation in both linear and best-shot public-good games, while it has no effect in the weakest-link public good. The team allocator uses her allocation power to distribute benefits from the public good in a way that motivates people to contribute. Re-allocating team payoffs allows the team allocator to reward cooperating team members and to sanction non-cooperating members at no efficiency losses from explicit sanctioning costs. As a result, team profits are higher in the linear team allocator game but not in the best-shot case, where the lack of coordination leads to a welfare decrease for the remaining team members. |
| Keywords: | public goods provision,experiment,institutions,cooperation,allocation power,teams |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:419&r=all |
| By: | Matthias Diermeier; Hannah Frohwein; Aljoscha Nau |
| Abstract: | The radical right in Europe seemed to be on an unprecedented rise. In the run-up to the European Parliament elections in 2019, a newly founded ‘super-faction’ profoundly scared established politicians. In contrast to the widespread fear of a consolidated right-wing, this contribution carves out that the radical right’ policy congruence in the European Parliament is limited due to internal division primarily caused by the parties’ nativist core ideology. Splitting the radical right into its Eastern and Western European offshoots, reveals a significant economic nativism that systemically prevents comprehensive interregional cooperation. What is more, despite common authoritarian grounds with foreign powers such as the Peoples Republic of China and Russia and their significant advance on influencing the European radical right, nativism divides the radical right also in their stance on foreign autocracies. Whereas economic nativism triggers an opposition against China within the Western European radical right, political nativism in the East obviates cooperation between European rightwingers regarding Russia. |
| Keywords: | radical right, authoritarianism, nativism, economic policy, European Parliament |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eiq:eileqs:167&r=all |
| By: | Sarah Al Doyaili-Wangler (Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper seeks to give insights into how domestic voters form their preferences pro or contra compliance with IEAs and therefore how public concern for the environment and interest group activity influence national compliance behaviour. Three hypotheses are developed. First, compliance behaviour is positively influenced by a high concern for climate change and second, by a high number of ENGOs. Third, a strong prevalence of industry interests is assumed to be connected with lower compliance. A panel data analysis on compliance with the Kyoto Protocol by Annex B countries is applied in order to test these hypotheses. The empirical findings give evidence for the first and the third one. |
| Keywords: | Kyoto Protocol, interest groups, compliance, climate policy |
| JEL: | F53 H87 Q54 |
| Date: | 2021–01–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2021-001&r=all |
| By: | Rickard, Stephanie |
| Abstract: | How does globalization affect politics? One of the most controversial aspects of globalization is offshoring, when manufacturing operations and business functions move abroad. Although voters generally dislike offshoring, it remains unclear how moving jobs abroad impacts democratic elections. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, the author finds that incumbent government parties lose more votes in municipalities where a local plant moved production abroad between elections than in municipalities that did not experience such an event. The result holds across various time periods, different incumbent parties and diverse types of elections. In both national and regional elections, voters punish incumbent government parties when a local firm moves production abroad. Incumbent parties' vote shares fall as the number of jobs lost due to offshoring increases. In multiparty governments, voters disproportionately punish the largest coalition party for offshoring. The results of an original survey administered in Spain verify the importance of offshoring for voters' retrospective evaluations of incumbents. |
| Keywords: | globalization; offshoring; voting; coalition government; incumbents; economic vote; regional government; elections |
| JEL: | R14 J01 |
| Date: | 2021–03–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:107517&r=all |
| By: | Monica Anna Giovanniello |
| Abstract: | I study how strategic communication among voters shapes both political outcomes and parties' advertising strategies in a model of informative campaign advertising. Two main results are derived. First, echo chambers arise endogenously. Surprisingly, a small ideological distance between voters is not sufficient to guarantee that a chamber is created, bias direction plays a crucial role. Second, when voters' network entails a significant waste of information, parties tailor their advertising to the opponent's supporters rather than to their own. |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2104.04703&r=all |
| By: | Patrick Sawyer (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Populist studies are increasingly interested in the effects that populism has on political systems of contemporary democracies. This article analyzes the relationship between populist parties and politicians and the intensity of political protest. Arguing that populists generate feelings of anger and outrage at the establishment politicians, develop close relationships with social movements, and instigate further polarization and resistance from the opposition, the existence of populist actors in a political system is expected to generate more political protests. Empirical testing using cross-national figures considers the case of both the prevalence of populist parties in European countries and the existence of a populist politician as the head of government in European, Latin American, and North American countries. The results testify to strong positive correlations in both cases demonstrating the potential that populism has for socio-political destabilization. However, when tests are performed in order to observe whether this relationship holds within different geographical and temporal spaces, strong negative relationships are shown with populists prior to the year 2000 and positive ones afterwards. Finally, once the ideological disposition of the populist leaders is accounted for, the results testify to a diverging pattern; whereas the populist radical right and radical left are strongly associated with increasing protests after the year 2000, in the decade prior, centrist or neoliberal populism demonstrated a significantly negative correlation with protest intensity. This is especially true of the populist radical right that tends to rise alongside mobilizations for autocracy as well as provoke mass mobilizations for democracy among the opposition. |
| Keywords: | Populism, political protests, social movements, consequences of populism, radical right, radical left, neoliberal populism, riots, anti-government demonstrations, mass mobilization |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:80/ps/2021&r=all |
| By: | Stefano Barbieri; Kai A. Konrad; David A. Malueg |
| Abstract: | We consider a preemption game between groups where the ï¬ rst agent to take a costly action wins the prize on behalf of his group. We describe the equilibrium solution of this problem when players differ in their own costs of action and these costs are private information. The equilibrium is typically characterized by delay. The nature of the equilibrium depends on key parameters such as the number of groups and their size. More competition between groups reduces delay, whereas in larger groups members of a given cost type are more reluctant to act but may yield an earlier resolution of the conflict. We analyze asymmetries across groups, focusing on group size and strength of the externalities within groups. |
| Keywords: | preemption, free riding, dynamic conflict, inter-group conflict, dynamic conflict, incomplete information, waiting |
| JEL: | D74 H41 L13 |
| Date: | 2019–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2019-09&r=all |
| By: | Katya Long; Jean-Philippe Berrou (LAM - Les Afriques dans le monde - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Alain Piveteau (PRODIG - UMR 215 Prodig - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - IRD [France-Nord] - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - AgroParisTech, IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement, PRODIG - UMR 8586 Prodig - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - IRD [France-Nord] - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement - AgroParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Thibaud Deguilhem (LADYSS - Laboratoire Dynamiques Sociales et Recomposition des Espaces - UP - Université de Paris - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne); Leo Delpy (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Claire Gondard-Delcroix (GREThA - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée - UB - Université de Bordeaux - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UMI RESILIENCES - Unité mixte internationale Résiliences - Centre ivoirien de recherches économiques et sociales (CIRES) - Université de Cocody, IRD - Institut de Recherche pour le Développement) |
| Abstract: | The growing interest in social protection in Africa over the past two decades has led to a renewal of academic research and institutional literature, rang-ing from technical and evaluation approaches to political economy studies. The latter have the analyt-ical singularity of linking the outcomes of social pro-tection policies to their modalities of political inser-tion and appropriation rather than to their original conception and the manner in which they are im-plemented. As such, this report is an original contribution to the analysis of public policies in countries under foreign aid regimes. Considering the ‘political construction of public policies' as a determinant of their success, we present here an empirical analysis of the elabo-ration of Madagascar's new social protection policy. The study of the relationships between stakeholders reveals the coalitions of actors involved and their role in the ongoing changes in orientation. The empirical strategy we have chosen combines and applies the policy network and advocacy coali-tion framework (ACF) approaches by testing them with the tools of social network analysis. It is in line with the research on developed or emerging coun-tries that is rare or non-existent in low-income countries. The inter-organisational network data is drawn from a sociometric and qualitative survey carried out in 2018 and 2019 among the member organisations of the Groupe de travail sur la protec-tion sociale – GTPS (Social Protection Working Group). Under the auspices of the Ministry of Popu-lation, this group is responsible for drafting social protection policy in Madagascar. Joining the ACF and Policy Network methodological approaches, two complementary steps support our original empirical strategy. The first step deals with a structural analysis of social protection networks, using three cumulative criteria to identify coalitions of political actors. Foremost, a coalition necessary brings together structural equivalent actors within the network of collaborations (we applied one of the most relevant blockmodeling algorithm). After-ward, the coalition's subnetwork has higher within-clique density than between-clique density on col-laboration, sharing information and agreement ties. Finally, the coalition's subnetwork has higher be-tween-clique density than within-clique density on disagreement ties. The second step explores the resource circulation within the network and the cognitive consistency of each political coalition (closeness of values between actors). This then makes it possible to identify the coalition of power, with a strong capacity for mobili-sation and influence, that is at the heart of the new social protection policy. Our results show that Madagascar's approach direct-ly reflects the paradigm shift that took place in the international political arena at the turn of the 2000s. The five relational spaces under study reflect the singular way in which this has been translated in the Malagasy institutional and political context. That of a fragile, liquefied state, with a chronic inability to resolve the redistributive conflict, particularly in a phase of economic growth. Social protection policy is dominated by a ‘pro-vulnerable' or, in other words, a ‘pro-cash' coalition, which is much more decisive than the second, ‘pro-rights' coalition. Composed mainly of actors from the relief sector, the leading coalition has a view of economic security issues based on the understand-ing of individual risks and market integration. Its organization is based on the centrality of UNICEF and includes the two ministries historically in charge of social protection in the country: the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Protection. The over-determining role of international donors is confirmed on analysis. In a position to control the content of social protection policy statements and of the related policy tools, negotiations with national public actors remain limited. In this configuration, where the failure of politics is reflected even in the marginalization of civil society actors, the external global offer tends to be hegemonic. However, this conclusion calls for some nuance. Although they do not occupy central positions, gov-ernment institutions (ministries and agencies) often act as brokers. They build bridges between the sep-arate worlds of social protection. Even if they do not govern social protection policy, the state and its administration disseminate its principles and ideas. This role as an interface between the central inter-national organizations and the population, which is characteristic of a country under foreign aid regime, places the government institutions in the position of a "development-broker". This encourages the re-production of resource accumulation strategies. Due to a lack of a dense internal social and political construction, social protection policy can only count on the accuracy and relevance of a comprehensive offer of protection and its financing through aid. From this point of view, the development of a new Malagasy social contract that would create solidarity is not on the agenda. |
| Keywords: | Social protection policy,Political Networks,Madagascar,Complete social network analysis,Advocacy coalitions,Inter-organizational relations,Public policy analysis |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03180029&r=all |
| By: | Kurosaki, Takashi (Hitotsubashi University); Paul, Saumik (Newcastle University); Witoelar, Firman (Australian National University) |
| Abstract: | Do local institutions influence the nature of political clientelist exchange? We find a positive answer in the context of a village institution prevalent in Java since the Dutch colonial rule, where democratically elected village heads receive usufruct rights over a piece of communal village land (bengkok land) as a compensation for their service in lieu of salary. To formulate how limited-term private ownership of bengkok land promotes clientelism, we model a timely delegation of agricultural tenancy contracts to villagers-cum-voters as an incumbent re-election strategy. Based on a household survey fielded in 2018 across 130 villages in Java, Indonesia, we find that the chances of a bengkok plot being rented out increase by 6 percentage points as the time of the next election becomes closer by one year, and sharecropping is preferred to a fixed-rental contract as the election approaches. The empirical results are statistically significant and remain largely unchanged against a series of robustness checks. We also find suggestive evidence of short-term efficiency loss from clientelist politics over bengkok land. |
| Keywords: | tanah bengkok, political budget cycle, clientelism, agricultural tenancy, electoral competition, Indonesia |
| JEL: | D72 H77 H83 O17 O18 |
| Date: | 2021–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14263&r=all |
| By: | Gianmarco Daniele; Andrea F.M. Martinangeli; Francesco Passarelli; Willem Sas; Lisa Windsteiger |
| Abstract: | The causal nexus between socio-economic stressors and anti-immigration sentiments remains unclear despite increasing evidence over their correlation. We exploit the social and economic disruptions brought about by the epidemic outbreak in March 2020 to randomly provide survey respondents with, at the time of the survey, pessimistic information about the economic and health consequences of the epidemic. Both economic and social stressors causally induce upsurges in anti-immigration sentiment and demand for ï¬ scal pressure retrenchment. However, radicalised attitudes are accompanied by political radicalisation only when the negative economic consequences of the epidemic are highlighted. |
| Keywords: | economic crisis, social crisis, immigration, survey experiment, radical political preferences |
| JEL: | D72 H51 H53 H55 O52 P52 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2020-17&r=all |
| By: | Mekvabishvili, Rati |
| Abstract: | Can formal institutions shape prosocial behavior and lead to the spillover effect of cooperation? To explore this question, we experimentally test the spillover- based theory in a novel context. We measured the spillover effect on cooperation in the same domain measured by the repeated anonymous public goods game. We found strong evidence of altruism. Our results are inconsistent with prediction of the spillover-based theory. Our finding suggests that exposure to strong formal institutions that provide top-down motivation for cooperation substantially improves cooperation in their presence, but do not seem to lead to more prosociality after their absence. |
| Keywords: | Centralized Punishment, Spillover, Public Goods, Cooperation |
| JEL: | C92 D02 H41 |
| Date: | 2021–03–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:107047&r=all |