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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | François Durand (Nokia Bell Labs, LINCS - Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication Sciences - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - IMT - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - SU - Sorbonne Université); Antonin Macé (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Matias Nunez (CREST - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique - ENSAI - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information [Bruz] - X - École polytechnique - ENSAE ParisTech - École Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Économique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three-candidate elections. We consider three rules, varying according to the number of candidates that voters can support in their ballot: Plurality (one), Anti-Plurality (two) and Approval Voting (one or two). We show that the Condorcet winner—a normatively desirable candidate—can always be elected at equilibrium under Approval Voting. We then numerically study a dynamic process of political tâtonnement. Monte-Carlo simulations of the process deliver rich insights on election outcomes. The Condorcet winner is virtually always elected under Approval Voting, but not under the other rules. The dominance of Approval Voting is robust to alternative welfare criteria and to the introduction of expressive voters. |
| Keywords: | Approval voting,Poisson games,Strategic voting,Condorcet consistency,Fictitious play,Expressive voting |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03162184&r=all |
| By: | Changxia Ke; Florian Morath; Anthony Newell; Lionel Page |
| Abstract: | In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition formation stage. This creates the possibility for some players to ask for a renegotiation of the initial split. We predict that, in such situations, a player can suffer from being "too strong". Our experimental results confirm that, when the actual split of the prize is delayed, a player's strength can turn into a strategic disadvantage: a greater voting power in forming a winning coalition is undermined by the threat of being overly powerful at the stage when a split is determined. This result is relevant to many real world situations where "too strong" players find it paradoxically hard to partner with weaker players to win the game. |
| Keywords: | Shapley Value, (Non) Binding Agreement, Balance of Power, Communication |
| JEL: | C71 C92 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2021–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2021-09&r=all |
| By: | Felix Bierbrauer (University of Cologne); Aleh Tsyvinski (Yale University); Nicolas Werquin (Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We develop a model of political competition with endogenous turnout and endogenous platforms. Parties trade off incentivizing their supporters to vote and discouraging the supporters of the competing party from voting. We show that the latter objective is particularly pronounced for a party with an edge in the political race. Thus, an increase in political support for a party may lead to the adoption of policies favoring its opponents so as to asymmetrically demobilize them. We study the implications for the political economy of redistributive taxation. Equilibrium tax policy is typically aligned with the interest of voters who are demobilized. |
| Keywords: | Political competition, Income Taxation, Turnout |
| JEL: | D72 D82 H21 |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:071&r=all |
| By: | Dijkstra, Lewis; Poelman, Hugo; Rodríguez-Pose, Andrés |
| Abstract: | Support for parties opposed to European Union (EU) integration has risen rapidly, and a wave of discontent has taken over the EU. This discontent is purportedly driven by the very factors behind the surge of populism: differences in age, wealth, education, or economic and demographic trajectories. This paper maps the geography of EU discontent across more than 63,000 electoral districts in the EU-28 and assesses which factors push anti-EU voting. The results show that the anti-EU vote is mainly a consequence of local economic and industrial decline in combination with lower employment and a less educated workforce. Many of the other suggested causes of discontent, by contrast, matter less than expected, or their impact varies depending on levels of opposition to European integration. |
| Keywords: | anti-Europeanism; anti-system voting; populism; economic decline; industrial decline; education; migration; European Union |
| JEL: | D72 R11 |
| Date: | 2020–06–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:101307&r=all |
| By: | Amory Gethin (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, WIL - World Inequality Lab); Marc Morgan (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, WIL - World Inequality Lab) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the transformation of electoral cleavages in Brazil since 1989 using a novel assembly of electoral surveys. Brazilian political history since redemocratization is largely a history of the rise and fall of the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT). We show that the election of Lula da Silva as President in 2002, followed by the implementation of redistributive policies by successive PT governments, was at the origin of the marked socioeconomic cleavages that emerged. In a relatively short space of time the PT transformed itself from a party of the young, highly educated, high-income elite of the Southern party of the country, to a party of the poor and lesser educated voters, increasingly located in the disadvantaged region of the Northeast. Controlling for a host of socio-demographic factors, a voter in the Northeast was 20 percentage points more likely to vote for the PT in 2018 than voters in other regions, compared to being 5 percentage points less likely to do so in 1989. In sharp contrast to other western democracies, political conflict in Brazil has followed an increasingly unidimensional class-based path. This culminated in the unification of elites and large parts of the middle class behind Bolsonaro in the 2018 presidential election. We argue that contextual policy-driven factors and programmatic alliances are key to understand the PT's singular evolution, and thus the transformation of electoral cleavages in Brazil. |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03165718&r=all |
| By: | Paola Azar (University of the Republic, Uruguay); Sergio Espuelas (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | By the turn of the 20th century, nation-building reformers in Spain tried to stimulate schooling expansion to improve (or at least dignify) Spain’s position in the international arena. However, in this paper we find that democratic imperfections help explaining the modest spread of primary schooling after the 1902 reforms. Regression results show that the lack of effective electoral competition and political patronage lowered public primary education spending across Spanish provinces in 1902-22. Voter turnout had a positive impact but it was not big enough to compensate for this negative effect. |
| Keywords: | Education, Spain, Democracy, distributive politics. |
| JEL: | D72 H52 I28 N33 N34 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ewp:wpaper:409web&r=all |
| By: | Uppenberg, Carolina (Department of Economic History, Lund University); Olsson, Mats (Department of Economic History, Lund University) |
| Abstract: | The Swedish Municipality Act, issued in 1862, consolidated a plutocratic system in which ownership and income, and the resulting level of taxation, translated into political power. However, as a measure to hinder large landowners from holding a majority of the votes, the Act guaranteed voting rights for tenants. The aim of the article is to analyse how power relations played out after this challenge to landlords’ hegemony. Through an analysis of tenants’ contracts, appeals to the King in Council and minutes from municipal board meetings, we show how landlords did not trust a political culture of deference to secure power, even if they had demanded subservience in contracts. In a deliberate and specific way, they also reserved voting rights for themselves, which we find to have been a widespread pattern although it was repeatedly pointed out as illegal by the King in Council.However, through the analysis of the board meetings, it becomes clear that the position of manorial landlords in these municipalities was so obvious that they rarely had to confront their tenants with their illegal contractual restrictions. The results empirically challenge a narrative of slow but steady democratization and theoretically challenge the alleged reciprocity of landlord-tenant relations. |
| Keywords: | landlord; tenant farmer; municipality; Swedish Municipality Act; 1862; deference; local politics; voting rights; political culture |
| JEL: | N43 N53 N93 |
| Date: | 2021–02–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:luekhi:0218&r=all |
| By: | James Rockey (University of Birmingham); Nadia Zakir (University of Leicester) |
| Abstract: | American corporate and political elites are connected by the donations that the latter receive from the former. Using a novel dataset, this paper analyzes these connections as a social network. This analysis uncovers the changing structure of this network, and thus of the changing nature of money in US politics. In particular, beyond the well understood increase in the scale of donations, we document how donation patterns have become more polarized and more concentrated. We show that the determinants of this network's structure have remained broadly constant over time. Donors associated with the same firm or industry are substantially more likely to donate to the same candidates in all the elections we study. Likewise, politicians serving on the same congressional committees have been consistently more likely to receive campaign funds from the same donors. Yet, there has been a transformation in the concentration of donations on a small number of donors and recipients connected with a small number of committees and a small number of industries. This concentration is reflected in substantial increases in the power (centrality) of the most important donors and politicians. |
| Keywords: | Donations, Campaign Contributions, Networks |
| JEL: | D72 L14 |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:21-03&r=all |
| By: | Ingela Alger (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-François Laslier (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Why do voters incur costs to participate in large elections? This paper proposes an exploratory analysis of the implications of evolutionary Kantian morality for this classical problem in the economic theory of voting: the costly participation problem. |
| Keywords: | Homo moralis,Ethical voter,Voting,Voter turnout,Kantian morality |
| Date: | 2021–03–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03163438&r=all |
| By: | David Szakonyi (George Washington University); Ora John Reuter (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee & Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Does electoral fraud stabilize authoritarian rule or undermine it? The answer to this question rests, in part, on how voters evaluate regime candidates who engage in fraud. Using a survey experiment conducted after the 2016 elections in Russia, we find that voters withdraw their support from ruling party candidates who commit electoral fraud. This effect is especially large among strong supporters of the regime. Core regime supporters are more likely to have ex ante beliefs that elections are free and fair. Revealing that fraud has occurred significantly reduces their propensity to support the regime. These findings illustrate that fraud is costly for autocrats not just because it may ignite protest, but also because it can undermine the regime’s core base of electoral support. Because many of its strongest supporters expect free and fair elections, the regime has strong incentives to conceal or otherwise limit its use of electoral fraud. |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2020-19&r=all |
| By: | Hend Ghazzai (UR MASE - Modélisation et Analyse Statistique et Economique - ESSAIT - Ecole Supérieure de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information - Université de Carthage - University of Carthage); Wided Hemissi; Rim Lahmandi-Ayed (UR MASE - Modélisation et Analyse Statistique et Economique - ESSAIT - Ecole Supérieure de la Statistique et de l'Analyse de l'Information - Université de Carthage - University of Carthage); Sana Kefi |
| Abstract: | This note extends the results already obtained by Khaloul et al. (2017) on the majority vote between monopoly and duopoly by a heterogeneous population composed of individuals who are potentially consumers, workers, and shareholders to the general case where firms are owned by a given proportion of the population. Results show that duopoly is preferred when non-shareholders constitute a majority of the population. Otherwise, the majority vote depends on the relative dispersion of the individuals with respect to their intensity of preference for quality and their sensitivity to effort. |
| Keywords: | Imperfect Competition,Democracy,Vertical Differentiation,General Equilibrium |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02480175&r=all |
| By: | Carmen Durrer de la Sota (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, WIL - World Inequality Lab); Amory Gethin (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, WIL - World Inequality Lab); Clara Martínez-Toledano (Imperial College London, WIL - World Inequality Lab) |
| Abstract: | This paper combines post-electoral surveys to study the transformation of the structure of political cleavages in Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland over the last five decades. Despite their history of linguistic, regional, and religious conflicts, all four countries share a common tradition of consensus decision-making, which has remained until the present. Yet, the weakening of historical cleavages, the emergence of new political formations (i.e. Green parties on the left and anti-immigration parties on the right), and the rise of new divides have significantly transformed their party systems since the 1980s. Support for green and left-wing parties among highest-educated voters, and for anti-immigration parties among the lower-educated has grown, while top-income earners have remained instead more supportive of the traditional right. Both the rise of new green and anti-immigration parties, but also changes within old parties have thus led to the emergence of "multi-elite party systems", as it has been shown in other Western democracies. |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03165720&r=all |