nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2021‒03‒08
fifteen papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Legislative Election 2019: Overview of the Civil Apparatus Position in Barito Kuala By Sompa, Andi Tenri
  2. Trust we lost: The Treuhand experience and political behavior in the former German Democratic Republic By Kellermann, Kim Leonie
  3. Electoral Accountability and Fiscal Federalism: The Case of Peru By Janet Porras-Mendoza; Charles R. Hankla; Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
  4. Scoring Run-off Rules, Single-peaked Preferences and Paradoxes of Variable Electorate By Eric Kamwa; Vincent Merlin; Faty Mbaye Top
  5. Political Connections, Allocation of Stimulus Spending, and the Jobs Multiplier By Joonkyu Choi; Veronika Penciakova; Felipe Saffie
  6. Social Norms and Elections: How Elected Rules Can Make Behavior (In)Appropriate By Arno Apffelstaedt; Jana Freundt; Christoph Oslislo
  7. Homo moralis goes to the voting booth: a new theory of voter turnout By Alger, Ingela; Laslier, Jean-François
  8. Election polling is not dead: A Bayesian bootstrap method yields accurate forecasts By Olsson, Henrik
  9. Naturally occurring enhancements to competition for talent in teams By Abhijit Ramalingam; Brock V. Stoddard; James M. Walker
  10. The Political Economy of Open Borders: Theory and Evidence on the role of Electoral Rules By Matteo Gamalerio; Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri
  11. Political Cleavages, Class Structures, and the Politics of Old and New Minorities in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, 1963-2019 By Amory Gethin
  12. Institutions and Opportunistic Behavior: Experimental Evidence By Antonio Cabrales; Irma Clots-Figueras; Roberto Hernán-González; Praveen Kujal
  13. Community Aspirations and Cooperation: Prescriptive vs. Descriptive Role Models By Marcela Ibañez Diaz; Menusch Khadjavi; Christina Martini
  14. Social Capital: A Double-Edged Sword By Harold L. Cole; Dirk Krueger; George J. Mailath; Yena Park
  15. Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games By Encarnacion Algaba; Rene van den Brink

  1. By: Sompa, Andi Tenri
    Abstract: The State Civil Apparatus (ASN) is a vital subject in a country's governance and development system. ASN neutrality in politics is a must. In fact, ASN is often used as a political object from the power of political parties and actors not only at the national but also regional level. This study aims to describe the ASN's political position in the elections in Barito Kuala Regency. As a critical review to explore and build a new paradigm of looking at ASN's political position during the 2019 Legislative Election process in Barito Kuala Regency. A qualitative approach with descriptive methods is used in research. Data collection techniques through three steps, namely: observation, interviews, and documentation. Analysis of Miles and Hubermen's data models and triangulation techniques are used to see the validity of the data. The results of the study are described: (1) The Political Position of ASN in Barito Kuala Regency during the 2019 Legislative Election in some ASNs was still considered to be in favor of one of the legislative candidates. Cases of neutrality violations that occurred in several ASNs, put themselves in a neutral political position. The role of ASN in the formation and distribution of power is only in the voting booth, namely choosing one of the existing legislative candidates. (2) The political position of ASN in Barito Kuala Regency during the 2019 Legislative Election should be able to place itself in a neutral position in accordance with the appeal of the circular letter from MENPAN-RB and the applicable regulations. To build a new paradigm for ASN's political position, the perpetrators of ASN neutrality violations should be fostered because most do not understand their position. For ASN which shows partiality, the organizer (Bawaslu) should take action on this matter.
    Date: 2021–01–31
  2. By: Kellermann, Kim Leonie
    Abstract: We study whether the experience of losing one's job due to the Treuhand activities in the early 1990s affected long-term political behavior among citizens of the former German Democratic Republic. During the German Reunification process, the Treuhand coordinated the privatization of former GDR firms at the cost of massive job losses. We exploit individual and spatial variation in Treuhand layoffs between 1990 and 1994, based on micro-level survey data from the German Socio-economic Panel and firm data from the IWH Treuhand Database to examine the effects on various behavioral outcomes in later years. Our results suggest that former GDR citizens who have experienced a Treuhand layoff are significantly more likely to prefer a radical party, are less interested in politics and tend to have less trust in others. At the aggregate level, districts with relatively more layoffs exhibit higher radical left vote shares in federal elections. Investigating the underlying mechanisms, we find that the effects of Treuhand job losses are relatively stronger for respondents who stayed in East Germany after Reunification. Furthermore, it seems to be nostalgia and disappointment with the transition process which drive the effects, rather than financial grievances.
    Keywords: GDR,trust agency,political behavior,unemployment,radical voting
    JEL: D72 E24 L33
    Date: 2021
  3. By: Janet Porras-Mendoza (The World Bank); Charles R. Hankla (Department of Political Science, Georgia State University, USA); Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (International Center for Public Policy, Georgia State University, USA)
    Abstract: Accountability is at the heart of the democratic enterprise. One commonly touted benefit of decentralization is that it promotes this accountability by allowing sub-national governments to target fiscal policy more precisely to the varying preferences of people in different locales. But if accountability is really functioning as it should, then citizens should use the ballot box to reward and punish local officials for their concrete policy behavior. In other words, we should not only be able to link the presence of decentralization with improvements in local public goods, but we should also be able to connect voting behavior in specific locales with the competence of local politicians. Because of the empirical challenges, few scholars have attempted test this prediction directly. Using government information as well as data coded for this project, we examine the case of Peru, assessing how measures of local government success affect the probability of reelection and recall. We find that, when Mayors manage their waste collection and education portfolios more effectively, they are more likely to win office in subsequent elections. They are also less likely to be removed in recall votes. More than that, when Mayors spend more overall, and especially when they spend more on capital projects, we find that their probability of reelection improves, and their risk of recall declines. Overall, our results show clearly that Peru’s citizens use their votes rationally to reward and punish locally elected politicians. This gives substance and support to the notion that, at least under certain circumstances, accountability can function well under decentralized government.
    Date: 2021–02
  4. By: Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - UA - Université des Antilles - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UA FDEM - Université des Antilles - Faculté de droit et d'économie de la Martinique - Université des Antilles (Pôle Martinique) - UA - Université des Antilles); Vincent Merlin (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UNICAEN UFR SEGGAT - Université de Caen Normandie - UFR de Sciences Économiques, Gestion, Géographie et Aménagement des Territoires - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université); Faty Mbaye Top
    Abstract: In three-candidate elections with single-peaked preferences, this paper analyzes the vulnerability of scoring runoff rules to abstention and participation paradoxes. These paradoxes occur when the size of the electorate varies (grows or diminishes). In particular, the Abstention or No-show paradox occurs when a voter is better off by not casting his ballot in the election. First, we show that all the scoring runoff rules that always elect the Condorcet winner on this domain are immune to the different forms of Abstention and Participation paradoxes. Secondly, when these paradoxes are still possible, we compute their likelihood under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption. We conclude that considering the single-peaked domain drastically reduces, and even sometimes eliminates the impact of No-show paradoxes, for scoring runoff rules.
    Keywords: Participation,Abstention,No-show,Run-offs,Scoring Rules,Paradoxes,Impartial Anonymous Culture,Probability
    Date: 2021–02–17
  5. By: Joonkyu Choi; Veronika Penciakova; Felipe Saffie
    Abstract: Using American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) data, we show that firms lever their political connections to win stimulus grants and public expenditure channeled through politically connected firms hinders job creation. We build a unique database that links campaign contributions and state legislative election outcomes to ARRA grant allocation. Using exogenous variation in political connections based on ex-post close elections held before ARRA, we causally show that politically connected firms are 64 percent more likely to secure a grant. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we also establish that state-level employment creation associated with grants channeled through politically connected firms is nil. Therefore, the impact of fiscal stimulus is not only determined by how much is spent, but also by how the expenditure is allocated across recipients.
    Keywords: Campaign Finance; State Grants; Public Expenditure Allocation; American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
    JEL: D22 D72 E62 H57 P16
    Date: 2021–01–29
  6. By: Arno Apffelstaedt (University of Cologne, Center for Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) and ECONtribute; Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50931 Cologne, Germany); Jana Freundt (University of Fribourg, Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania, School of Arts and Sciences; University of Fribourg, Boulevard de Perolles 90, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland); Christoph Oslislo (University of Cologne, Institute for Economic Policy; Pohligstraße 1, 50969 Cologne, Germany)
    Abstract: Can elections change people’s ideas about what is ethically right and what is wrong? A number of recent observations suggest that social norms can change rapidly as a result of election outcomes. We explore this conjecture using a controlled online experiment. In our experiment, participants rate the social appropriateness of sharing income with poorer individuals. We compare situations in which a rule has been elected that asks people to share or not to share, respectively, with situations in which no rule has been elected. In the absence of an election, sharing is widely considered socially appropriate, while not sharing is considered socially inappropriate. We show that elections can change this social norm: They shift the modal appropriateness perception of actions and, depending on the elected rule, increase their dispersion, i.e. erode previously existing consensus. As a result, actions previously judged socially inappropriate (not sharing) can become socially appropriate. This power prevails, albeit in weaker form, even if the election is subject to controversial practices such as vote buying or voter disenfranchisement. Drawing on behavioral data from another experiment, we demonstrate that election-induced norm shifts predict behavior change.
    Keywords: social norms, elections, prosocial behavior, rule compliance
    JEL: D02 D91 C91
    Date: 2021–02
  7. By: Alger, Ingela; Laslier, Jean-François
    Abstract: Why do voters incur costs to participate in large elections? This paper proposes an exploratory analysis of the implications of evolutionary Kantian morality for this classical problem in the economic theory of voting: the costly participation problem.
    Keywords: voter turnout; voting, ethical voter; homo moralis; Kantian morality
    Date: 2021–02
  8. By: Olsson, Henrik
    Abstract: We present a new Bayesian bootstrap method for election forecasts that combines traditional polling questions about people’s own intentions with their expectations about how others will vote. It treats each participant’s election winner expectation as an optimal Bayesian forecast given private and public evidence available to that individual. It then infers the independent evidence and aggregates it across participants. The bootstrap forecast outperforms aggregate national polls in the 2020 U.S. election, as well as the forecasts based on traditional polling questions posed on large national probabilistic samples before the 2018 and 2020 U.S. elections. The bootstrap forecast puts most weight on people’s expectations about how their social contacts will vote, which might incorporate information about voters who are difficult to reach or who hide their true intentions. Beyond election polling, the new method is expected to improve the validity of other social science surveys.
    Date: 2021–02–18
  9. By: Abhijit Ramalingam; Brock V. Stoddard; James M. Walker
    Abstract: In a laboratory setting, we study team production of group-level public goods, where two teams compete for the resources of a common-member who can benefit from and provide effort in both teams. Intrinsically, the common-member faces divided loyalties. We examine such competition in settings in which the common-member has productive abilities equal to that of the other team members and in which he/she has greater relative potential. In the homogeneous setting, we find evidence that competition increases when the common-member must choose team membership across decision rounds, instead of sharing membership within a round. In the heterogeneous setting, we find the largest increase in team effort when the common-member has sufficient resources to match that of team members in both teams. When the common-member’s productivity increases, so his/her capabilities are equivalent to the setting where resources increase, team performance is not equally increased. Further treatments explore possible explanations for these latter findings. Key Words: public goods; experiment; divided loyalties; competition; group choice; heterogeneity
    JEL: C72 C91 C92 H41
    Date: 2020
  10. By: Matteo Gamalerio; Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri
    Abstract: Institutions matter for the political choice of policies, and hence the consideration of the median voter's preferences should not be considered sufficient. We study theoretically and empirically how different electoral systems affect the level of openness of a country or city, zooming on the labor market as the main source of heterogeneous economic preferences towards immigration. The general result is that a polity is more open to immigration the less likely it is that policy making can be supported by a plurality of voters who do not constitute the absolute majority. There is evidence for this result at all levels in terms of correlations, and we establish causality via regression discontinuity design for the Italian case.
    Keywords: Electoral Rules, Immigration, Occupational Choice
    JEL: D72 J24 J61 R23
    Date: 2021
  11. By: Amory Gethin (PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, WIL - World Inequality Lab)
    Abstract: This paper studies the long-run transformation of the structure of political cleavages in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Regional, linguistic, and religious identities inherited from nation-building processes have differentially shaped the representation of social inequalities in the former dominions. I discuss how the politics of "old minorities" – Catholics of Irish descent in Australia, French speakers of Québec in Canada, and the Māori in New Zealand – have interacted with the politics of class and the formation of electoral divides. In all three countries, higher-educated voters have become increasingly supportive of labor, social democratic, liberal, and green parties, while high-income voters have remained more likely to vote for conservative forces, leading to the emergence of "multi-elite party systems" comparable to that found in other Western democracies. Nonetheless, nativist cleavages remain more limited in these democracies than in Western Europe, as illustrated by the only moderate support of immigrants and new minorities for left-wing and liberal parties.
    Date: 2021–02
  12. By: Antonio Cabrales (Dept. of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid); Irma Clots-Figueras (School of Economics, University of Kent); Roberto Hernán-González (Burgundy School of Business); Praveen Kujal (Dept. of Economics, Business School, Middlesex University)
    Abstract: Risk mitigating institutions have long been used by societies to protect against opportunistic behavior. We know little about how they are demanded, who demands them or how they impact subsequent behavior. To study these questions, we run a large-scale online experiment where insurance can be purchased to safeguard against opportunistic behavior. We compare two different selection mechanisms for risk mitigation, the individual and the collective (voting). We find that, whether individual or collective, there is demand for riskmitigating institutions amongst high-opportunism individuals, while low-opportunism individuals demand lesser levels of insurance. However, high-opportunism individuals strategically demand lower insurance institutions when they are chosen collectively through voting. We also find that the presence of risk mitigating institutions crowds out reciprocity. Reciprocity is lower when the no-insurance option is chosen among other insurance options than when it is not available. Finally, we also observe higher gains from exchange in lowopportunism groups than in more opportunistic ones.
    Keywords: institutions; trust; trustworthiness; voting; insurance
    JEL: C92 D02 D64
    Date: 2021
  13. By: Marcela Ibañez Diaz; Menusch Khadjavi; Christina Martini
    Abstract: This paper examines the hypothesis that cooperation depends on the aspirations that individuals hold for their community welfare and tests whether videos that depict either a successful example of collective action or living conditions in rural areas can shape community aspirations and increase cooperation among rural communities in Zambia. The results of a lab in the field experiment indicate that compared with the no video condition, unconditional contributions are higher in the video that presents village life while the collective action video does not affect cooperation. When both contributors watch the village life video, conditional contributions are also higher compared to the control treatment. This points to the importance of social norms in the evolution of collective action. We find that individual aspirations are significantly negatively related to the unconditional contribution decision, while community aspirations do not correlate with contribution levels.
    Keywords: Community/Rural/Urban Development
    Date: 2021–01–11
  14. By: Harold L. Cole (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, and NBER); Dirk Krueger (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, CEPR and NBER); George J. Mailath (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, and RSE, Australian National University); Yena Park (Seoul National University)
    Abstract: We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when coalitions may deviate. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any deviating coalition rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term \social capital". We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviating coalitions symmetrically and show that higher social capital tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates both the formation of the original as well as a deviating coalition. As a consequence, although social capital facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of social capital and equilibrium allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: social capital is indeed a double-edged sword.
    Keywords: Financial Coalition, Limited Enforcement, Risk Sharing, Coalition-Proof Equilibrium
    JEL: E21 G22 D11 D91
    Date: 2021–02
  15. By: Encarnacion Algaba (Escuela Superior de Ingenieros); Rene van den Brink (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
    Abstract: Agents participating in different kind of organizations, usually take different positions in some network structure. Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks. We give an overview of the most common models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in cooperative games, compare different network structures with each other and discuss network structures that combine communication as well as hierarchical features. Throughout the survey, we illustrate these network structures by applying them to cooperative games with restricted cooperation.
    Keywords: Networks, games, communication, hierarchy, cooperative TU-game, Shapley value
    JEL: C71
    Date: 2021–02–24

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