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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Ana Alicia Dipierri; Dimitrios Zikos |
| Abstract: | Extreme environmental variations, as a phenomenon deriving from climate change, led to an exacerbated uncertainty on water availability and increased the likelihood of conflicts regarding water-dependent activities such as agriculture. In this paper, we investigate the role of conflict resolution mechanisms—one of Ostrom’s acclaimed Design Principles—when social-ecological systems are exposed to physical external disturbances. The theoretical propositions predict that social-ecological systems with conflict-resolution mechanisms will perform better than those without them. We tested this proposition through a framed field experiment that mimicked an irrigation system. This asymmetric setting exposed farmers to two (2) dilemmas: (i) how much to invest in the communal irrigation system’s maintenance and (ii) how much water to extract. The setting added a layer of complexity: water availability depended not only on the investment but also on the environmental variability. Our findings confirmed the theoretical proposition: groups with stronger ‘institutional robustness’ can cope with environmental variations better than those with weaker robustness. However, we also found that some groups, despite lacking conflict-resolution mechanisms, were also able to address environmental variations. We explored potential explanatory variables to these unexpected results. We found that subjects’ and groups’ attributes might address uncertainty and avert conflict. Thus, social-ecological systems’ capacity to respond to external disturbances, such as environmental variations, might not only be a question of Design Principles. Instead, it might also be strongly related to group members’ attributes and group dynamics. Our results pave the way for further research, hinting that some groups might be better equipped for mitigation measures, while others might be better equipped for adaptation measures. |
| Keywords: | irrigation systems; common-pool resources governance; environmental variability; collective action; institutional robustness; climate change |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/317130&r=all |
| By: | Walid Merouani (Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée pour le Développement); Rana Jawad (University of Bath) |
| Abstract: | Political participation by citizens is important to ensure good governance and the accountability of policy makers’ decisions and initiatives. However, this issue may be especially difficult in contexts of high informal labour, defined in this paper as workers not enrolled in the formal social security system. This paper examines the topic of political participation among young workers in five Arab countries: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. It compares both formal and informal sector workers using data from the European Union’s 2018 SAHWA survey (http://www.sahwa.eu/). Amongst other variables, the paper tests the impact of informality on political participation. It uses four proxies for political participation to compare formal and informal workers in the case study countries: (1) affiliation to a political party or movement; (2) frequency of participation in political meetings/campaigns or participation in politics via the Internet; (3) frequency of speaking about politics and economic issues with peers; (4) voting in elections (both general and local). By controlling for demographic and socio-economic variables, the analysis uses discrete choice model to test the impact of this informality on the four proxies of political participation. An important contribution of this paper is to incorporate job satisfaction into the analysis. The results indicate that informal workers are less likely to participate in key political behaviours such as belonging to political parties, participating in political meetings and speaking about politics and voting with peers. The paper proposes some key policy implications arising from the analysis |
| Date: | 2020–12–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erg:wpaper:1434&r=all |
| By: | Thomas Piketty (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, WIL - World Inequality Lab); Fabian Kosse (LMU - Institut für Informatik [München/Munich] - LMU - Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München) |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the changing relationships between party support, electoral cleavages and socioeconomic inequality in Germany since 1949. We analyze the link between voting behaviors and socioeconomic characteristics of voters. In the 1950s-1970s, the vote for left parties was strongly associated with lower education and lower income voters. Since the 1980s voting for left parties has become associated with higher education voters. In effect, intellectual and economic elites seem to have drifted apart, with high-education elites voting for the left and high-income elites voting for the right. We analyze how this process is related to the occurrence of new parties since 1980 and the recent rise of populism. |
| Date: | 2020–11–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03022265&r=all |
| By: | Laura Metzger; Adnan Qadir Khan; Teddy Svoronos |
| Abstract: | In a lab-in-field experiment with elite civil servants in Pakistan, we investigate whether groups outperform individuals in a two-staged task which requires effective use of data and evidence. We also study how efficiently groups harness their members' individual knowledge for problem-solving. We do not find a significant difference in individual (first stage) and group performance (second stage). Yet, groups could have significantly improved their performance during the second stage of the task, had they more efficiently collaborated to retrieve their members' respective knowledge. Carefully interpreted in the setting of our experiment, our data suggests that diversity in individual knowledge may hamper effective use of data and evidence for decision-making in small groups of policymakers. |
| Keywords: | evidence-based policy, adult learning, group decisions, lab-in-field experiment, civil servants, Pakistan |
| JEL: | A29 C92 I28 I38 |
| Date: | 2020–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stieop:68&r=all |
| By: | Pollermann, Kim; Fynn, Lynn-Livia; Schwarze, Stefan |
| Abstract: | Fostering innovation-driven regional development has become a major priority for public policy. Thus innovation is a crucial issue in Rural Development Programmes (RDP) to overcome challenges like economic development and demographic change. One part of RDP funded by the European Union, which explicitly addresses innovation, is LEADER: a bottom-up-oriented, participatory approach which relies on cooperation between local actors in the sense of a Community-led local development (CLLD). Stakeholders of different institutions and origins come together in a Local Action Group (LAG) to decide on the projects to be financed. Previous research provides evidence that rural communities are innovative when they have the necessary space and power to act. There is, however, little knowledge about the factors, which are crucial for the power to act, and about the policy framework that provides the necessary space in CLLD-context. The aim of the paper is hence to identify factors, which influence the implementation of innovative projects. Our analysis builds on surveys among LAG-managers, LAG-members and beneficiaries in 115 LEADER areas in four federal states in Germany (Hesse, Lower-Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein). Since the explanatory is a dummy variable we used logit models for the analysis. Overall, 56% of the beneficiaries classified their own project as innovative. There are, however, large differences between the different federal states. Our econometric results suggest that origin of the project idea and the type of beneficiary significantly influence the likelihood of innovation. The expectation that heterogeneity fosters innovative ideas is not supported by our analyses.Fostering innovation-driven regional development has become a major priority for public policy. Thus innovation is a crucial issue in Rural Development Programmes (RDP) to overcome challenges like economic development and demographic change. One part of RDP funded by the European Union, which explicitly addresses innovation, is LEADER: a bottom-up-oriented, participatory approach which relies on cooperation between local actors in the sense of a Community-led local development (CLLD). Stakeholders of different institutions and origins come together in a Local Action Group (LAG) to decide on the projects to be financed. Previous research provides evidence that rural communities are innovative when they have the necessary space and power to act. There is, however, little knowledge about the factors, which are crucial for the power to act, and about the policy framework that provides the necessary space in CLLD-context. The aim of the paper is hence to identify factors, which influence the implementation of innovative projects. Our analysis builds on surveys among LAG-managers, LAG-members and beneficiaries in 115 LEADER areas in four federal states in Germany (Hesse, Lower-Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein). Since the explanatory is a dummy variable we used logit models for the analysis. Overall, 56% of the beneficiaries classified their own project as innovative. There are, however, large differences between the different federal states. Our econometric results suggest that origin of the project idea and the type of beneficiary significantly influence the likelihood of innovation. The expectation that heterogeneity fosters innovative ideas is not supported by our analyses. |
| Keywords: | Innovation,Rural development,LEADER,evaluation |
| JEL: | R1 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esconf:228489&r=all |
| By: | Andrzej Baranski Author e-mail: a.baranski@nyu.edu; Diogo Geraldes Author e-mail: diogogeraldes@gmail.com; Ada Kovaliukaite Author e-mail: ada.kovaliukaite@nyu.edu; James Tremewan Author e-mail: james.tremewan@auckland.ac.nz (Division of Social Science) |
| Abstract: | Does the gender composition of committees affect negotiations in majoritarian bargaining? We report the results of an experiment in which subjects are placed in triads to negotiate the division of a sum of money under majority rule and the gender composition of the group is manipulated, ranging from all female (FFF), female majority (FFM), male majority (MMF), to all male (MMM). Results show that men are more likely to make the opening offer, and contrary to our hypothesis, agreements are reached fastest in MMM and slowest in FFF. The proportion of grand coalitions is increasing in the number of females while minimal winning coalitions (MWCs) increase monotonically in the number of males. MWCs are disproportionately more likely to be same-gender in MMF, which leads to a gender gap in earnings compared to FFM. When provisional MWCs form prior to a final agreement, excluded men are more proactive than excluded women in attempting to break the coalition by making alluring offers, which partially explains why mixed gender MWCs are less frequent in MMF compared to FFM. Notably, some females adopt male-type behavior in MMF regarding their initial proposals and aggressiveness when left out from a MWC. |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nad:wpaper:20210060&r=all |
| By: | Vasudha Chopra (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee); Hieu M. Nguyen (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee); Christian A. Vossler (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee) |
| Abstract: | This study examines how behavior in inter-group contests is altered when players have incomplete information on their opponent. We model a Tullock contest where there are two possible types of groups that are heterogeneous in the incentives they face, and players only know the probability their opponent is a particular group type. Relative to a contest with complete information, we find theoretically that incomplete information lowers contest-level effort in (even) contests between groups of the same type, whereas it increases effort in uneven contests. Through an experiment, we compare three sources of heterogeneity – differences in cost-of-effort, prize value, and group size. For the cost and value treatments, we find that incomplete information increases effort in uneven contests but has no effect in even contests. For the group size treatments, incomplete information has no effect. A theory that assumes players are altruistic towards group members, rather than purely self-interested, is much better at predicting outcomes. |
| Keywords: | inter-group competition; heterogeneous contests; Tullock contests; incomplete information; public goods; group size paradox; experiments; altruism |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D74 D82 D91 H41 |
| Date: | 2020–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ten:wpaper:2020-05&r=all |
| By: | Amory Gethin, (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, WIL - World Inequality Lab); Sultan Mehmood (Aix-Marseille School of Economics [Aix-Marseille Université] - Centre de la Vieille Charité [Aix-Marseille Université] - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Thomas Piketty (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, WIL - World Inequality Lab) |
| Abstract: | This study documents the changing structure of Pakistan's political cleavages by making use of a unique set of exit polls covering every direct election held in the country between 1970 and 2018. We analyze the evolution of the party system, beginning with the initial economic "left-right" opposition between the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Muslim Leage. Regionalist, ethnolinguistic and religious divides have weakened and transformed this party system. The decline of the PPP has come with its transformation from a lowincome mass-based party to an ethnic party confined to Sindhi speakers. We also analyze the recent rise of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the role played by the political unification of the various economic, religious and military elites in its success. Finally, we discuss how the Islamization policies implemented under the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) have contributed to weaken the development of a pro-redistribution secularist coalition. |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03022253&r=all |
| By: | McGaughey, Ewan (King's College, London) |
| Abstract: | This is a response to the Law Commission's call for evidence for its Intermediated Securities project (2019-2020). This submission sets out (1) the concentration of voting power in the hands of asset managers and banks, (2) the way that votes on shares are appropriated from other people's money, particularly the true investors in pensions, life insurance or mutual funds, (3) the conflicts of interest that asset managers and banks have, by voting in companies to whom they sell financial products, (4) the market failures and competition law problems when a small number of asset managers and banks take other people's votes, and (5) how the law can remove these problems, and make capital accountable to the real investor, by requiring asset managers or bans vote only based on a policy set by elected or accountable representatives of the true investors, or their instructions. Currently UK asset managers are uniformly refusing to follow any instructions of the people to whom the money belongs, often with an unfounded excuse that this is difficult when funds are pooled. This is an untenable position. It warrants intervention by the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority, or both. It explains models and proposals in other countries, such as Switzerland or the US, which face the same problems. |
| Date: | 2019–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:lawarx:bxk46&r=all |
| By: | Yonatan Berman (LML - London Mathematical Laboratory) |
| Abstract: | This paper draws on pre-and post-election surveys to address the long run evolution of voting patterns in Israel from 1949 to 2019. The heterogeneous ethnic, cultural, educational, and religious backgrounds of Israelis created a range of political cleavages that evolved throughout its history and continue to shape its political climate and its society today. Despite Israel's exceptional characteristics, we find similar patterns to those found for France, the UK and the US. Notably, we find that in the 1960s-1970s, the vote for left-wing parties was associated with lower social class voters. It has gradually become associated with high social class voters during the late 1970s and later. We also find a weak interrelationship between inequality and political outcomes, suggesting that despite the social class cleavage, identity-based or "tribal" voting is still dominant in Israeli politics. |
| Keywords: | Political cleavages,Political economy,Income inequality,Israel |
| Date: | 2020–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-03022224&r=all |
| By: | Brunnschweiler, Christa N. (University of East Anglia); Obeng, Samuel Kwabena (University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | We examine how local governments' political alignment with central government affects subnational fiscal outcomes. In theory, alignment could be rewarded with more intergovernmental transfers, or swing voters in unaligned constituencies could be targeted instead. We analyze data from Ghana, which has a complex decentralized system: District Chief Executives (DCEs) are centrally-appointed local administrators loyal to the ruling party, while district MPs may belong to another party. A formula for transfer distribution aims to limit the ifluence of party politics. Using a new dataset for 1994-2014 and a regression discontinuity design, we find that despite this system, districts with aligned MP and DCE receive more transfers, have higher district expenditure, and more internally generated funds. Results are strongest for a subsample of constant districts over the period, suggesting that municipal fragmentation has weakened political alignment effects. We also show strong electoral cycle effects, and find a crowd-in effect for Ghanaian districts. JEL codes: H7 ; D72 ; H87 ; O55 |
| Keywords: | fiscal federalism ; political alignment ; ypaper effect ; Ghana ; regression discontinuity |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1316&r=all |
| By: | Heinz, Nicolai; Koessler, Ann-Kathrin |
| Abstract: | Pro-environmental behaviour (PEB) is often promoted by reinforcing or highlighting own benefits. However, considering that actors also care about the outcomes for others (i.e. they hold other-regarding preferences), PEB may also be encouraged by addressing these other-regarding preferences. In this paper, we review the results from social science experiments where interventions addressing other-regarding preferences were used to promote PEB. Based on our synthesis, we conclude that addressing other-regarding preferences can be effective in promoting (various types of) PEB in some, but not in all instances. Whether an intervention was effective depended inter alia on the pre-established preferences, cost structures and the perceived cooperation of others. Effective interventions included the provision of information on behavioural consequences, perspective-taking, direct appeals, framing and re-categorization. The interventions worked by activating other-regarding preferences, raising awareness about adverse consequences, evoking empathic concern and expanding the moral circle. We propose to take these findings as an impulse to examine policy instruments and institutions in terms of whether they activate and strengthen other-regarding preferences, thereby enabling collective engagement in PEB. |
| Keywords: | pro-environmental behaviour,experiments,other-regarding preferences,empathic concern,preference activation,review |
| JEL: | Q56 Y80 D90 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:228467&r=all |
| By: | Victor Augias; Daniel M. A. Barreto |
| Abstract: | How can motivated thinking impact strategic information disclosure? We investigate this question by modelling a game of persuasion in which Receiver is a "wishful thinker" in the fashion of Caplin and Leahy (2019). Following reception of Sender's signal, Receiver optimally chooses its subjective belief by trading off the anticipatory utility she derives from being optimistic and the psychological cost of distorting beliefs. We derive the optimal correspondence between Bayesian and motivated belief and characterize conditions on primitives of the model that define whether the persuader is better or worse off when facing a wishful thinker vis-\`a-vis the Bayesian canonical model of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). We apply those results to explain some stylized facts such as why financial advisors often mislead their clients and why informational interventions are often inefficient in inducing more investment in preventive health treatments. Finally, we extend the model to a binary majority voting setting in which wishful voters hold heterogeneous partisan preferences. We show that, if voters' preferences are symmetrically distributed around the median voter, optimal public persuasion induces maximum belief polarization in the electorate. This formalizes a new mechanism for the emergence of polarization: as a byproduct of strategic information disclosure to wishful agents. |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2011.13846&r=all |