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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Gerard Domènech i Gironell (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | This work proposes and studies a two candidate model of electoral competition with candidate quality and media. The role of media is to inform voters about the quality of each candidate. We assume that there are two non-strategic media outlets, each one with a different ideal policy (there is a leftist media outlet and a rightist one), and that both of them transmit lower quality for a candidate the further from their ideal policy the policy the candidate proposes is. We also assume that the rightist media outlet has greater coverage, in the sense that it informs neutral voters and voters slightly on the left side of the political spectrum. We study the model under the classical assumption of risk-averse voters. Classical results concerning PSNE generally hold with a "media bias". We extend and characterize in our setting the MSNE found in Aragonés and Xefteris (2012), which sometimes fails to exist in our model. |
| Keywords: | Electoral competition, Median voter, Media manipulation, Candidate quality. |
| JEL: | C72 C82 D72 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ewp:wpaper:401web&r=all |
| By: | Gallo, E.; Langtry, A. |
| Abstract: | In recent years online social networks have become increasingly prominent in political campaigns and, concurrently, several countries have experienced shock election outcomes. This paper proposes a model that links these two phenomena. In our set-up, the process of learning from others on a network is influenced by confirmation bias, i.e. the tendency to ignore contrary evidence and interpret it as consistent with one's own belief. When agents pay enough attention to themselves, confirmation bias leads to slower learning in any symmetric network, and it increases polarization in society. We identify a subset of agents that become more/less influential with confirmation bias. The socially optimal network structure depends critically on the information available to the social planner. When she cannot observe agents' beliefs, the optimal network is symmetric, vertex-transitive and has no self-loops. We explore the implications of these results for electoral outcomes and media markets. Confirmation bias increases the likelihood of shock elections, and it pushes fringe media to take a more extreme ideology. |
| Keywords: | social learning, confirmation bias, network, elections, media |
| JEL: | C63 D72 D83 D85 D91 L15 |
| Date: | 2020–11–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2099&r=all |
| By: | Martin Mosler |
| Abstract: | I empirically examine whether autocratic governments use decoy voting in the United Nations General Assembly to hide repressive behavior of their regimes. Previous research has identified the State of Israel as a unique decoy. My sample includes votes on all 4,878 contested resolutions involving Israel between 1950 and 2018. The vote agreement rate of fully autocratic regimes with Israel is on average 3.2 percentage points or 18 percent of a standard deviation lower than among fully democratic governments for Israel- and Palestinian issues-related resolutions. The effect is more pronounced for resolutions that primarily deal with the State of Israel, with an estimated decline in voting alignment of 3.6 percentage points or 20 percent of a standard deviation. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that autocratic governments use resolutions against the only Jewish-majority state to fill the voting agenda and deflect attention from their regimes. |
| Keywords: | United Nations, autocracy, ethics of governance, decoy, political alignment, Israel |
| JEL: | F53 D72 D74 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_340&r=all |
| By: | Volker Britz (CER–ETH – Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zurichbergstrasse 18, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland); Hans Gersbach (CER–ETH – Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Zurichbergstrasse 18, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | We consider non–cooperative bargaining on the division of a surplus under simple majority rule. We use the “open rule” bargaining protocol as originally suggested by Baron and Ferejohn (1989): Proposals can be amended before they are voted on. It is widely known that there are significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. In order to address these gaps, we provide a fresh analysis of a particularly simple class of equilibria. Our results shed new light on the efficiency and fairness implications of using an open vs. closed rule in bargaining. In particular, our results on the open rule model suggest that equilibrium delays tend to be longer, and surplus allocations tend to be less egalitarian than originally predicted by Baron and Ferejohn. Understanding the efficiency and fairness properties of different bargaining protocols is crucial for institutional design. |
| Keywords: | Bargaining, Legislatures, Open Rules, Baron and Ferejohn, Stationary Equilibrium |
| JEL: | C72 C78 D72 |
| Date: | 2020–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:20-346&r=all |
| By: | Enrico Cantoni; Vincent Pons |
| Abstract: | We measure the overall influence of contextual versus individual factors (e.g., voting rules and media as opposed to race and education) on voter behavior, and explore underlying mechanisms. Using a U.S.-wide voter-level panel, 2008–18, we examine voters who relocate across state and county lines, tracking changes in registration, turnout, and party affiliation to estimate location and individual fixed effects in a value-added model. Location explains 37 percent of the cross-state variation in turnout (to 63 percent for individual characteristics) and an only slightly smaller share of variation in party affiliation. Place effects are larger for young and White voters. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27998&r=all |
| By: | Adam, Antonis; Tsavou, Evi |
| Abstract: | We use a cross-country dataset on terrorism and leadership survival from 1970 through 2015 to shed light on a leader’s fate after terrorists’ strike. We provide robust evidence that incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes face an increased hazard of exit from political power. This is contrasted with the closed authoritarian dictators that remain intact. Moreover, we fail to find a robust effect of terrorism on a leader’s survival probability in democracies. We conceive this effect to be due to the collapse of the elite coalition in autocracies after an attack, suggesting that the Dictator’s “loyal friends” betray him in the aftermath of terrorism. |
| Keywords: | Terrorism · Political Survival · Incumbent Leaders · Electoral Autocracies · Closed Autocracies |
| JEL: | P16 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:103772&r=all |
| By: | José Mª Alonso-Meijide (Universidade de Santiago de Compostela); Mikel Álvarez-Mozos (Universitat de Barcelona); Mª Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro (Universidade de Vigo); Andrés Jiménez-Losada (Universidad de Sevilla) |
| Abstract: | Given a finite set of agents, an embedded coalition consists of a coalition and a partition of the rest of agents. We study a partial order on the set of embedded coalitions of a finite set of agents. An embedded coalition precedes another one if the first coalition is contained in the second and the second partition equals the first one after removing the agents in the second coalition. This poset is not a lattice. We describe the maximal lower bounds and minimal upper bounds of a finite subset, whenever they exist. It is a graded poset and we are able to count the number of elements at a given level as well as the total number of chains. The study of this structure allows us to derive results for games with externalities. In particular, we introduce a new concept of convexity and show that it is equivalent to having non-decreasing contributions to embedded coalitions of increasing size. |
| Keywords: | Partial order, Embedded coalition, Partition function, Convexity. |
| JEL: | C71 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ewp:wpaper:388web&r=all |
| By: | Jordi Brandts; David J. Cooper |
| Abstract: | We study the tradeoffs between managerial control and delegation using a new experimental game, the manager-subordinate game. Actions for two subordinates are either chosen independently by the subordinates (delegation) or imposed by a manager (managerial control). The manager-subordinate game combines four properties: (1) All parties benefit if the subordinates coordinate their actions. (2) The state of the world varies, changing which outcome is efficient. (3) Subordinates have differing preferences over which common course of action should be chosen. (4) Subordinates know the state of the world, but the manager does not. Efficient coordination requires coordinating subordinates’ action and utilizing their private information. We find that total efficiency is highest with a combination of managerial control and free-form chat between the three players. This combination works because subordinates rarely lie about their private information, making efficient coordination possible. The frequency of truth-telling contrasts with findings from the experimental literature on lying. |
| Keywords: | Coordination, experiments, Organizations, communication, truth-telling |
| JEL: | C92 D23 L20 |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1211&r=all |
| By: | Sarah Schneider-Strawczynski (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Does exposure to refugees change the political preferences of natives towards far-right parties, and how does this change in preferences occur? This paper examines the political economy of refugee-hosting. Using the opening of refugee centers in France between 1995 and 2017, I show that voting for far-right parties in cities with such opening between two presidential elections has fallen by about 2 percent. The drop in far-right voting is higher in municipalities with a small population, working in the primary and secondary sectors, with low educational levels and few migrants. I show that this negative effect can not be explained by an economic channel , but rather by a composition channel, through natives' avoidance, and a contact channel, through natives' exposure to refugees. I provide suggestive evidence that too-disruptive exposure to refugees, as measured by the magnitude of the inflows, the cultural distance and the media salience of refugees, can mitigate the beneficial effects of contact on reducing far-right support. |
| Keywords: | Migration,Refugees,Political Economy,Preferences Keywords: Migration,Preferences |
| Date: | 2020–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-02982827&r=all |