nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2020‒05‒04
eighteen papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention By Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois
  2. Ballots instead of Bullets? The effect of the Voting Rights Act on political violence By Jean Lacroix
  3. Identity Politics, Clientelism, and Public Goods Provision: Theory and Evidence By Rohit Ticku; Raghul S. Venkatesh
  4. Procedural Preferences, Self-Interest, and Communication. Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment By Philipp Harms; Claudia Landwehr; Maximilian Lutz; Markus Tepe
  5. Does the Winner Take It All? Redistributive Policies and Political Extremism By Gianmarco Daniele; Amedeo Piolatto; Willem Sas
  6. Divided They Fall. Fragmented Parliaments and Government Stability By Felipe Carozzi; Davide Cipullo; Luca Repetto
  7. Do Inheritance Rules Affect Voter Turnout? Evidence from an Alpine Region By Andrea Bonoldi; Chiara Dalle Nogare; Martin Mosler; Niklas Potrafke
  8. Resilience, self-efficacy and political participation By Andrea Chmitorz; Claudia Landwehr; Arndt Leininger; Thomas Schroeter; Oliver Tüscher
  9. A Glimpse of Freedom: Allied Occupation and Political Resistance in East Germany By Luis R. Martinez; Jonas Jessen; Guo Xu
  10. One Man, One Vote Part 2: Measurement of Malapportionment and Disproportionality and the Lorenz Curve By de Mouzon, Olivier; Laurent, Thibault; Le Breton, Michel
  11. Political Integration of Foreigners How does foreigners suffrage impact natives’ attitudes? By Anna Maria Koukal; Marco Portmann
  12. The Institutions of Livelihood and Social Enterprise Systems By Silvia Sacchetti; Carlo Borzaga; Ermanno C. Tortia
  13. Compound Games, focal points, and the framing of collective and individual interests. By Stefan Penczynski; Stefania Sitzia; Jiwei Zheng
  14. EU Solidarity and Policy in Fighting Infectious Diseases: State of Play, Obstacles, Citizen Preferences and Ways Forward. By Anniek de Ruijter; Roel Beetsma; Brian Burgoon; Francesco Nicoli; Frank Vandenbroucke
  15. Social Influence in Committee Deliberation By Chaim Fershtman; Uzi Segal
  16. Platform Cooperativism in Italy and in Europe By Francesca MARTINELLI, , & Giuseppe GUERINI; Samuele BOZZONI; Simone CAROLI; Francesca TAMASCELLI; Giuseppe GUERINI
  17. Tension Between Stability and Representativeness in a Democratic Setting By Victorien Barbet; Juliette Rouchier; Noé Guiraud; Vincent Laperrière
  18. The public sector innovation lifecycle: A device to assist teams and organisations in developing a more sophisticated approach to public sector innovation By OECD

  1. By: Balles, Patrick (University of Basel); Matter, Ulrich (University of Basel); Stutzer, Alois (University of Basel)
    Abstract: We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to politics. Based on 425 roll calls between 2005 and 2014 in the US House of Representatives, we show that representatives are more likely to vote with special interests and against constituency interests when the two are in conflict. Importantly, the latter effect is significantly larger when there is less attention on politics due to exogenous newsworthy events. The opportunistic behavior seems not to be mediated by short-term scheduling of sensitive votes right after distracting events.
    Keywords: Attention, campaign finance, interest groups, legislative voting, mass media, roll call voting, US House of Representatives
    JEL: D72 L82 L86
    Date: 2020–04–24
  2. By: Jean Lacroix
    Abstract: The extension of voting rights epitomizes the construction of modern democracies. This paper empirically investigates the effect of such an enfranchisement on political violence in the context of the US Voting Rights Act (VRA - 1965). The Act forbade discrimination in voting. Its coverage formula generated both geographic and temporal local discontinuities in its application. The empirical strategy takes advantage of these features by comparing the evolution of political violence in geographically close covered and non-covered counties. Difference-in- differences estimates indicate that the VRA coverage halved the incidence and the onset of political violence. Alternative approaches such as geographic matching or geographic discontinuity design reach the same results whereas multiple tests validate the empirical strategy. Extensions also show that redistribution and electoral outcomes do not explain these dynamics. Instead, I report empirical evidence suggesting that voting became the new institutionalized way to state political preferences. Indeed, the VRA mostly decreased pre-elections and small- scale strategic disruptive violence and not complements to voting such as larger-scale protests turning violent.
    Keywords: Political violence; Enfranchisement; Civil rights movement
    JEL: D74 N44 H89
    Date: 2020–04–13
  3. By: Rohit Ticku (Institute for the Study of Religion, Economics and Society, Chapman University); Raghul S. Venkatesh (University of Aix-Marseille)
    Abstract: We study how identity politics determines clientelism and provision of public goods in representative democracies. Parties cultivate vote banks—a group of voters who vote along identity lines — in exchange for clientelistic transfers, and provide public goods to nonpartisan voters. There is ex-post identity formation among non-partisans that depends on the party in power. This generates an asymmetry in ex-post conflict payoff for the majority identity. The main theoretical result proposes a new mechanism for clientelism and rent seeking that is driven by identity politics. We further show that asymmetry in identity payoffs i) increases investment in conflict when the party with the support of minorities wins; and ii) increases public goods provision by both parties when income of minorities is below a threshold. We provide empirical evidence from state level elections in India for the period from 1983 till 2000. Results show that identity conflict is more intense when the party with minority identity vote bank is in power. This effect is magnified by the income of minorities. Further, provision of public goods under the party with minority vote bank increases with asymmetry in identity payoffs.
    Keywords: Identity Politics; Clientalism; Inter-group Conflict; Public Goods
    JEL: D0 H0 H4
    Date: 2020
  4. By: Philipp Harms (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany); Claudia Landwehr (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany); Maximilian Lutz (University of Oldenburg); Markus Tepe (University of Oldenburg)
    Abstract: What determines individuals’ preferences over alternative decision-making procedures – the potential gain from these procedures or the intrinsic value assigned to them? This study tests an income redistribution game, in which subjects can endogenously determine whether to decide upon redistribution by majority voting or to delegate the decision to a randomly selected member of the group (a “random decider”). Subjects are assigned to groups of three and receive an initial endowment, the sum of endowments being common knowledge. After a choice of the decision procedure to be applied, they can choose to either redistribute endowments equally or to maintain the original allocation. We find that the share of rational egoistic procedural choices increases when the distribution of endowments is common knowledge, compared to a situation in which subjects only know their own endowment. However, a substantive share of subjects reveals a persistent preference for majority voting, regardless of their distributional interest. Support for majority voting is strongest when common knowledge of initial endowments is combined with a chat option. These findings not only suggest that majority voting is a normative default when the rational egoistic procedural choice is limited by a lack of information, but also that support for majority voting, even where it is costly to the individual, is promoted through communication.
    Keywords: procedural preferences, endogenous institutional choice, majority voting, delegation, laboratory experiment
    Date: 2020–04–23
  5. By: Gianmarco Daniele; Amedeo Piolatto; Willem Sas
    Abstract: We show that regional heterogeneity of underlying fundamentals (e.g. economic history, geography, social capital) can lead to extreme voting in federations. When the outcome of federal policies – such as transfer schemes, market regulation or migration laws – depends on these fundamentals, the set of regions that wins or loses from a given policy is fixed. This gives voters a strategic incentive to distort the policy magnitude, by electing federal representatives that are extremely protective of regional interests. Interestingly, the benefits of selecting tough negotiators outweigh those of belonging to the ruling coalition. We test our predictions by looking at parties’ performances at national and European Parliament elections from 1990 onwards, and find that strategic voting is indeed U-shaped: winning and losing member states vote more extremely than those in the middle. Our online survey provides further evidence.
    Keywords: political extremism, interregional redistribution, federalism, strategic delegation, bargaining, coalitions, EU elections, Euroscepticism, populism
    JEL: D72 H60 H71 H77
    Date: 2020
  6. By: Felipe Carozzi; Davide Cipullo; Luca Repetto
    Abstract: This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. We show that each additional party with representation in Parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 4 percentage points. Governments with more resources at their disposal for bargaining are less likely to be replaced. When they are, new government leaders are younger and better educated, suggesting instability may induce positive selection. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition formation featuring government instability. Our findings indicate that the rising fragmentation in parliaments worldwide may have a substantial impact on stability and political selection.
    Keywords: government stability, fragmentation, no-confidence votes, bargaining, alignment effect
    JEL: H10 H70 R50
    Date: 2020
  7. By: Andrea Bonoldi; Chiara Dalle Nogare; Martin Mosler; Niklas Potrafke
    Abstract: We examine the relationship between inheritance rules and voter turnout. Inheritance rules are measured by entailed farms in South Tyrol: land properties whose inheritance is regulated by a law similar to the right of primogeniture. Using data for municipalities between 1998 and 2010, we show that voter turnout is high in municipalities with many entailed farms relative to population. The effect is based on local elections. If the number of entailed farms per 100 inhabitants increases by one standard deviation, voting turnout in municipal and provincial elections increases by around 1.27 and 1.43 percentage points (around 25 and 35 percent of a standard deviation). Our results suggest that entailed farm owners themselves are more likely to vote, and that entailed farms owners encourage other citizens of their municipality to participate in local elections.
    Keywords: entailed farms, voter turnout, inheritance rules, identity, civic duty
    JEL: D72 H70 K11 Q15 Z19
    Date: 2020
  8. By: Andrea Chmitorz (Esslingen University); Claudia Landwehr (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany); Arndt Leininger (University of Berlin); Thomas Schroeter (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany); Oliver Tüscher (Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz, Germany)
    Abstract: The large gap in political participation between well-educated and wealthy citizens on the one hand and less educated and poorer citizens, on the other hand, has in recent years gained new attention. Several authors argue that unequal participation leads to unequal political representation and responsiveness and results in policy decisions that are tilted against the interests of disadvantaged groups, thus further increasing inequality. This paper takes a different starting point by turning the old question why people do not participate in politics around and asking why people participate. We hypothesize that enduring engagement with politics requires individuals to be resilient in the face of frustration and to possess strong, perhaps even delusional, efficacy beliefs. Using data from the German GESIS Panel we demonstrate positive correlations between individual resilience, internal and external efficacy, and political participation. We conclude by pointing to the possibility that resilience and efficacy beliefs help privileged groups to overcome collective action problems to achieve disproportionate influence on political decisions and point to avenues for further research.
    Date: 2020–04–21
  9. By: Luis R. Martinez; Jonas Jessen; Guo Xu
    Abstract: This paper studies costly political resistance in a non-democracy. When Nazi Germany surrendered in May 1945, 40% of the designated Soviet occupation zone was initially captured by the western Allied Expeditionary Force. This occupation was short-lived: Soviet forces took over after less than two months and installed an authoritarian regime in what became the German Democratic Republic (GDR). We exploit the idiosyncratic line of contact separating Allied and Soviet troops within the GDR to show that areas briefly under Allied occupation had higher incidence of protests during the only major episode of political unrest in the GDR before its demise in 1989 - the East German Uprising of 1953. These areas also exhibited lower regime support during the last free elections in 1946. We argue that even a “glimpse of freedom” can foster civilian opposition to dictatorship.
    Keywords: East Germany, political resistance, protest, autocracy, spatial RDD, World War II
    JEL: F51 H10 N44 P20
    Date: 2020
  10. By: de Mouzon, Olivier; Laurent, Thibault; Le Breton, Michel
    Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to explore and estimate the departure from the One Man, One Vote principle in the context of political representation and its consequences in distributive politics. To proceed in the measurement of the inequalities in the representation of territories (geographical under/over representation) or opinions/parties (ideological under/over representation), we import (with some important qualifications and adjustments) the Lorenz curve which is an important tool in the economics of income distribution. We consider subsequently some malapportionment and disproportionality indices. The paper contains applications of these tools to the evaluation of malapportionment and disproportionality to the 2010 Electoral College and the French parliamentary and local elections with a special attention to the electoral reform in 2015.
    Keywords: Apportionment; Disproportionality; Electoral Justice; Lorenz Curve
    JEL: D71 D72
    Date: 2020–04
  11. By: Anna Maria Koukal; Marco Portmann
    Abstract: Today's world is characterized by globalization and international mobility, yet most democratic participation rights are still tied to traditional forms of citizenship. As a consequence, non-citizen are the largest group without franchise. We examine how citizens evaluate and react to the enfranchisement of non-citizens in Switzerland. This paper combines a novel dataset about the enfranchisement process of non-citizens with individual and aggregated data about citizens' attitudes toward non-citizens and their perception of democracy. We find evidence that citizens become more skeptical toward additional migra- tion, yet show a tendency to reduce ethnocentric attitudes toward non-citizens residing in Switzerland and are more satisfied with democracy once non-citizen are granted the right to vote.
    Date: 2020–04
  12. By: Silvia Sacchetti; Carlo Borzaga; Ermanno C. Tortia
    Abstract: This paper considers resource coordination in production systems featuring the presence of enterprises and organizations pursuing social, health-related, educational, cultural, and environmental aims, or social enterprises (SEs). The resource coordination problem is one of allocating and distributing resources towards these aims. By their very nature, these goals are very close to the Polanyian idea of the primacy of society over the self-regulating market. We ask what the specificities of organisations that pursue social aims are, and what coordination mechanisms underpin their production. The premise is that individuals are driven by plural motivations, including pro-social motivations besides self-interested ones, thus requiring a plurality of coordination mechanisms. The paper suggests that SEs make principal use of cooperative pacts based on norms of reciprocity, but include also market and state-led coordination, both at organisational and systemic levels. We consider specific institutional solutions in support of cooperation and reciprocity. These are: combined rules on profit and asset distribution, surplus accumulation and redistribution, and multi-stakeholding.
    Keywords: Social enterprise, Polanyi, Resource coordination, Cooperation, Motivations, Multi-stakeholding, Deliberation, Public interest, Systemic governance
    JEL: L31 L21 P00
    Date: 2019
  13. By: Stefan Penczynski (School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich.); Stefania Sitzia (School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Angle, Norwich.); Jiwei Zheng (School of Economics and CBESS, University of East Anglia, Norwich.)
    Abstract: This study introduces the game theoretical concept of “compound games†and investigates whether the decomposition of a game influences behaviour. Specifically, we investigate whether separating battle of the sexes games into a pure coordination component and the remaining battle of the sexes component changes coordination success. The literature attributes high coordination rates in pure coordination games with focal points to team reasoning and low coordination rates in related battle of the sexes games to level-k reasoning. We find that coordination success in compound games depends on the decomposition and order of component games, suggesting that collective interests are fragile in the presence of opposing individual interests. Our results show that compound games are empirically relevant; we discuss a wide range of possible applications for compound games.
    Keywords: Compound games, focal points, framing, collective interest
    JEL: C72 C91 D90
    Date: 2020–04
  14. By: Anniek de Ruijter; Roel Beetsma; Brian Burgoon; Francesco Nicoli; Frank Vandenbroucke
    Abstract: In this paper we confront the role the EU traditionally plays in the domain of health with the urgent need for collective action triggered by the corona virus pandemic. In the face of such a crisis, we argue that the joint procurement, stockpiling and allocation of medical countermeasures is a key component of true European solidarity, besides maintaining the integrity of the Single Market. We present the first results of a survey experiment taken before the current crisis on citizens’ attitudes towards centralizing at the EU level of policies to combat infectious diseases, which indicates considerable support. We conclude that a more robust policy framework with substantial centralization of procurement, stockpiling and allocation is warranted.
    Keywords: Covid-19, medicines, European Union, centralization
    JEL: I10 I18
    Date: 2020
  15. By: Chaim Fershtman (Tel Aviv University); Uzi Segal (Boston College)
    Abstract: Committee protocols typically involve deliberations in which committee members try to influence and convince each other regarding the “right” choice. Such deliberations do not involve only information exchange, but their aim is also to affect the preferences and the votes of other members. This aspect of social influence and committee deliberation is the focus of this paper. Using a model of social influence we demonstrate how deliberation procedures affect the voting outcome and how different protocols of consultation by committees’ chairs may affect the chairs’ final decisions. We then analyze the ability of a “designer” to control the deliberation protocol and to manipulate the deliberation procedure to increase the probability that the outcome he favors will be selected.
    Keywords: Committee, social influence, deliberation
    JEL: D71
    Date: 2020–04–27
  16. By: Francesca MARTINELLI, , & Giuseppe GUERINI (Fondazione Centro Studi Doc, Verona (Italy)); Samuele BOZZONI (Confcooperative Lombardia (Italy)); Simone CAROLI (Confcooperative Modena (Italy)); Francesca TAMASCELLI (Legacoop Estense – Culture and Media (Italy)); Giuseppe GUERINI (Cecop – Cicopa Europe)
    Abstract: This research investigates some cases of cooperative platforms in the field of workerowned cooperation and consumer cooperation and explores the effects of the merger of platform technology with cooperation. The research focuses on the main consequences of this merger on the organizational model and the engagement level of individuals and studies the change of attitudes of providers and consumers when they are engaged in a cooperative project. The argument is that a cooperative platform can offer solutions and answers to both platform workers’ needs and problems of modern consumption by allowing both providers and consumers to join the entrepreneurial project, share resources – and, in specific cases, earnings – in an equal way, and be part of a community. Against the outsourcing and dispersive models of a classical digital platform, such as Deliveroo, Uber or Airbnb, where providers and consumers are separated and isolated, a cooperative platform enables the propensity of providers and consumers to engage in collective actions and become the protagonist of the platform activity. In this way, the organizational form of a cooperative platform is both an alternative to classical digital platforms and an evolution of traditional cooperative models.
    Keywords: Platform cooperativism, Gig workers, Prosumers, Digital platform, Platform work
    JEL: O35
    Date: 2019
  17. By: Victorien Barbet (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Juliette Rouchier (Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, 75016 PARIS, FRANCE); Noé Guiraud (FSAA - Faculté des sciences de l'agriculture et de l'alimentation); Vincent Laperrière (ESPACE - Études des Structures, des Processus d’Adaptation et des Changements de l’Espace - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (... - 2019) - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - AU - Avignon Université - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We present a model showing the evolution of an organization of agents who discuss democratically about good practices. This model feeds on a field work we did for about twelve years in France where we followed NPOs, called AMAPs, and observed their construction through time at the regional and national level. Most of the hypothesis we make here are either based on the literature on opinion diffusion or on the results of our field work. By defining dynamics where agents influence each other, make collective decision at the group level, and decide to stay in or leave their respective groups, we analyse the effect of different forms of vertical communication that is meant to spread good practices within the organization. Our main indicators of the good functioning of the democratic dynamics are stability and representativeness. We show that if communication about norms is well designed, it has a positive impact on both stability and representativeness. Interestingly the effect of communication increases with the number of dimensions discussed in the groups. Communication about norms is thus a valuable tool to use in groups that wish to improve their democratic practices without jeopardizing stability.
    Keywords: Communication,Short Food Chain,Agent-Based Model,Opinion Dynamics,Democracy,Non-Profit Organization
    Date: 2020–03
  18. By: OECD
    Abstract: This working paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the public sector innovation process at an organisational or team level, and suggests areas for consideration for public sector organisations developing their innovation capabilities. It explores why a more sophisticated approach to public sector innovation is required and explains how an explicit innovation process (the innovation lifecycle) can support such an approach. The paper argues that organisations need to take a multifaceted portfolio approach, combined with a more deliberate recognition of other actors in their ecosystem. It finishes by examining how the innovation lifecycle plays out in practice, and suggests criteria to guide organisations and teams in selecting tools and methods to support them along the different stages of the innovation lifecycle.
    Date: 2020–05–01

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