nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2020‒04‒27
five papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. The Impact of Information on Voters Perceptions and Electoral Behavior: A Randomized Controlled Experiment By Bruno Carvalho; Claudia Custodio; Benny Geys; Diogo Mendes; Susana Peralta
  2. Unions, Tripartite Competition and Innovation By Alex Bryson; Harald Dale-Olsen
  3. Stop invasion! The electoral tipping point in anti-immigrant voting. By Massimo Bordignon; Matteo Gamalerio; Edoardo Slerca; Gilberto Turati
  4. Patient democracies? By Daniel Horn; Hubert Kiss Janos; Sára Khayouti
  5. Political Networks across the Globe By Commander, Simon; Poupakis, Stavros

  1. By: Bruno Carvalho; Claudia Custodio; Benny Geys; Diogo Mendes; Susana Peralta
    Abstract: We study the impact of information about central government on voters’ perception of government performance and subsequent voting behavior. We randomly expose voters to media articles with positive, neutral or negative information about government policy actions prior to the 2017 Portuguese local elections. We find that treated voters update their perceptions about the incumbent. This update is more pronounced among voters exposed to negative news (negativity bias), first-time voters, and individuals who report a lower interest in politics. We do not find evidence of an average treatment effect on voting behaviour. However, we find that, when exposed to negative information, initially undecided voters are more likely to cast a blank vote, to abstain or to vote for opposition parties. Overall, our findings suggest that voters’ sensitivity to information is heterogeneous and depends on the level of education and political awareness.
    Keywords: Media, Information; Negativity Bias; Performance Perception; Local Elections
    JEL: D72 D83 H11 H70
    Date: 2020–04
  2. By: Alex Bryson (University College London); Harald Dale-Olsen (Institute for Social Research)
    Abstract: We present theoretical and empirical evidence challenging results from early studies that found unions were detrimental to workplace innovation. Under our theoretical model, which extends the Cournot duopoly innovation model, local union wage bargaining is more conducive to innovation - particularly product innovation - than competitive pay setting. We test the theory with workplace data for Britain and Norway. Results are consistent with the theory: local union bargaining is positively associated with product innovations in both countries. In Norway, local union bargaining is also positively associated with process innovation.
    Keywords: product innovation; process innovation; trade unions; collective bargaining
    JEL: J28 J51 J81 L23
    Date: 2020–04–01
  3. By: Massimo Bordignon (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Matteo Gamalerio; Edoardo Slerca; Gilberto Turati
    Abstract: Why do anti-immigrant political parties have more success in areas that host fewer immigrants? Using regression discontinuity design, structural breaks search methods and data from a sample of Italian municipalities, we show that the relationship between the vote shares of anti-immigrant parties and the share of immigrants follows a U-shaped curve, which exhibits a tipping-like behavior around a share of immigrants equal to 3.35 %. We estimate that the vote share of the main Italian anti-immigrant party (Lega Nord) is approximately 6 % points higher for municipalities below the threshold. Using data on local labor market characteristics and on the incomes of natives and immigrants, we provide evidence which points at the competition in the local labor market between natives and immigrants as the more plausible explanation for the electoral success of anti-immigrant parties in areas with low shares of immigrants. Alternative stories find less support in the data.
    Keywords: Migration, extreme-right parties, anti-immigrant parties, populism, tipping point, regression discontinuity design.
    JEL: D72 J61 R23
    Date: 2020–03
  4. By: Daniel Horn (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies and Corvinus University of Budapest); Hubert Kiss Janos (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies and Corvinus University of Budapest); Sára Khayouti (University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands)
    Abstract: We test if the political regime of a country associates with the patience of the citizens. Recent findings indicate that i) more democratic countries tend to have higher growth, and ii) patience correlates positively with economic development, suggesting a potential link between the political regime and patience. We document a positive association between the level of democracy and patience for most of the political regime indices that we use, even after controlling for region, economic development, geographical conditions, and culture. We report some evidence that political participation is behind our findings.
    Keywords: democracy, patience, political regime, time preferences
    JEL: D02 D12
    Date: 2020–02
  5. By: Commander, Simon (IE Business School, Altura Partners); Poupakis, Stavros (University of Oxford)
    Abstract: Political networks are an important feature of the political and economic landscape of countries. Despite their ubiquity and significance, information on such networks has proven hard to collect due to a pervasive lack of transparency. However, with the advent of big data and artificial intelligence, major financial services institutions are now actively collating publicly available information on politically exposed persons and their networks. In this study, we use one such data set to show how network characteristics vary across political systems. We provide results from more than 150 countries and show how the format of the network tends to reflect the extent of democratisation of each country. We also outline further avenues for research using such data.
    Keywords: political networks, rent-seeking, democratic consolidation
    JEL: D72 H11 P26 P36 N44
    Date: 2020–03

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