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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Elizabeth U. Cascio; Na’ama Shenhav |
| Abstract: | This year marks the centennial of the Nineteenth Amendment, which provided American women a constitutional guarantee to the franchise. We assemble data from a variety of sources to document and explore trends in women’s political participation, issue preferences, and partisanship since that time. We show that in the early years following enfranchisement, women voted at much lower rates than men and held distinct issue preferences, despite splitting their votes across parties similarly to men. But by the dawn of the 21st century, women not only voted more than men, but also voted differently, systematically favoring the Democratic party. We find that the rise in women’s relative voter turnout largely reflects cross-cohort changes in voter participation and coincided with increasing rates of high school completion. By contrast, women’s relative shift toward the Democratic party permeates all cohorts and appears to owe more to changes in how parties have defined themselves than to changes in issue preferences. The findings suggest that a confluence of factors have led to the unique place women currently occupy in the American electorate, one where they are arguably capable of exerting more political influence than ever before. |
| JEL: | I0 J16 N32 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26709&r=all |
| By: | Guillaume Cheikbossian (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I study the ability of group members to cooperate against an incumbent in a repeated rent-seeking game and where group members and the incumbent have di¤erent valuations of the prize. I rst consider that group members use Nash Reversion Strategies (NRS) to support cooperative behavior and show that full cooperation within the group is more easily sustained as a Stationary Subgame Perfect (Nash) Equilibrium (SSPE) as either group size, or the heterogeneity in the valuation of the prize, increases. In turn, I show that full cooperation within the challenger group can also be sustained as a Weakly Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium (WRPE). Yet, an increase in group size makes it more di¢ cult to sustain within-group cooperation but an increase in the relative valuation of the prize by group members still facilitates group cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Renegotiation,Collective Action,Group Cooperation,Repeated Game,Trigger Strategies |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02378829&r=all |
| By: | Philippos Louis (Department of Economics, University of Cyprus); Orestis Troumpounis (DSEA, University of Padova and LUMS, University of Lancaster); Nikolaos Tsakas (Department of Economics, University of Cyprus); Dimitrios Xefteris (Department of Economics, University of Cyprus) |
| Abstract: | Formal analysis predicts that the likelihood of an electoral accident depends on the preference intensity for a successful protest, but not on the protest's popularity: an increase in protest's popularity is fully offset by a reduction in the individual probability of casting a protest vote. By conducting the first laboratory experiment on protest voting, we find strong evidence in favor of the first prediction and qualified support for the latter. While the offset effect is present, it is not as strong as the theory predicts: protest candidates gain both by fanaticising existing protesters and by expanding the protest's popular base. |
| Keywords: | protest voting, electoral accident, coordination, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0247&r=all |
| By: | Christoph Engel; Alexandra Fedorets; Olga Gorelkina |
| Abstract: | Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German Socio-Economic Panel with two members from 494 households. Participants have a good estimate of each other’s risk preferences, even if not explicitly informed. They do not simply match this preference when deciding on behalf of the other household member, but shy away from exposing others to risk. We model the situation, and we find four distinct types of individuals, and two distinct types of households. |
| Keywords: | risk preference, household, reticence to expose others to risk, tradeoff between individual and foreign risk preference |
| JEL: | C45 D13 D81 D91 |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:liv:livedp:20186&r=all |
| By: | Marco Rogna (Free University of Bolzano‐Bozen, Faculty of Economics and Management, Italy) |
| Abstract: | The paper presents a coalitional bargaining model with a peculiar type of partial breakdown: the Burning Coalition Bargaining Model. Rather than triggering the end of all negotiations or the exclusion of some players from the game, as already proposed in the literature, in this model the rejection of a proposal causes the possibility of the proposed coalition to vanish. Under this type of partial breakdown and adopting a standard rejecter-proposes protocol, 0-normalized, 3-players games are examined for extreme values of the breakdown probability. When such probability is equal to one, efficiency is more difficult to obtain than in models adopting discounting. Furthermore, when an efficient outcome is attained, the final pay-offs distribution reflects the strength of players in the game, with strength being defined by belonging to more valuable coalitions. The same feature is retained when considering a probability of breakdown approaching zero. |
| Keywords: | Bargaining Theory; Bargaining protocols; Coalition formation; Efficiency; Partial breakdown. |
| JEL: | C71 C78 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bzn:wpaper:bemps69&r=all |
| By: | Alberto F. Alesina; Davide Furceri; Jonathan D. Ostry; Chris Papageorgiou; Dennis P. Quinn |
| Abstract: | We assemble two unique databases. One is on reforms in domestic finance, external finance, trade, product markets and labor markets, which covers 90 advanced and developing economies from 1973 to 2014. The other is on electoral results and timing of elections. In the 66 democracies considered in the paper, we show that liberalizing reforms engender benefits for the economy, but they materialize only gradually over time. Partly because of this delayed effect, and possibly because voters are impatient or do not anticipate future benefits, liberalizing reforms are costly to incumbents when implemented close to elections. We also find that the electoral effects depend on the state of the economy at the time of reform: reforms are penalized during contractions; liberalizing reforms undertaken in expansions are often rewarded. Voters seem to attribute current economic conditions to the reforms without fully internalizing the delay that it takes for reforms to bear fruit. |
| JEL: | D72 J65 L43 L51 O43 O47 P16 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26720&r=all |
| By: | Francesco Fallucchi (Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER)); R. Andrew Luccasen III (Mississippi University for Women); Theodore L. Turocy (University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | Experiments which elicit preferences for conditional cooperation in public goods games with linear payoffs find that about one-quarter of people approximately match the average contributions of others. To identify from among possible explanations proposed for this strong form of conditional cooperation, we extend the elicitation method of Fischbacher et al. (2001) and study voluntary contributions games with a broader range of economic and strategic incentives. We find that most strong conditional cooperators are sophisticated in responding to these incentives, by matching contributions only when doing so leads to an overall welfare improvement. Our data favour an account of conditional cooperation based on social norm compliance, and are not consistent with accounts in which these people are motivated by inequity aversion or warm-glow giving, or are confused about the economic incentives presented by the elicitation mechanism. |
| Keywords: | public goods, conditional cooperation, sophistication, experiment. |
| JEL: | C72 D62 D71 H41 |
| Date: | 2020–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:20-01&r=all |
| By: | Han, Johann; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Vomhof, Markus |
| Abstract: | We investigate the quality provision behavior and its implications for the occurrence of collusion in competitive health care markets where providers are assumed to be altruistic towards patients. For this, we employ a laboratory experiment with a health care market framing where subjects decide on the quality levels for one of three competing hospitals respectively. We vary whether quality decisions within hospitals are made by individuals or teams. Realized monetary patient benefits go to real patients outside the lab. We find that degrees of cooperation quickly converge towards negative values implying absence of collusion and patient centered quality choices. Moreover, hospitals treat qualities as strategic complements and adjust their quality choice in the same direction as their competitors. The response magnitude for team markets is weaker. This is driven by the non-cooperative, or altruistic teams which tend to set qualities strategically independent. |
| Keywords: | quality competition,health care markets,team decisions,altruism,laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D03 D43 D64 I11 L13 |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:rwirep:839&r=all |
| By: | Timothy N. Cason; Sau-Him Paul Lau; Vai-Lam Mui |
| Abstract: | This paper studies theoretically and experimentally how success in prior interaction affects cooperation in the one-shot inter-group prisoner’s dilemma (IPD). |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D02 |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pur:prukra:1320&r=all |
| By: | René van den Brink (VU University Amsterdam); Dinko Dimitrov (Saarland University [Saarbrücken]); Agnieszka Rusinowska (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We study the issue of assigning weights to players that identify winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. For this, we consider plurality games which are simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be precisely supportive if it possible to assign weights to players in such a way that a coalition being winning in a partition implies that the combined weight of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is decisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We show that decisive plurality games with at most four players, majority games with an arbitrary number of players, and almost symmetric decisive plurality games with an arbitrary number of players are precisely supportive. Complete characterizations of a partition's winning coalitions are provided as well. |
| Abstract: | Nous étudions la question de l'attribution de pondérations aux acteurs qui identifient les coalitions gagnantes dans les démocraties à la pluralité des suffrages. Pour cela, nous considérons les jeux à la pluralité qui sont de simples jeux sous forme de partition, de telle sorte que dans chaque partition, il existe au moins une coalition gagnante. On dit qu'un tel jeu est justement favorable s'il est possible d'attribuer des pondérations aux joueurs de telle sorte qu'une coalition gagnante dans une partition implique que le poids combiné de ses membres est maximal par rapport à toutes les coalitions de la partition. Un jeu à la pluralité est décisif si dans chaque partition il y a exactement une coalition gagnante. Nous montrons que les jeux à la pluralité décisive avec au plus quatre joueurs, les jeux à la majorité avec un nombre arbitraire de joueurs et les jeux à la pluralité décisive presque symétriques avec un nombre de joueurs arbitraire sont précisément favorables. Des caractérisations complètes des coalitions gagnantes d'une partition sont également fournies. |
| Keywords: | plurality game,plurality voting,precise support,simple game in partition function form,winning coalition,jeu à la pluralité,vote à la pluralité,soutien précis,jeu simple sous forme de partition,coalition gagnante |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-02346134&r=all |
| By: | Angelova, Vera (Technische Universität Berlin, Germany); Güth, Werner (Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany); Kocher, Martin G. (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, University of Vienna, Austria and University of Gothenburg, Sweden) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally analyze leading by example in a public goods game with two permanent and two temporary group members. Our results show that leadership when permanent and temporary members interact leads to lower contributions than interaction without leadership. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation; leadership; social dilemma; public goods provision; experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D64 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ihs:ihswps:10&r=all |
| By: | Marie Christine Apedo-Amah (Stanford University, SIEPR); Habiba Djebbari (Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, EHESS, Ecole Centrale, AMSE, Marseille, France.); Roberta Ziparo (Aix-Marseille Univ, CNRS, EHESS, Ecole Centrale, AMSE, Marseille, France.) |
| Abstract: | We explore how the capacity of farm households to reach efficiency and share information on production is related to their consumption decision-making process. West African farm households often cultivate several plots, and there is extensive evidence of allocative inefficiencies (Udry, 1996). We design an experiment with Togolese cotton producers, contextualized as an input allocation game, and build a model based on its findings. We further test the model's predictions using our lab-in-the-field data. The cotton producers are found to allocate too few inputs to their wife's plot, failing to maximize household aggregate profits. They do transfer more inputs to their wife's plot when the returns from that plot are increased. Yet, when we experimentally manipulate information on these returns, informational frictions on average do not impact decisions. We attribute these experimental findings to the role that conflict in consumption plays in creating production inefficiencies. The model predicts that both efficiency loss and responses to asymmetric information are heterogenous. Moreover, we show that spouses are unable to communicate on the returns effectively and cannot avoid extra losses, though the damaging effects of private information vanish if information is verifiable ex post. We present evidence consistent with these predictions. |
| Keywords: | farm households, household production and intra-household allocation, non-cooperative game theory, asymmetric and private information, lab-in-the-field experiment |
| JEL: | Q12 C72 D13 D82 C91 C93 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1937&r=all |