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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Jaelle Scheuerman; Jason L. Harman; Nicholas Mattei; K. Brent Venable |
| Abstract: | In many collective decision making situations, agents vote to choose an alternative that best represents the preferences of the group. Agents may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In real world voting scenarios, people often do not have complete information about other voter preferences and it can be computationally complex to identify a strategy that will maximize their expected utility. In such situations, it is often assumed that voters will vote truthfully rather than expending the effort to strategize. However, being truthful is just one possible heuristic that may be used. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of heuristics in single winner and multi-winner approval voting scenarios with missing votes. In particular, we look at heuristics where a voter ignores information about other voting profiles and makes their decisions based solely on how much they like each candidate. In a behavioral experiment, we show that people vote truthfully in some situations and prioritize high utility candidates in others. We examine when these behaviors maximize expected utility and show how the structure of the voting environment affects both how well each heuristic performs and how humans employ these heuristics. |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1912.00011&r=all |
| By: | Levi, Eugenio; Patriarca, Fabrizio |
| Abstract: | We present an exploratory machine learning analysis of populist votes at municipality level in the 2018 Italian general elections, in which populist parties gained almost 50% of the votes. Starting from a comprehensive set of local characteristics, we use an algorithm based on BIC to obtain a reduced set of predictors for each of the two populist parties (Five-Star Movement and Lega) and the two traditional ones (Democratic Party and Forza Italia). Differences and similarities between the sets of predictors further provide evidence on 1) heterogeneity in populisms, 2) if this heterogeneity is related to the traditional left/right divide. The Five-Star Movement is stronger in larger and unsafer municipalities, where people are younger, more unemployed and work more in services. On the contrary, Lega thrives in smaller and safer municipalities, where people are less educated and employed more in manufacturing and commerce. These differences do not correspond to differences between the Democratic Party and Forza Italia, providing evidence that heterogeneity in populisms does not correspond to a left/right divide. As robustness tests, we use an alternative machine learning technique (lasso) and apply our predictions to France as to confront them with candidates' actual votes in 2017 presidential elections. |
| Keywords: | Voting,Populism,Economic insecurity,Political Economy |
| JEL: | D72 F52 G01 J15 O33 Z13 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:430&r=all |
| By: | Nicolas Ajzenman; Ruben Durante |
| Abstract: | Can seemingly unimportant factors influence voting decisions by making certain issuessalient? We study this question in the context of Argentina 2015 presidential electionsby examining how the quality of the infrastructure of the school where citizens wereassigned to vote influenced their voting choice. Exploiting the quasi-random assignmentof voters to ballot stations located in different public schools in the city of BuenosAires, we find that individuals assigned to schools with poorer infrastructure weresignificantly less likely to vote for Mauricio Macri, the incumbent mayor then runningfor president. The effect is larger in low-income areas - where fewer people can affordprivate substitutes to public education - and in places where more households have children in school age. The effect is unlikely to be driven by information scarcity,since information on public school infrastructure was readily available to parents beforeelections. Rather, direct exposure to poor school infrastructure at the time of votingis likely to make public education - and the poor performance of the incumbent - moresalient. |
| Keywords: | Elections, Salience, Electoral Punishment, Public Infrastructure, Education |
| JEL: | D72 D83 I25 D90 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udt:wpgobi:wp_gob_2019_3&r=all |
| By: | Sylvain Bouveret; Renaud Blanch; Antoinette Baujard; François Durand; Herrade Igersheim; Jérôme Lang; Annick Laruelle; Jean-François Laslier; Isabelle Lebon (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Vincent Merlin (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In April 2017, during the first round of the French presidential election, we performed a set of experiments on the use of voting rules. Participants to these experiments were asked to test several alternative voting methods, like approval voting, and other variants of evaluative voting. The experiments were both carried out in situ in polling stations during the first round of the presidential election (using paper ballots), and on line during the month preceding the first round, and until the second round of the election (using a web application). A total of 6358 participants took part to the in situ experiment and 37739 participants took part to the on line experiment. This paper describes the protocol of the in situ experiments and the format of the collected dataset. |
| Keywords: | Online Voting,Elections,Experiments,Voting Theory |
| Date: | 2019–11–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02379941&r=all |
| By: | Stefanie Gäbler; Niklas Potrafke; Felix Rösel |
| Abstract: | We examine whether compulsory voting influences political participation as measured by voter turnout, invalid voting, political interest, confidence in parliament, and party membership. In Austria, some states temporarily introduced compulsory voting in national elections. We investigate border municipalities across two states which differ in compulsory voting legislation using a difference-in-differences approach. The results show that compulsory voting increased voter turnout by 3.5 percentage points but we do not find long-run effects. Once compulsory voting was abolished, voter turnout returned to pre-compulsory voting levels. Microdata evidence suggests that compulsory voting tends to crowd out intrinsic motivation for political participation which may explain why compulsory voting is not found to be habit-forming. |
| Keywords: | Compulsory voting, election, voter turnout, Austria |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_315&r=all |
| By: | Walter Bossert (CIREQ - Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, University of Montreal - University of Montreal); Andrew E. Clark (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Conchita d'Ambrosio (INSIDE - INtegrative research unit on Social and Individual DEvelopment - University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]); Anthony Lepinteur (INSIDE - INtegrative research unit on Social and Individual DEvelopment - University of Luxembourg [Luxembourg]) |
| Abstract: | Economic insecurity has attracted growing attention in social, academic and policy cir- cles. However, there is no consensus as to its precise de_nition. Intuitively, economic insecurity is multi-faceted, making any comprehensive formal de_nition that subsumes all possible aspects extremely challenging. We propose a simpli_ed approach, and character- ize a class of individual economic-insecurity measures that are based on the time pro_le of economic resources. We then apply our economic-insecurity measure to data on political preferences. In US, UK and German panel data, and conditional on current economic resources, economic insecurity is associated with both greater political participation (sup- port for a party or the intention to vote) and notably more support for parties on the right of the political spectrum. We in particular _nd that economic insecurity predicts greater support for both Donald Trump before the 2016 US Presidential election and the UK leaving the European Union in the 2016 Brexit referendum. |
| Keywords: | Economic index numbers,Insecurity,Political participation,Conservatism,Right-leaning political parties,Trump,Brexit |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02325984&r=all |
| By: | Alexis Poindron (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne) |
| Abstract: | We consider a society of agents making an iterated yes/no decision on some issue, where updating is done by mutual influence under a Markovian process. Agents update their opinions at the same time, independently of each other, in an entirely mechanical manner. They can have a favourable or an unfavourable perception of their neighbours. We study the qualitative patterns of this model, which captures several notions, including conformism, anti-conformism, communitarianism and leadership. We discuss under which conditions opinions are stable. Finally, we introduce a notion of entropy that we use to extract information on the society and to predict future opinions. |
| Keywords: | opinion dynamics,convergence,absorbing class,groups,entropy |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02372486&r=all |
| By: | Gathmann, Christina (Heidelberg University) |
| Abstract: | There has been a longstanding debate about the link between political representation and health. In this article, I provide novel evidence that electoral reforms that shifted from a majoritarian to a proportional system of voter representation generated substantive health benefits for the general population. Using the exemplary case of Switzerland, I first show that the spread of proportional representation between 1890 and 1950 increased political participation and gave the working class, represented by left-wing parties, greater weight in the political process. Consistent with theories of the electoral system, proportional representation increased public investments, esp. in basic education, with few effects on redistribution or total spending. Based on comprehensive archival mortality statistics since 1890, I then demonstrate that the observed shifts in representation and public finances were associated with substantial declines in child mortality by 15% and in mortality from infectious diseases, the major killer of the time, by 10-15%. |
| Keywords: | electoral system, proportional representation, mortality, health, Switzerland |
| JEL: | N33 N34 I14 H51 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12729&r=all |
| By: | M. Keith Chen; Kareem Haggag; Devin G. Pope; Ryne Rohla |
| Abstract: | Equal access to voting is a core feature of democratic government. Using data from millions of smartphone users, we quantify a racial disparity in voting wait times across a nationwide sample of polling places during the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Relative to entirely-white neighborhoods, residents of entirely-black neighborhoods waited 29% longer to vote and were 74% more likely to spend more than 30 minutes at their polling place. This disparity holds when comparing predominantly white and black polling places within the same states and counties, and survives numerous robustness and placebo tests. We shed light on the mechanism for these results and discuss how geospatial data can be an effective tool to both measure and monitor these disparities going forward. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2019–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26487&r=all |
| By: | J. Stephen Ferris (Department of Economics, Carleton University); Marcel-Christian Voia (Laboratoire d'Économie d'Orléans (LEO) Faculté de droit, d'économie et de gestion Université d'Orléans) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we examine the relationship between economic and electoral outcomes in Canada since Confederation (1867) and the role that economic policy has played in influencing this relationship. The results are consistent with voter concern for the overall performance of the economy in the incumbent’s governing term—the average growth rate of per capita GDP and average unemployment rate—while rejecting the presence of a political business/budget cycle response in the period leading into an upcoming election. Evidence for the effect of performance on the stability of the political party system (as measured by party vote volatility) is even stronger. The data also are consistent with the use of policy for countercyclical stability (primarily through spending and deficits), fiscal response to voter turnout, the growth of both spending and deficits under larger governing majoritiesand compliant monetary response to fiscal deficits. |
| Keywords: | economic and electoral outcomes, political business cycle, political influences on policy,policy endogeneity, seemingly unrelated regressions |
| JEL: | Z18 H30 E60 |
| Date: | 2019–12–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:car:carecp:19-11&r=all |
| By: | Mustapha Ridaoui (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Christophe Labreuche (Thales Research and Technology [Palaiseau] - THALES) |
| Abstract: | Models in Multicriteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) can be analyzed by means of an importance index and an interaction index for every group of criteria. We consider first discrete models in MCDA, without further restriction, which amounts to considering multichoice games, that is, cooperative games with several levels of participation. We propose and axiomatize two interaction indices for multichoice games: the signed interaction index and the absolute interaction index. In a second part, we consider the continuous case, supposing that the continuous model is obtained from a discrete one by means of the Choquet integral. We show that, as in the case of classical games, the interaction index defined for continuous aggre-gation functions coincides with the (signed) interaction index, up to a normalizing coefficient. |
| Keywords: | multicriteria decision analysis,interaction,multichoice game,Choquet inte- gral |
| Date: | 2019–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02380901&r=all |
| By: | Zulfikar, Achmad |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to disseminate information on Open Government Partnership (OGP) in Indonesia, in particular to examine the extent to which civil society organizations (CSOs) are involved. This paper uses qualitative methods with data collection through literature review sourced from online document. The data analysis process through data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion is done simultaneously with data collection process. This paper reveals five issues: the reason of Indonesia joining the Open Government Partnership, the involvement and welfare of Indonesia CSOs in the Implementation of OGP Program, the cooperation between Indonesia CSOs and Government in the OGP Matters, and greatest achievements of the OGP in Indonesia. The conclusion of OGP's progress in Indonesia is that the Indonesian government together with CSOs have synergized to jointly realize Indonesia's commitment to realize good governance. Nevertheless, the scope of synergized areas is still limited, therefore broader cooperation and more coordinated networks are needed to reach all areas of public services to bring about openness, accountability and public participation. |
| Date: | 2018–04–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:inarxi:e87bz&r=all |