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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Federico Revelli; Tsung-Sheng Tsai |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether the rare occurrence of a local election ending in a tie or being decided by a single vote generates informational spill-overs on nearby localities’ subsequent elections. First, based on the pivotal-voter theory, we develop a model of costly instrumental voting in sequential elections with private information, where voters update their beliefs regarding the distribution of political preferences and the probability of their vote being decisive upon observing the outcomes in earlier elections, and decide whether to turn out to vote accordingly. Next, by exploiting over a hundred exact ties or one-vote-difference results in Italian mayoral elections during the past two decades and the quasi-experimental conditions created by the staggered municipal electoral calendar, we test the model’s empirical predictions and find a substantial impact on voter turnout rates of exposure for geographical reasons to spill-overs from the localities experiencing those bizarre electoral outcomes. |
| Keywords: | tied elections, voter turnout, information spill-over, salience |
| JEL: | D72 H71 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7786&r=all |
| By: | Daniela Glätzle-Rützler; Philipp Lergetporer; Matthias Sutter |
| Abstract: | Many important intertemporal decisions, such as investments of firms or households, are made by groups rather than individuals. Little is known what happens to such collective decisions when group members have different incentives for waiting, because the economics literature on group decision making has, so far, assumed homogeneity within groups. In a lab experiment, we study the causal effect of group members’ heterogeneous payoffs from waiting on intertemporal choices. We find that three-person groups behave more patiently than individuals and that this effect is driven by the presence of at least one group member with a high payoff from waiting. We present group chat content, survey data, and additional treatments to uncover the mechanism through which heterogeneity in groups increases patience. |
| Keywords: | patience, time preferences, group decisions, payoff heterogeneity, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 D90 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7716&r=all |
| By: | Lacroix, Jean; Méon, Pierre-Guillaume; Oosterlinck, Kim |
| Abstract: | The literature on political dynasties in democracies usually considers them as a homogenous group and points out their negative effects. By contrast, we argue that they may differ according to their origin and that democratic dynasties â??â?? those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals â??â?? show stronger support for democracy. This claim is backed by an analysis of the vote by the French parliament on July 10, 1940, of an enabling act granting full power to Marshal Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third Republic. Using newly collected data from the biographies of the members of the then parliament, we observe that members of a democratic dynasty were more likely, by a margin of between 7.6 and 9.0 percentage points, to oppose the act than were members of other political dynasties or elected representatives belonging to no political dynasty. We report suggestive evidence showing that the effect of democratic dynasties was possibly driven by internalized democratic norms and beliefs. |
| Keywords: | Autocratic reversals; democratic dynasties; voting behavior; World War II |
| JEL: | D72 H89 N44 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13871&r=all |
| By: | Johan A. Elkink (School of Politics & International Relations, University College Dublin); David M. Farrell (School of Politics & International Relations, University College Dublin); Sofie Marien (Center for Political Research, KU Leuven); Theresa Reidy (Department of Government, University College Cork); Jane Suiter (School of Communications, Dublin City University) |
| Abstract: | The outcomes of two recent Irish referendums - on marriage equality in 2015 and abortion in 2018 - have placed contemporary Irish voters in sharp contrast with their long-standing conservative Catholic reputation. These referendums also stand out internationally because of the associated deliberative innovation. This paper aims to explain the watershed abortion vote drawing on theories of generational change, issue-voting, cue-taking and deliberative democracy, using data from an exit poll at the 2018 abortion referendum. We show that age and cleavage effects are key to understanding the referendum outcome. These results offer insight into how societal processes such as rapid secularisation, generational replacement and democratic innovations shape politics. Moreover, voters who were aware of the deliberative innovation were more likely to support the liberal referendum option. To increase willingness to deviate from the status quo, engaging citizens actively in the debate is a fruitful approach. |
| Keywords: | referendums, voting behaviour, abortion, generational effects, deliberative democracy, Ireland |
| Date: | 2019–08–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucd:wpaper:201911&r=all |
| By: | Henning, Christian H. C. A.; Diaz, Daniel; Lendewig, Andrea |
| Abstract: | Electoral competition is a democratic mechanism to guarantee high governmental performance. In reality, however, it often leads to policy failure due to Government Capture and Government Accountability. An understanding of both phenomena has to be based on voter theory and nowadays the probabilistic voter model is the workhorse model applied in voter studies. In this paper we first proceeded to derive a theoretical model to estimate voter behavior including three voting motives: non-policy oriented, policy oriented and retrospective oriented. Then, we derived government performance indicators to estimate Capture and Accountability based on marginal effects and relative importance of the three components. Subsequently, we tested our theory estimating a probabilistic voter model for Ghana using own election survey data. In particular, we calculated different mixed logit model specifications and, to allow heterogeneity, we followed the latent class approach. Using the results of the estimations, we were able to calculate marginal effects and relative importance of each voting motive and we found that the non-policy component is the most important whereas the retrospective component is the less relevant. Finally, the government performance indicators were estimated and they suggest that, although the political weights are unequally distributed in Ghana, the government is partially accountable towards the voter and elections provide an effective mechanism to promote democracy. |
| Keywords: | probabilistic voter model,capture,accountability,agricultural policy,Ghana,Africa |
| JEL: | Q18 C31 C35 C38 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cauapw:wp201804&r=all |
| By: | Matthew Gould; Matthew D. Rablen |
| Abstract: | We focus on the preferences of an extremely salient group of highly-experienced individuals who are entrusted with making decisions that affect the lives of millions of their citizens, heads of government. We test for the presence of a fundamental behavioral bias, loss aversion, in the way heads of government choose decision rules for international organizations. If loss aversion disappears with experience and high-stakes it should not exhibited in this context. Loss averse leaders choose decision rules that oversupply negative (blocking) power at the expense of positive power (to initiate affirmative action), causing welfare losses through harmful policy persistence and reform deadlocks. We find evidence of significant loss aversion (λ = 4:4) in the Qualified Majority rule in the Treaty of Lisbon, when understood as a Nash bargaining outcome. World leaders may be more loss averse than the populous they represent. |
| Keywords: | loss aversion, behavioral biases, constitutional design, voting, bargaining, voting power, EU Council of Ministers |
| JEL: | D03 D81 D72 C78 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7763&r=all |
| By: | Archishman Chakraborty (Syms School of Business, Yeshiva University); Parikshit Ghosh (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics); Jaideep Roy (Department of Economics, University of Bath) |
| Abstract: | Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefitt voters? The answer depends on the nature of democratic institutions and the extent of communication possibilities. Expert endorsements induce office-seeking parties to serve the expert’s interests, hurting voters. Expert advocacy makes policies respond to information, helping voters. Together, policy advocacy and partisan endorsements are often better than either alone. Their interaction creates a delegation benefit of indirect democracy. Voters may prefer this institution to one where policymaking is geared to serving the public interest. Direct expert capture of one party is another form of delegation and the best institution for voters. |
| Keywords: | experts, endorsements, advocacy, electoral competition, indirect democracy, cheap talk, intermediation, delegation. |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cde:cdewps:299&r=all |
| By: | Holden, Stein T. (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Tilahun, Mesfin (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Abstract: | This working paper is an output from the research project “Youth Business Groups for Sustainable Development: Lessons from the Ethiopian Model” that is funded by Research Council of Norway under the NORGLOBAL2 research program for the period 2019-2022. This working paper provides a summary of baseline survey data collected in the period January-May 2019 primarily from 2427 sampled members of 246 active youth business groups in four districts in the Tigray Region of Ethiopia. The large majority of the active groups are functioning well and have overcome the potential collective action problem associated with self-organization. Most group members are satisfied with their group boards and group leaders and are able to change board members that do not function well. Their bylaws facilitate and enforce compulsory participation in group meetings and group work activities. Equal sharing of incomes and work responsibilities is the dominant principle. Punishment for violation of group bylaws is practiced with graduated sanctions that are socially accepted by the large majority of group members. Most group leaders were motivated to continue as group leaders, only 4% were unmotivated, although 67% of the group leaders found the job to be challenging or very challenging. The group leaders were inspired by the good social relations in their groups, and by that they learned a lot from being group leaders. 68% of the group leaders stated that the group performance had improved over the last three years and only 14% that it had deteriorated. Most groups have been able to protect the vegetation on the allocated land and according to the group leaders the vegetation has improved on the land of 81% of the groups and has been stable for another 14% of the groups. Most groups have been able to establish a system with border demarcation, fencing and/or guarding such that the problem with illegal harvesting by outsiders has been reduced. Most youth group members are environmentally conscious and willing to take their part of the compulsory annual 20 days of work for free for conservation of the natural resources in their community. |
| Keywords: | Land-poor rural youth; youth business groups; leadership; group and member statistics; Ethiopia |
| JEL: | D02 D23 |
| Date: | 2019–08–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsclt:2019_005&r=all |
| By: | Fetzer, Thiemo |
| Abstract: | This paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an individual or area to the UK government's austerity-induced welfare reforms begun in 2010, and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK Independence Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership; broader individual-level measures of political dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave. Leveraging data from all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed, individual-level panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could have resulted in a Remain victory had it not been for austerity. |
| Keywords: | austerity; EU; Globalization; political economy; voting |
| JEL: | D72 H2 H3 H5 P16 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13846&r=all |
| By: | Campbell, Arthur; Leister, Matthew; Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | Because of its impacts on democracy, there is an important debate on whether the recent trends towards greater use of social media increases or decreases (political) polarization. One challenge for understanding this issue is how social media affects the equilibrium prevalence of different types of media content. We address this issue by developing a model of a social media network where there are two types of news content: mass-market (mainstream news) and niche-market (biased or more "extreme" news) and two different types of individuals who have a preference for recommending one or other type of content. We find that social media will amplify the prevalence of mass-market content and may result in it being the only type of content consumed. Further, we find that greater connectivity and homophily in the social media network will concurrently increase the prevalence of the niche market content and polarization. We then study an extension where there are two lobbying agents that can and wish to influence the prevalence of each type of content. We find that the lobbying agent in favor of the niche content will invest more in lobbying activities. We also show that lobbying activity will tend to increase polarization, and that this effect is greatest in settings where polarization would be small absent of lobbying activity. Finally, we allow individuals to choose the degree of homophily amongst their connections and demonstrate that niche-market individuals exhibit greater homophily than the mass-market ones, and contribute more to polarization. |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13860&r=all |
| By: | Battaglini, Marco; Patacchini, Eleonora; Rainone, Edoardo |
| Abstract: | We present a model of the U.S. Congress in which social connections among Congress members are endogenous and matter for their legislative activity. We propose a novel equilibrium concept for the network formation game that allows for a sharp characterization of equilibrium behavior and that yields a unique prediction under testable conditions. While the equilibrium is characterized by a large number of nonlinear equations, we show that the model can be structurally estimated by an appropriately designed Approximate Bayesian Computation method. Estimating the model using data from the 109th to 113th U.S. Congresses, we show that social connections are important for legislators' productivities and we identify some of the key determinants of social centralities in Congress. |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13845&r=all |