nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2019‒07‒29
seventeen papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. News We Like to Share: How News Sharing on Social Networks Influences Voting Outcomes By Pogorelskiy, Kirill; Shum, Matthew
  2. Populism: consequences for global sustainable development By Marschall, Paul; Klingebiel, Stephan
  3. Poisson voting games: proportional rule By Francesco De Sinopoli; Claudia Meroni
  4. Managing wages: Fairness norms of low- and high-performing team members By Fochmann, Martin; Sachs, Florian; Weimann, Joachim
  5. Technological change, campaign spending and polarization By Pau Balart; Agustin Casas; Orestis Troumpounis
  6. Gordon Tullock on Majority Voting: the Making of a Conviction. By Julien Grandjean
  7. Tariff Bindings and the Dynamic Formation of Preferential Trade Agreements By James Lake; Moïse Nken; Halis Murat Yildiz
  8. Democracy support and peaceful democratisation after civil war By Mross, Karina
  9. Access to environmental information: a driver of accountable governance in Morocco and Tunisia? By Houdret, Annabelle; Pasqua, Irene; Meknassi, Saâd Filali
  10. Evidence-oriented approaches in development cooperation: experiences, potential and key issues By Marschall, Paul
  11. The engagement of Visegrad countries in EU-Africa relations By Chmiel, Oskar J.
  12. Pledges as a Social Influence Device: Experimental Evidence By Damien Besancenot; Radu Vranceanu
  13. Cultural values, attitudes, and democracy promotion in Malawi: how values mediate the effectiveness of donor support for the reform of presidential term limits and family law By Nowack, Daniel
  14. How addressing divisions on African migration inside the EU can strengthen transnational development By Schöfberger, Irene
  15. The relevance of social policies for democracy: preventing autocratisation through synergies between SDG 10 and SDG 16 By Leininger, Julia; Lührmann, Anna; Sigman, Rachel
  16. Daunou’s Voting Method By Salvador Barberà; Walter Bossert; Kataro Suzumura
  17. Why writing a new constitution after conflict can contribute to peace By Fiedler, Charlotte

  1. By: Pogorelskiy, Kirill (University of Warwick); Shum, Matthew (Caltech)
    Abstract: More voters than ever get political news from their friends on social media platforms. Is this bad for democracy? Using context-neutral laboratory experiments, we find that biased (mis)information shared on social networks affects the quality of collective decisions relatively more than does segregation by political preferences on social media. Two features of subject behavior underlie this finding: 1) they share news signals selectively, revealing signals favorable to their candidates more often than unfavorable signals; 2) they na¨ively take signals at face value and account for neither the selection in the selection in the shared signals nor the differential informativeness of news signals across different sources.
    Keywords: news sharing, social networks, voting, media bias, fake news, polarization, filter bubble, lab experiments JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92, D72, D83, D85
    Date: 2019
  2. By: Marschall, Paul; Klingebiel, Stephan
    Abstract: Populism is a style of politics that attacks the existing normative consensus within society, making systematic use of marginalisation and bogeyman tactics. Typical marginalisation strategies target minorities within the population and adopt an anti-scientific world view. Restrictions on civil society are one of the consequences of government action dominated by populism. When it comes to mobilising voters, populists draw upon selected topics which differ according to political camp (left-wing versus right-wing populism) and national context. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify certain patterns of populist expression, such as the practice of contrasting the “people” and their supposed will with an allegedly out-of-touch political “elite”. The values of the population are largely set within the national context, while representatives of the elite are often portrayed as primarily interested in interactions outside of the nation state and thus perceived and characterised as proponents of globalisation. Populist trends can be seen in Western nations, former Eastern Bloc states and countries in the global South. Populist movements pose considerable threats to multilateral efforts aimed at tackling transnational political challenges. These patterns include: Abandonment of efforts to promote integration. Accordingly, the European Union (EU) is considered an “elite project” and emblematic of many of the negative aspects of globalisation. Abandonment of multilateral institutions and inter¬na¬tional trade agreements. This includes withdrawal from international accords (Paris climate agreement, etc.) and international organisations. Reinterpretation/rejection of development policy. Development policy is not understood as an original instrment for promoting global sustainable development, but rather reinterpreted as a vehicle for achieving narrow national goals. The partially transnational nature of populism could present an additional challenge for global sustainable development in future. Efforts by populist streams to cooperate at cross-border level and thus create a form of “meta-populism” have barely succeeded to date, but this could change after the European elections in May 2019. The current and the expected future significance of populist actors varies from country to country. Even in nations in which populists are not currently in government, the state could introduce budget cuts or reallocate funding to specific development policy topics in an effort to minimise the electoral gains of the populists. This runs the threat of populist approaches becoming effective even in countries where populist parties are not in government.
    Keywords: Demokratie und Autokratie,Deutsche + Europäische + multilaterale Entwicklungspolitik
    Date: 2019
  3. By: Francesco De Sinopoli (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Claudia Meroni (Department of Economics (University of Verona))
    Abstract: We analyze strategic voting under pure proportional rule and two candidates, embedding the basic spatial model into the Poisson framework of population uncertainty. We prove that the Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. We show that it is characterized by a cutpoint in the policy space that is always located between the mean of the two candidates’ positions and the median of the distribution of voters’ types. We also show that, as the expected number of voters goes to infinity, the equilibrium converges to that of the complete information case.
    Keywords: Poisson games, strategic voting, proportional rule
    JEL: C72 D72
    Date: 2019–07
  4. By: Fochmann, Martin; Sachs, Florian; Weimann, Joachim
    Abstract: Services are often provided by groups. The question of remuneration arises both at the group level and for each individual group member. We examine the question of how relative pay should be designed within the group if all group members are to regard the payment scheme as fair. We use a three-step laboratory experiment to compare which fairness norms are chosen by high-performing and low-performing group members. It turns out that both types of group members prefer the performance pay principle. Support for equal pay is negligible. However, the low performers use their bargaining power to improve their position, but without deviating from the performance principle substantially. A random influence on the performance of the players does not change the results.
    Keywords: performance principle,fairness norms,relative remuneration
    JEL: C91 C92 D31 D90 J31 M52
    Date: 2019
  5. By: Pau Balart; Agustin Casas; Orestis Troumpounis
    Abstract: We focus on changes in technology and campaign management to study the documented simultaneous increase in campaign spending and polarization. In our model, some voters are ideological while others are impressionable. If the distribution of voters between types is endogenous and depends on parties' platform choices, our results show that a) an increase in the effectiveness of electoral advertising or a decrease in the electorate's political awareness, surely increases polarization and may also increase campaign spending, while b) a decrease in the cost of advertising does not affect neither polarization nor spending.
    Keywords: electoral competition, campaign spending, impressionable voters, semiorder lexicographic preferences
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2019
  6. By: Julien Grandjean
    Abstract: This paper participates in the formation of the history of public choice theory. In particular, it will focus on the role of Gordon Tullock and the analysis of the simple majority decision-making process promoted in the famous Calculus of Consent, written along with James M. Buchanan. This paper shows that Tullock has already think about the issue of majority voting prior to the writing of his common book with Buchanan. Between 1959 and 1961 in particular, while Tullock was a postdoctoral fellow at the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy and Social Philosophy at the University of Virginia and later Assistant Professor in the Department of International Studies at the University of South Carolina, he had an interesting interaction with Anthony Downs about majority decision-making process in a democracy. This interaction that consists in a correspondence between Tullock, Downs and their editors can be found for a part in the Gordon Tullock papers of the Hoover Institution Archives. It gave birth to some major articles by the two authors such as The Problem of Majority Voting by Tullock in 1959, Why the Government Budget is Too Small in a Democracy by Downs in 1960, Problems of Majority Voting: In Defense of Majority Voting by Downs and Problems of Majority Voting: Reply to a Traditionalist by Tullock in 1961. Our purpose is to highlight the interaction that forms the basis of these publications and shows the way Tullock matured his view about the majoritarian rule – one of the cornerstones of the public choice theory – at this time.
    Keywords: Gordon Tullock, Anthony Downs, public choice, majority voting, logrolling, unanimity.
    JEL: B21 B31 D72
    Date: 2019
  7. By: James Lake; Moïse Nken; Halis Murat Yildiz
    Abstract: We show that multilateral tariff binding liberalization substantially impacts the nature and extent of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) formation. First, it shapes the nature of forces constraining expansion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The constraining force is a free riding incentive of FTA non-members under relatively high bindings but an exclusion incentive of FTA members under relatively low bindings. Second, multilateral tariff binding liberalization shapes the role played by PTAs in the attainment of global free trade. Initially, tariff binding liberalization leads to Custom Union (CU) formation in equilibrium but in a way that undermines the pursuit of global free trade. However, further tariff binding liberalization leads to FTA formation in equilibrium and in a way that facilitates the attainment of global free trade. Our theoretical analysis also has implications regarding recent empirical discussions over the relative merits of FTAs versus CUs.
    Keywords: tariff bindings, preferential trade agreement, free trade agreement, customs union, global free trade, dynamic
    JEL: C72 F12 F13
    Date: 2019
  8. By: Mross, Karina
    Abstract: Evidence exists that democracies are particularly stable, yet also that processes of democratisation are highly susceptible to conflict, especially if democratisation occurs in the aftermath of violent conflict. New research from the German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) indicates that external democracy support can help mitigate the destabilising effects of post-conflict demo¬cratisation. Since the 1990s, democracy support has been integral to most peacebuilding efforts. Supporting free and fair elections or a vibrant media seems well-suited for fostering peace: Democratic institutions can actively deal with societal conflicts, in sharp contrast to authoritarian regimes, which often rely on repression. However, altering power relations through more political competition can also trigger power struggles, which newly emerging democratic institutions may have difficulty containing. Therefore, questions arise regarding countries that have embarked on a process of democratisation after civil war: Can democracy support help to mitigate destabilising effects, or does it reinforce them? If it can foster peace, how should it be designed in order to avoid renewed violence? The wisdom or folly of supporting democracy to build peace after civil war has caused controversy, yet has rarely been tested empirically. This briefing paper summarises findings from DIE research that addresses this gap. The results demonstrate that: External democracy support that accompanies post-conflict democratisation can help to foster peace after civil war. Importantly, it does not trigger renewed violence. Analysing the effects of two donor strategies to deal with trade-offs between stability (preventing renewed violence) and democracy shows that prioritising stability over democracy does not contain fewer risks than gradualist support, in contrast to widespread assumptions. In fact, the prioritising strategy can also fail, and even be counterproductive. The competitive elements of a democratic system explain both why it can help to avoid, or provoke, renewed violence. Democracy support facilitating “controlled competition” can mitigate the destabilizing effects: Support for political competition strengthens the peace-enhancing effects by promoting meaningful choice and enabling the peaceful allocation and withdrawal of political power. Fostering institutional constraints limits the discretionary power of the executive and enforces a commitment to democratic rules. These results can provide guidance to policy-makers when engaging in post-conflict situations: Donors should actively accompany post-conflict democratisation processes with substantial democracy support. They should not refrain from offering such support until stability has already proven to be sustain¬able, since it can make an important contribution towards strengthening peace and help in avoiding destabilising effects. When facing trade-offs between stability and democracy in post-conflict situations, donors should bear in mind that prioritising stability is not less risk-prone than a gradualist approach, which promotes both stability and democracy in an iterative way. Thus, prioritising stability should not be the obvious choice in post-conflict situations. Instead, donors should carefully scrutinise the political dynamics before applying either strategy and recall that a gradualist approach offers considerable potential for strengthening peace sustainably. Engaging in a context of post-conflict democratisation, donors should provide substantial support both for political competition and for institutional constraints.
    Keywords: Governance,Sicherheit, Frieden und fragile Staaten
    Date: 2019
  9. By: Houdret, Annabelle; Pasqua, Irene; Meknassi, Saâd Filali
    Abstract: In Tunisia, Morocco and other North African countries, en¬vironmental problems increasingly lead to political protest. Industrial pollution and a lack of clean drinking water adversely impact the living conditions and income op¬portunities of already marginalised groups and trigger unrest. Environmental governance in the region is often highly centralised, and takes no consideration of the needs of the citizens in the use of natural resources. In a political context that remains unstable following the 2011 uprisings, the double challenge of mounting environmental problems and related social unrest calls for new approaches. Reinforcing accountable environmental governance could help, not only by addressing environmental problems and needs, but by contributing to the overall transformation of societal relationships towards more democratic (i.e. transparent, accountable and participative) governance in the longer term. Access to environmental information plays a crucial role in this regard: only if citizens know about availability, quality and use of natural resources, can they make informed choices and claim their rights. When public institutions address these rights, they can increase sustainable wealth for present and future generations. Institutions charged with strengthening accountability can also include citizens in their monitoring exercises, and help to hold public and private actors legally responsible for their decisions and behaviour. Related international standards can inform such reforms: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Rio Declaration and the Aarhus Convention confirm the importance of access to environmental information. At national levels, environmental charters and Morocco’s and Tunisia’s new constitutions stress the need for participatory and accountable governance. As recent assessments in Morocco and Tunisia reveal, governments and development partners can support access to environmental information and thereby accountable governance. First, they can do this by strengthening accountable environmental governance and access to environmental information across sectors. This includes engaging democratic institutions in environmental issues and building up related capacities and know-how, supporting accountability organisations and rules, and improving citizens’ and the administrations’ understanding of new rights. It also entails empowering communities and forging new cross-sectoral coalitions, besides integrating the countries into international initiatives for accountable governance. Second, governments and development cooperation can support accountability in the environmental sector, including by taking advantage of international initiatives, such as the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Climate mitigation and adaptation policies also provide opportunities for strengthening accountable environmental governance. Moreover, policy-makers need to be more aware of the links between environmental governance and its potential impact on human rights and political stability. Access to environmental information, related legal frameworks and institutional capacities also need further backing, including support to articulate related claims. Finally, comprehensive and transparent environmental and social impact assessments of public and private projects, and engaging protest movements in constructive dialogues with the administration and the private sector can help in preventing and addressing related social unrest.
    Keywords: Governance,Umwelt, Ökosysteme und Ressourcen
    Date: 2018
  10. By: Marschall, Paul
    Abstract: The use of more evidence as an instrument for achieving higher impact in development cooperation (DC) is a major topic in current discussions. This discussion paper is a contribution to answering three questions. First, how is evidence currently provided in DC? Second, what are ways of using evidence in this regard? Third, what is the potential of considering evidence in policy-making in the near future? This refers to how and in what context it is usable. Evidence is a term with several meanings and connotations. Based on a broad definition of evidence, a comprehensive conceptual approach is developed for understanding the scope, value and relevance of evidence in policy-making. Until recently, evidence about what works in DC was mostly only available for specific settings. Within the Millennium Development Goals, those shortcomings became obvious and things started to change. Monitoring, results-based management and results-based approaches were installed and provide evidence for different purposes. The number of evaluations and their quality increased. International networks and organisations now provide capacity-building for delivering more and better evidence. There are institutes and persons who aim at awareness-raising in this regard at the level of decision-making and administrative bodies. Evidence matters in DC policy-making. It is used both symbolically, for increasing the credibility of the decision-makers and their decisions, and instrumentally, to adjust knowledge and to improve decision-making. Because of a strong push from national and international initiatives, the awareness of the value of evidence for DC has risen in a striking way, but the adoption of evidence in different settings is still rather mixed, namely as a consequence of complexities in real-world settings and other existing barriers. There are still enormous problems in translating evidence into practical use due to less appropriate transmission formats. Currently, social media and marketing campaigns, as used by the Copenhagen Consensus (CC) Centre, are important instruments for attracting attention. Ranking schemes – including the value-for-money of different interventions, as provided by the CC – are welcomed, because they are transparent and easy to get. However, such menus are often only used for “cherry picking”. In policy-making, available evidence is mostly only one of several inputs. Pathways to success are based on accompanying measures, including ongoing policy advice and an understanding about the joint production of required evidence. This approach can help to identify missing evidence, provide the available pieces of evidence in an appropriate quality and strength, and contribute to the consideration of evidence in policy-making in a reasonable way.
    Keywords: Deutsche + Europäische + multilaterale Entwicklungspolitik,Wirksamkeit und Evaluierung
    Date: 2018
  11. By: Chmiel, Oskar J.
    Abstract: The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, commonly referred to as the Visegrad Four (V4) states, developed friendly relations with several African states both during and after the wave of independence. After the transition from Socialist to democratic systems at the beginning of the 1990s, the focus of the Visegrad countries had shifted to the West. The foreign policies of the V4 mainly focused on the accession to NATO and then to the EU, to the relative neglect of other aspects and regions, including Africa. As one of the conditions for acceding to the European Union (EU) in 2004, the members of the Visegrad group acceded to the EU-Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) Cotonou Partnership Agreement. They also became part of the regular Africa-EU Summits of Heads of State and Government, and became influential actors in the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy that covers relations with North Africa as well as with the Central and East European region under the Eastern Partnership (EaP). Discussions on EU-Africa relations strongly emphasise the engagement and interests of certain (founding) EU member states who have traditionally been vocal in this sphere. On the other side, there is a widely spread perception of the V4’s lack of interest in Africa. Nevertheless, while facing the recent turmoil induced by the migration crisis, the V4 governments often declare the intention of greater commitment to development cooperation and humanitarian aid, especially in African migrants’ countries of origin. This paper discusses the recent engagement of the Visegrad countries in the EU-Africa relations, with a key focus on four main issues (the post-Cotonou mandate negotiations; the southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy; the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa; and the European Development Fund). Furthermore, it identifies prospects for the Group’s future engagement. The Visegrad countries’ foreign policy, as well as economic priorities, primarily lie somewhere else and not in Africa. Their focus on the EaP is one of the reasons why the V4 engagement in the shaping of EU-Africa relations has been limited. Since their interests are elsewhere, they try to balance the EU’s focus within its external relations. Also, the V4 countries often point to their lack of interests and expertise in this region. Seemingly, there are too many technical and political limitations for a considerable increase of the V4 engagement in Africa in the near future. This paper’s findings suggest that the migration crisis indeed reinforced the increasing interest of Visegrad countries in Africa, and to some extent accelerated their engagement – both in this region and in the EU arena. However, the tendency to (re)engage in Africa had been initiated before the migration crisis, and it was a result of higher interest stemming from security concerns and from the desire to diversify economic ties. The overall conclusion of this paper is that the V4 have not managed to effectively translate their joint positions on EU-Africa relations into collective action within the EU. In most of the cases they did not share interests and, in consequence, did not formulate joint positions. This could particularly be observed in the post-Cotonou mandate negotiations. Nevertheless, along with the emergence of the current migration and refugee crisis, a new field for joint engagement of the V4 appeared. Since joint efforts could help to overcome the lack of capacities for greater development cooperation and diplomatic representation, there is now potential for the Visegrad countries cooperation on the ground.
    Keywords: Deutsche + Europäische + multilaterale Entwicklungspolitik
    Date: 2018
  12. By: Damien Besancenot (LIRAES - EA 4470 - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5, UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5); Radu Vranceanu (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, ESSEC Business School - Essec Business School)
    Abstract: This paper reports the results from a two-person "pledge and give" experiment. Each person's endowment is private information available only to him. In the first stage, each agent informs the other about the amount he intends to give, or makes a pledge. In the second stage, each agent makes a contribution to the joint donation. A simple theoretical model shows that in this game the equilibrium pledge function is linear in the endowment of each agent. Furthermore, if agents have a strong taste for conformity, the optimal gift is positively related to one's own endowment and to the pledge of his partner. Data from the lab experiment show that, indeed, subjects pledge approximately 60% of their endowment. Also, pledges have an important social influence role: an agent will increase his donation by 20 cents on average if his partner pledges one more euro.
    Keywords: charity giving,conformity,strategic pledges,social influence
    Date: 2019–06–24
  13. By: Nowack, Daniel
    Abstract: Democratisation as a historical process began in the 19th century and is continuing in the 21st. As one aspect of this, donor countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are promoting democratic standards around the globe. Democracy promotion now constitutes a central part of development cooperation between donor and partner countries. A number of scholars, however, argue that the current practice of democracy promotion is inherently flawed. By promoting democracy as a culturally invariant political order, donor countries are glossing over significant cultural differences in other countries and this hampers the successful and effective promotion of democratic institutions. Yet, how cultural differences affect the promotion of democracy is still not sufficiently understood. This Discussion Paper is part of the larger research project “What is Democracy’s Value? The Influence of Values on the Effectiveness of Democracy Promotion”, which aims at understanding how societal values and attitudes influence the effectiveness of international democracy promotion in African countries. The project looks at how social values and political attitudes mediate the promotion of democracy in two specific realms: attempts by heads of state to circumvent presidential term limits; and reforms to legislation in the realm of family law and LGBTI (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transsexual, Intersex) rights. This Discussion Paper focuses on two cases situated in Malawi: the attempt of former president Bakili Muluzi to alter presidential term limits in Malawi in 2002; and the reform of Malawi’s family and marriage law in 2015. In both cases, donors engaged in democracy promotion in different ways and to different degrees. In the former case, donor countries and organisations warned the Muluzi government to heed the democratic process and thereby seconded popular attitudes. In the latter, donor countries and organisations played an important role in coordinating and mobilising domestic actors towards the reform of Malawi’s family and marriage law. Both cases are analysed using in-depth process tracing investigating how donors took part in the constellations of actors engaged in the reform of either the term limit or the family law. The results of the analysis are fourfold: First, although the supply of organisational resources to domestic actors played an important role in both cases, this was not in itself sufficient to guarantee the success of democracy promotion. Rather the coordination of partner organisations played a crucial role in rendering democracy promotion effective. Second, popular mass attitudes played a crucial role in determining the outcome of the two reform processes analysed here. Third, democracy promotion involving the employment of conditionality instruments was effective when the values of the donors matched those of domestic audiences. Finally, when donors were held in esteem in Malawi this aided the effectiveness of democracy promotion by means of public statements and other appropriateness-focused instruments. However, donor esteem did not trump popular attitudes which emphasises that the effectiveness of democracy promotion is sensitive to the specific issue it addresses. These findings prompt a number of recommendations for donors wishing to promote democracy. First, donors need to assess the space available for intervention on an issue-by-issue basis. Values and attitudes in partner countries cannot simply be generalised across issues but are uniquely linked to certain social and political issues. Where attitudes and values in partner countries do not match the goals of donors, it is necessary for donors to support an open discourse. If, in turn, local attitudes and values do favour donors’ goals, domestic civil society actors in partner countries are still in need of support from donors for the purpose of mobilisation and coordination. Furthermore, interventions making use of conditionality seem to necessitate a concurrence of attitudes and values between donor and partner countries.
    Keywords: Demokratie und Autokratie,Einstellungen, Werte und Normen
    Date: 2018
  14. By: Schöfberger, Irene
    Abstract: Intense negotiations about migration management policies are taking place inside the European Union (EU), and between the EU and African states. Although these two negotiation processes are often analysed separately, they are actually interlinked. Drawing on interviews with representatives of European and African states and regional organisations as well as on policy analysis, this Briefing Paper argues that negotia¬tions inside the EU restrict EU-Africa cooperation on migration in two ways: first, by transmitting a strengthened focus on border control from the internal to the external dimension of EU migration management policies; second, by framing migration in a narrow way, which has hindered progress with regard to transnational development. Intra-EU policy negotiations on migration are essential for the evolvement of EU-Africa cooperation on migration. Their increasing focus on border controls in Europe and Africa hinders the adoption of policies that support the potential of migration to contribute towards transnational resilience and development. Therefore, addressing the divisions on the internal dimension of EU migration management policy is a prerequisite for identifying sustainable EU-Africa cooperation pathways and supporting African migrants as actors of transnational development. There are two important lessons that the Commission and the member states can learn from their difficulties in reaching an internal agreement on how to manage migration inside and outside the EU. The first lesson is that they need to address the challenge of balancing European national and transnational competencies and approaches. This challenge is inherent to the EU being a transnational union of nation states. The second lesson is that they need to take into greater consideration the needs of vulnerable citizens of both European and African countries. In particular, the EU and its member states should: Focus on the internal dimension of migration management and rebalance the current distribution of national and EU transnational competencies on migration. This is needed to address the conflicts of competencies that are currently hindering the nego¬tiations on common policies. In particular, they should explore the feasibility of transferring some national competencies to the EU, including through the creation of a pilot EU Agency on Labour Migration. Introduce effective mechanisms of transnational responsibility-sharing in the EU in order to safeguard free movement within the Schengen Area. In particular, they should foresee an EU relocation system based on incentives and sanctions as part of a reform of the Dublin Regulation. Take the needs of young and low-skilled workers as well as migrant European workers into greater consideration by promoting employment, job security and labour rights, with funding through the European Social Fund. Reintroduce policy and development cooperation measures supporting the potential of African migration to contribute towards transnational resilience and development and provide adequate funding through the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027. In particular, such measures should support self-determined strategies of African migrants, for example by facilitating circular mobility and the transfer of remittances.
    Keywords: Flucht und Migration,Regionale + globale + transnationale Governance
    Date: 2018
  15. By: Leininger, Julia; Lührmann, Anna; Sigman, Rachel
    Abstract: Global threats to democracy – one of the world’s most important forms of inclusive governance – have been rising recently. This paper assesses the effects of social and economic inequalities on autocratisation, meaning a decline in the democratic qualities of a political regime. The key question we study is whether different types, levels and changes in distributional inequalities (Sustainable Development Goal 10) contribute to the erosion of democratic institutions, thereby making governance less inclusive (SDG 16). The paper focusses, in particular, on distributional inequalities and more or less inclusive forms of governance (autocracy vs. democracy). Our findings suggest that conventional measures of income inequality – namely the Gini coefficient – have little to no discernible relationship to the likelihood of a decline in the democratic qualities of a political system. By contrast, inequalities in the provision of social services, particularly healthcare and education, have a clear and consistent relationship to the likelihood of autocratisation. As countries provide social opportunities more equally across their population, they are significantly less likely to experience a weakening of their democratic qualities. The findings of our empirical analyses are likely to receive the most interest from international actors who keep support for democracy high on their agendas, such as Sweden and Switzerland. However, the findings should matter to all those who are investing in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, because achieving SDG 16 is decisive for the overall agenda.
    Keywords: Agenda 2030,Demokratie und Autokratie
    Date: 2019
  16. By: Salvador Barberà; Walter Bossert; Kataro Suzumura
    Abstract: Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a method that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining alternatives. We axiomatically characterize his method which combines potentially conflicting criteria of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to open up a novel way of applying potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically.
    Keywords: voting rules, Daunou's method, Condorcet criterion
    JEL: D71 D72
    Date: 2019–07
  17. By: Fiedler, Charlotte
    Abstract: In every fourth post-conflict country a new constitution is written, but the effect of these post-conflict constitution-making processes on peace remains understudied. Constitution-making has become a corner stone of peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies and is widely supported by international actors. It is often seen as a main component of a political transition necessary in states that have experienced internal warfare. This is because a successful constitution-making process establishes a new and potentially permanent governance framework that regulates access to power. However, systematic analyses of the effect of post-conflict constitution-making on peace have been lacking. This Briefing Paper presents new, empirical evidence showing that post-conflict constitution-making can contribute to peace. Countries emerging from conflict often adopt new constitutions in order to signal a clear break with the past regime and to reform the institutions that are often seen as at least partially responsible for conflict having erupted in the first place. Post-conflict constitution-making has taken place in highly diverse settings – ranging from the aftermath of civil war, as in Nepal or South Africa, to interethnic clashes or electoral violence, as in Kyrgyzstan or Kenya. And in the current peace talks around Syria the question of writing a new constitution also plays a prominent role. Since academic evidence is lacking as to whether constitution-making can contribute to peace after civil war, it remains an open question whether efforts in this regard should be pursued by international actors. This Briefing Paper presents evidence that writing a new constitution positively influences post-conflict countries’ prospects for peace (for the full analysis see Fiedler, 2019). It summarises innovative, statistical research on post-conflict constitution-making, conducted by the DIE project “Supporting Sustainable Peace”. Based on an analysis of 236 post-conflict episodes between 1946 and 2010, two main results with clear policy implications emerge: Writing a new constitution reduces the risk of conflict recurrence. The analysis shows a statistically significant and robust association between writing a new constitution after experiencing violent conflict and sustaining peace. International efforts to support post-conflict constitution-making are hence well-founded. The theoretical argument behind the relationship suggests that it is important that constitution-making processes enable an extensive inter-elite dialogue that helps build trust in the post-conflict period. Post-conflict constitution-making processes that take longer are more beneficial for peace. This is likely because the trust-building effect of constitution-making only occurs when enough time enables bargaining and the development of a broad compromise. International actors frequently pressure post-conflict countries to go through these processes very quickly, in only a matter of months. The results question this approach, as very short constitution-making processes do not positively affect peace.
    Keywords: Governance,Sicherheit, Frieden und fragile Staaten,Soziale Kohäsion
    Date: 2019

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