nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2019‒03‒11
ten papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules By Bernardo Moreno; Maria del Pino Ramos-Sosa; Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
  2. Social Acceptability of Condorcet Committees By Mostapha Diss; Muhammad Mahajne
  3. Inter-municipal cooperation in administrative tasks– the role of population dynamics and elections By Ivo Bischoff; Eva Wolfschuetz
  4. On the political economy of income taxation By Berliant, Marcus; Gouveia, Miguel
  5. Cohesive Institutions and Political Violence By Thiemo Fetzer; Stephan Kyburz
  6. Analysis of Approval Voting in Poisson Games By François Durand; Antonin Macé; Matias Nunez
  7. Understanding the Marketing Arrangements of Smallholder farmers in the Western Cape Province of South Africa: A case study of Goedverwacht Community By Makeleni, M.; Tournaire, E.; Grwambi, B.; Troskie, D.
  8. Civil Society Meta-organizations and Legitimating Processes: the Case of the Addiction Field in France By Adrien Laurent; Pierre Garaudel; Géraldine Schmidt; Philippe Eynaud
  9. 74 days under the Argentine Flag: The Experiences of Occupation during the Falklands/Malvinas War By Alejandro L. Corbacho
  10. Games and Network Structures on Corruption, Income Inequality, and Tax Control By Elena Gubar; Edgar Javier Sanchez Carrera; Suriya Kumacheva; Ekaterina Zhitkova; Galina Tomilina

  1. By: Bernardo Moreno (Departamento de Teoría e Historia Econñomica, Universidad de Málaga.); Maria del Pino Ramos-Sosa (Departamento de Economia, Universidad Loyola Andalucia.); Ismael Rodriguez-Lara (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada.)
    Abstract: We induce conformity in a binary-decision voting game in which one of the options require certain support (majority, supermajority or unanimity) to be the adopted decision. We consider heterogenous types of voters in that each of them prefer a different outcome in the voting game. We demonstrate theoretically that truthful voting is the unique equilibrium without conformity for each possible voting rule. Introducing conformity enlarges the set of equilibria, which includes voting profiles in which agents do not necessarily vote for their preferred option. If we account for the presence of non-conformist honest voters that vote truthfully for their preferred option, truthful voting is more pervasive for conformist voters in equilibrium. In our setting, the effects of conformity and honest voters on the likelihood of voting truthfully depend on the voting rule that determines whether or not voters are in a decisive group to implement one of the decisions. We provide empirical support for our theoretical predictions by means of a laboratory experiment. Our findings indeed suggest an interplay between the voting rule and the willingness to conform.
    Keywords: truthful voting, conformity, honest voters, voting rules, experimental evidence.
    JEL: C91 C92 D71 D72
    Date: 2019–03–05
  2. By: Mostapha Diss (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Muhammad Mahajne (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable. We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every non-member by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability.
    Keywords: Social Acceptability,Voting,Multiwinner Elections,Committee,Condorcet
    Date: 2019–02–08
  3. By: Ivo Bischoff (University of Kassel); Eva Wolfschuetz (University of Kassel)
    Abstract: We analyze the factors driving the emergence of inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) in tasks of internal administration in West-Germany between 2001 and 2014. In line with the Institutional Collective Action Approach, we find similarities in political ideology to foster cooperation. Cost pressure drives IMC. Given substantial cost hysteresis in administrative tasks, we expect IMC to be more frequent among shrinking municipalities. Our results supports this notion. However, there is no evidence that municipalities make use of complementarities from divergent population dynamics. We apply a hazard model that allows us to analyze the timing of IMC arrangements. We find state subsidies for IMC are an important driving force behind IMC. IMC agreements are less likely to emerge in election years when municipalities face low cost pressure while the opposite is true for municipalities with high cost pressure.
    Keywords: Inter-municipal cooperation, public administration, elections, hazard model, Germany, survey
    JEL: H77 D72
    Date: 2019
  4. By: Berliant, Marcus; Gouveia, Miguel
    Abstract: The literatures dealing with voting, optimal income taxation, implementation, and pure public goods are integrated here to address the problem of voting over income taxes and public goods. In contrast with previous articles, general nonlinear income taxes that affect the labor-leisure decisions of consumers who work and vote are allowed. Uncertainty plays an important role in that the government does not know the true realizations of the abilities of consumers drawn from a known distribution, but must meet the realization-dependent budget. Even though the space of alternatives is infinite dimensional, conditions on primitives are found to assure existence of a majority rule equilibrium when agents vote over both a public good and income taxes to finance it.
    Keywords: Voting; Income taxation; Public good
    JEL: D72 D82 H21 H41
    Date: 2019–03–04
  5. By: Thiemo Fetzer (University of Warwick,; Pearson Institute at the University of Chicago; CEPR); Stephan Kyburz (Center for Global Development)
    Abstract: Can institutionalized transfers of resource rents be a source of civil conflict? Are cohesive institutions better at managing conflicts over distribution? We exploit exogenous variation in revenue disbursements to local governments and use new data on local democratic institutions in Nigeria to answer these questions. There is a strong link between rents and conflict far away from the location of the resource. Conflict over distribution is highly organized, involving political militias, and concentrated in the extent to which local governments are non-cohesive. Democratically elected local governments significantly weaken the causal link between rents and political violence. Elections produce more cohesive institutions, and vastly limit the extent to which distributional conflict between groups breaks out following shocks to the rents. Throughout, we confirm these findings using individual level survey data.
    Keywords: conflict, ethnicity, natural resources, political economy, commodity prices
    JEL: Q33 O13 N52 R11 L71
    Date: 2019–02–07
  6. By: François Durand (Nokia Bell Labs [Espoo], LINCS - Laboratory of Information, Network and Communication Sciences - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - Sorbonne Université); Antonin Macé (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - La plante et son environnement - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INA P-G - Institut National Agronomique Paris-Grignon - UP11 - Université Paris-Sud - Paris 11 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique); Matias Nunez (LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris-Dauphine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We analyze Approval Voting in Poisson games endowing voters with private values over three candidates. We firsts how that any stable equilibrium is discriminatory: one candidate is commonly regarded as out of contention. We fully characterize stable equilibria and divide them into two classes. In direct equilibria, best responses depend only on ordinal preferences. In indirect equilibria, preference intensities matter. Counter-intuitively, any stable equilibrium violates the ordering conditions, a set of belief restrictions used to derive early results in the literature. We finally use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate the prevalence of the different sorts of equilibria and their likelihood to elect a Condorcet winner.
    Keywords: Approval voting,Poisson games,Stable equilibria,Monte-Carlo simulations
    Date: 2019–03
  7. By: Makeleni, M.; Tournaire, E.; Grwambi, B.; Troskie, D.
    Abstract: This case study sought to investigate marketing arrangements of smallholder farmers at Goedverwacht in the West Coast district of the Western Cape. A Social Network Analysis framework was applied to identify the structure of relationships among social entities used by farmers and to evaluate the patterns and implications of these relationships with regards to these marketing arrangements. The networks within the community include the local cooperative, local tourism centre, local shops, the Moravian church, farmer�s association etc and outside the community they include hawkers, input suppliers, supermarkets etc. Results indicate that all of the smallholder farmers in Goedverwacht use mostly social networks within the community to sell their produce. Sale of produce through formal channels like supermarkets is limited due to such factors as lack of transport and low volumes. Nevertheless, the Goedverwacht community benefits from free access to water and government support through provision of farming equipment and seeds. The annual Snoek and Patat festival also serves as the market for the Goedverwacht community. It is thus realized that for farmers to fully exploit social networks, market readiness is important. Collective action must also be encouraged to strengthen farmers� bargaining power and market positions thereby sustaining market access. Key words: Social Network Analysis, smallholder farmer, market access, informal market,
    Keywords: Marketing
    Date: 2018–09–25
  8. By: Adrien Laurent (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School); Pierre Garaudel (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School); Géraldine Schmidt (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School); Philippe Eynaud (IAE Paris - Sorbonne Business School)
    Abstract: To cope with the new challenges inherent to their political role, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) must convince their stakeholders about their legitimacy, and meta-organizations (MOs) appear to play a central role in such a context (Arhne & Brunsson, 2005; Bonfils, 2011). In this paper, we aim to better understand the legitimating processes of a specific kind of MOs-namely Civil Society M Os (CSMOs)-, considering that CSMOs feature some characteristics that reinforce both internal and external legitimacy issues. Our research is based on an in-depth case study of a French national federation (Fédération Addiction) formed by the merger of two former federations originating in different fields, alcoholism treatment and drug addiction professionals. We confirm the importance of stakeholders' representativeness in the governance of MOs and especially in multi-stakeholders CSMOs, and we corroborate the assertion that MOs closely relate to categorization-related issues and the categorization process itself in many ways: the legitimacy and the potential f or action of M Os depend on the socially perceived appropriateness of the delimitation of the f ield that they claim to represent, and at the same time categorization is reinforced by the creation of MOs. We contribute to the current literature on MOs in two main ways. First, we show how a change in the relevant categorization may result from the dual and interacting actions of the M Os themselves and public authorities. Second, our case study illustrates how a restructuring of the MOs landscape may strengthen the salience of internal legitimacy issues federative actors are confronted with in order to maintain their representativeness and position in the expanded organizational field. In this dynamic context, external and internal legitimating processes appear closely intricate, and categorization and governance issues appear strongly interrelated.
    Keywords: Key-words: Legitimacy,legitimating process,meta-organizations,civil society organizations,merger,addictions,addictology
    Date: 2019–01
  9. By: Alejandro L. Corbacho
    Abstract: The experience of military occupation confronts two groups of people in an asymmetrical relation of power established by the occupiers and suffered by the occupied. Once the occupation ends, this traumatic situation leaves a deep imprint in the memory of the occupied. The occupation of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands by Argentine troops that triggered the South Atlantic War in 1982 lasted 74 days and the cooperation from the islanders was negligible; they resorted to passive resistance, and showed their rejection of the invaders at every possible opportunity and the islanders even helped the British troops by providing intelligence and guidance on the terrain. This paper assesses the experience of the Argentine occupation. How did this small, tightly-knit islander community cope with the traumatic event of an occupation? How did the Argentine military personnel act and react during this period? In short, how did they conduct the occupation? How separated were the cultures of both occupiers and occupied? Until now this story has been told in a fragmentary form, scattered across different sources. This paper intent to put these fragments together and narrates the experience from three sides (the occupiers, the occupied and the liberators). Further analysis centers on the lasting effects of the occupation in the memories of three sides (the Argentineans, the islanders, and the British). The sources are interviews about the experience of the direct participants that were published shortly after the war and written material over the experience already published by both sides. This work shows that the views clashed at two different levels: one, about the interpretation of the rights and claims. How each country tells the story of possession and dispossession of the islands. The second level, considers the cultural characteristics of each group: the two cultures clashed because of differences in language, heritage, political and judicial traditions. Analysis of this case can yield important insights into occupations, particularly the “friendly” type, in which occupiers attempt to win the hearts and minds of the occupied, or, failing that, at least not antagonize them greatly.
    Date: 2018–12
  10. By: Elena Gubar (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University); Edgar Javier Sanchez Carrera (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino Carlo Bo); Suriya Kumacheva (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University); Ekaterina Zhitkova (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University); Galina Tomilina (Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University)
    Abstract: IWe study taxpayers’ decisions according to their personal income, individual preferences with respect to the audit and tax control information perceived in their social environment. We consider that citizens are classified by two social groups, the rich and the poor. When public authorities are corrupt, we show that the poor group is the most affected by corruption. However, when taxpayers are corrupt or tax evaders, we implement mechanisms to audit and control this corrupt behaviour. We show that this situation can be represented by several well-known theoretical games. Then, evolutionary dynamics of the game in networks considering that each taxpayer receives information from his neighbours about the probability of audit is analyzed. Our simulation analysis shows that the initial and final preferences of taxpayers depend on important parameters, i.e. taxes and fines, audit information and costs.
    Keywords: Behavioral economics; Corrupt behavior; Income distribution; Income taxation system; Network Games; Population games
    JEL: C72 C73 O11 O12 O55 K42
    Date: 2018

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