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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Tim Friehe; Helge Müller; Florian Neumeier |
| Abstract: | This paper explores the causal influence of media content on voting behavior. We exploit a natural experiment involving access to West German TV within the German Democratic Republic. Focusing on federal and state election outcomes in the post-reunification decade (i.e., a time at which TV content was harmonized), we find that municipalities that had access to Western TV broadcasts before reunification have lower vote shares for left-wing and right-wing extremist parties. With regard to potential channels, we provide evidence based on survey data that GDR citizens with access to West German TV were less loyal to the socialist regime, less hostile toward foreigners, and exhibited higher levels of social capital. Our findings thus support the notion that access to free media influences political attitudes and facilitates the consolidation of democracy. |
| Keywords: | voting, extremism, television, media, natural experiment, Germany |
| JEL: | D72 L82 P30 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7485&r=all |
| By: | Mostapha Diss (Univ Lyon, UJM Saint-Etienne, CNRS, GATE L-SE UMR 5824, F-42023 Saint-Etienne, France); Muhammad Mahajne (Univ Lyon, Université Lumière Lyon 2, GATE UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France) |
| Abstract: | We define and examine the concept of social acceptability of committees, in multi-winner elections context. We say that a committee is socially acceptable if each member in this committee is socially acceptable, i.e., the number of voters who rank her in their top half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her in the least preferred half, otherwise she is unacceptable. We focus on the social acceptability of Condorcet committees, where each committee member beats every non-member by a majority, and we show that a Condorcet committee may be completely unacceptable, i.e., all its members are unacceptable. However, if the preferences of the voters are single-peaked or single-caved and the committee size is not "too large" then a Condorcet committee must be socially acceptable, but if the preferences are single-crossing or group-separable, then a Condorcet committee may be socially acceptable but may not. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability for a Condorcet committee, when it exists, to be socially (un)acceptable under Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC) assumption. It turns to be that, in general, Condorcet committees are significantly exposed to social unacceptability. |
| Keywords: | Voting, Multiwinner Elections, Committee, Condorcet, Social Acceptability |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1906&r=all |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju |
| Abstract: | Exogenously imposed infinite repetition is known to mitigate people’s uncooperative behaviors in dilemma situations with partner matching through personal enforcement. One as yet unanswered question is whether people collectively choose to interact with each other under the partner matching condition when there exists an alternative possibility under random matching. In an indefinitely repeated public goods game framework, I let subjects democratically choose whether to (i) play with pre-assigned specific others for all rounds or to (ii) play with randomly matched counterparts in every round. The experimental results revealed that most groups collectively opt for the partner matching protocol. The data also indicated that groups achieve a higher level of cooperation when they democratically select the partner matching protocol by voting, relative to when the same option is exogenously imposed. These findings imply that people’s equilibrium selection may be affected by how the basic rules of games are introduced (endogenously or exogenously). The paper provides further evidence to suggest that the positive effect of democratic decision-making is stronger when the majority voting rule, rather than the unanimity rule, is applied. |
| Keywords: | experiment, public goods, cooperation, dilemma, social norms, endogenous choices |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2019–02–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92097&r=all |
| By: | Manuela Krause |
| Abstract: | The political business cycle theories describe that election-motivated politicians manipulate economic policy-making. Election cycles occur in many fiscal variables, for example tax rates. I examine whether electoral motives influence communal fees in Germany. Fees have to be paid for the use of many public services, for example waste management or sewerage provisions. Fees should be equivalent to the costs of a public service and thus correspond to the benefit principle in public finance. The German municipalities, however, have a leeway to determine fees. I use revenue data for around 7,000 West German municipalities from seven states over the period 1992–2006. The results show that municipalities increase communal fees in election years to a smaller extent than in the middle of the legislative period, while they increase fees more directly after elections. Fees increase in election years by 0.94 euro per capita less and directly after elections by 1.74 euro per capita more than in the middle of the legislative period. The results thus corroborate the predictions of the political business cycle theories. |
| Keywords: | Electoral cycles, political business cycles, local government, communal fees, public utilities sector |
| JEL: | D72 H72 A13 R50 H27 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_293&r=all |
| By: | Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap; Abhijit Ramalingam; Brock K. Stoddard |
| Abstract: | In experiments, contributions to a team public good increase when the team is placed in a competition with another team for prize. This paper is concerned with whether this insight generalises to teams that are internally unequal. In the experiment we report, it does. Indeed, the boost to public goods contributions is bigger with unequal teams than equal ones. We also find that the boost to contributions is most significant among the ‘rich’ in the team. Hence, since the public good is shared equally, competition not only promotes efficiency, it also reduces inequality in our experiment. Key Words: public goods, experiment, team competition, inequality, within group, productivity |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D31 D63 D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-17&r=all |
| By: | Alessandra Casella; Luis Sanchez |
| Abstract: | Storable Votes and Quadratic Voting are voting systems designed to account for voters’ intensity of preferences. We test their performance in two samples of California residents using data on four initiatives prepared for the 2016 California ballot. We bootstrap the original samples and generate two sets of 10,000 multi-elections simulations. As per design, both systems induce minority victories and result in higher expected welfare relative to majority voting. In our parametrization, quadratic voting induces more minority victories and achieves higher average welfare, but causes more frequent inefficient minority victories. The results are robust to different plausible rules-of-thumb in casting votes. |
| JEL: | D02 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25510&r=all |
| By: | Abhijit Ramalingam; Brock K. Stoddard; James M. Walker |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory setting, we investigate the effect of competition for the resources of team members with ‘divided loyalties’, and the role of such competition in overcoming the free-rider problem associated with the provision of team-level public goods. We find that competition alone creates ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. However, if groups have access to more information on the actions of team members, or are able to determine their membership through ostracism, they are more successful in attracting the ‘loyalties’ of team members. By eschewing the study of additional mechanisms that require external intervention or alterations of payoff functions, our work highlights the potential of implicit competition in promoting cooperation. Key Words: public goods, experiment, divided loyalties, competition, resources, endogenous membership |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 H41 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-18&r=all |
| By: | Enrico Cantoni; Vincent Pons |
| Abstract: | U.S. states increasingly require identification to vote – an ostensive attempt to deter fraud that prompts complaints of selective disenfranchisement. Using a difference-in-differences design on a 1.3-billion-observations panel, we find the laws have no negative effect on registration or turnout, overall or for any group defined by race, gender, age, or party affiliation. These results hold through a large number of specifications and cannot be attributed to mobilization against the laws, measured by campaign contributions and self-reported political engagement. ID requirements have no effect on fraud either – actual or perceived. Overall, our results suggest that efforts to reform voter ID laws may not have much impact on elections. |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25522&r=all |
| By: | Abhijit Ramalingam; Antonio J. Morales; James M. Walker |
| Abstract: | This study brings together two strands of experimental literature, “Give and Take” versions of strategically and payoff isomorphic linear public goods games and the effectiveness of peer punishment in promoting cooperation in repeated fixed-group game settings. We find evidence of lower cooperation in the Take game setting, primarily due to a greater decrease in cooperation in later decision rounds. Importantly, we also find that peer punishment is able to overcome the decrease in cooperation in the Take game, leading to greater relative increases in cooperation and earnings. Overall, with punishment, we observe efficiency gains in the Take game, but not in the Give game. This result is linked to the fact that low contributors in their respective groups are targeted for punishment more frequently in the Take game than in the Give game. Key Words: isomorphic, social dilemma, experiment, cooperation, punishment, reciprocal preferences |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 D02 H41 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-15&r=all |
| By: | Carsten Hefeker; Michael Neugart |
| Abstract: | What are the incentives for governments to coordinate their policies internationally when there is model disagreement and uncertainty? We build a model where countries disagree on policy targets and how policies affect the economies, and show that uncertainty not only determines the type of cooperative policy but also whether countries want to cooperate at all. Countries facing larger model disagreement also need to face larger uncertainty with respect to policy spillovers to agree on cooperation. Thus, uncertainty on spillovers can be a substitute for model agreement. |
| Keywords: | policy coordination, uncertainty, ideological commitment, model disagreement |
| JEL: | F42 F53 F55 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7477&r=all |
| By: | Toke S. Aidt; Facundo Albornoz; Esther Hauk |
| Abstract: | In an interconnected world, economic and political interests inevitably reach beyond national borders. Since policy choices generate external economic and political costs, foreign state and non-state actors have an interest in influencing policy actions in other sovereign countries to their advantage. Foreign influence is a strategic choice aimed at internalizing these externalities and takes many forms. We distinguish three broad types of intervention strategies, (i) voluntary agreement interventions between the intervening foreign power and the target country, (ii) policy interventions based on rewarding or sanctioning the target country to obtain a specific change in policy and (iii) institution interventions aimed at influencing the policy choice by changing the political institutions in the target country (with or without a civil war). We propose a unifying theoretical framework to understand when and which form of foreign influence is chosen and use it to organize and evaluate the new political economics literature on foreign influence along with work in cognate disciplines. Foreign intervention plays a more important role for a proper understanding of domestic policy choices, for institutional dynamics and for internal conflict than is commonly acknowledged in both empirical and theoretical research. |
| Keywords: | foreign influence, international agreements, institutions, aid, sanctions, conflict |
| JEL: | D7 D72 D74 F13 F23 F51 F53 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1072&r=all |
| By: | Ch. BELLÉGO (Insee, Crest); V. DORTET-BERNADET (Insee); M. TÉPAUT (Direction générale des entreprises) |
| Abstract: | In 2005, two mechanisms were set up to support collaborative research and development (R & D) between companies and research organizations. One carried by the National Research Agency (ANR) subsidizes projects that are more oriented towards basic research. The other supported by the Interministerial Fund (FUI) supports R & D activities that are more applied. This study presents a first exploitation of a database concerning these two schemes over the 2007-2014 period. This analysis allows to describe the selected projects, to examine the determinant of the participation of companies, and to investigate the decision of the two organizations to finance or not a project. This work confirms that the ANR and FUI mechanisms pursued different objectives: on average, the projects supported by the ANR are smaller than those supported by the FUI, they involve relatively more public research organizations, and R & D spending per partner is almost three times lower. In addition, in line with the policy of the competitiveness clusters (‘‘Pôles de Compétitivité’’), the FUI program seems to have favored more projects involving partners of the same territory whereas the ANR has more financed distant collaborations and projects with partners located in Ile-de-France. However, the selection process decreases the difference between the two devices: the ANR selects rather large projects, while the FUI rather retains those granting more to research organizations. In addition, the two schemes are aimed at the same very specific population of companies: companies that are already innovative, that carry out more R & D than others, that are more frequently members of a competitiveness cluster, and that have a better knowledge of the public support system for innovation. This last point raises the question of the redundancy of the other devices supporting collaborative R & D created in 2010, which are addressed in principle to the same population of companies. |
| Keywords: | R&D, Innovation, Collaborative R&D, public subsidizes |
| JEL: | D31 L38 O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nse:doctra:g2018-10&r=all |
| By: | Diane Jackson (Rowett Institute of Nutrition and Health); Nicolas Jullien (IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire, LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - IBSHS - Institut Brestois des Sciences de l'Homme et de la Société - UBO - Université de Brest - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire, MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de Analyse de l'Information - Rennes - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UR2 - Université de Rennes 2 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire); Sorin Matei (CERIAS - Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (Purdue University)); Amira Rezgui (LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris]) |
| Abstract: | What types of social processes generate strong online co-production groups? How do these groups evolve to reach peak performance? How does the quality of the products generated by the groups co-vary with the evolution of their social systems over time? The paper analyzes the entire English and French Wikipedia editorial histories, from their inception until 2015, identifying the specific phases through which two different massive online production systems grew. By tracking the emergence of the high contribution group across two different online spaces on a fine-grained level, the paper uncovers their temporal evolutions and impacts on the organization of social systems. Furthermore, the paper reveals how the quality of the content co-evolves with the emergence of the production groups through each growth phase. |
| Keywords: | collective action,online co-production,Wikipedia,evolution,phases |
| Date: | 2019–05–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01985702&r=all |