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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Ole Henning Nyhus (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology); Bjarne Strøm (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology) |
| Abstract: | Changes in population age composition is challenging in modern welfare states. Intergenerational conflicts may have important consequences for provision of services directed towards specific age groups as schooling and care for elderly. A relevant question is to what extent the supply side responds to changes in the age composition of the electorate in terms of actual spending policies. This paper exploits a novel experiment that took place in Norway in the 2011 local elections to estimate the causal relationship between local government school spending and the age composition of the electorate. We exploit that the voting age was reduced from 18 to 16 years in local elections in selected local governments (experimental governments), while voting age was kept at 18 in the rest (control governments). Using a difference in differences strategy, we find that compulsory school spending decreased by approximately 2% in the experimental governments. The results are robust across a number of econometric specifications and robustness checks. Since all the newly enfranchised voters had just finished compulsory school and receive no direct benefits from local government school spending, the result is consistent with selfish voter behavior. |
| Keywords: | Youth voting franchise; Compulsory school spending; Local governments |
| JEL: | D72 H10 H70 |
| Date: | 2019–01–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nst:samfok:17719&r=all |
| By: | Herrade Igersheim (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); François Durand (Nokia Bell Labs [Paris-Saclay]); Aaron Hamlin (Center for election science); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Before the 2016 US presidential elections, more than 2,000 participants participated to a survey in which they were asked their opinions about the candidates, and were also asked to vote according to different alternative voting rules, in addition to plurality: approval voting, range voting, and instant runoff voting. The participants were split into two groups, a first one facing a short set of four candidates (Clinton, Trump, Johnson and Stein), and a second one facing a long set of nine candidates (the previous four plus Sanders, Cruz, McMullin, Bloomberg, and Castle). The paper studies three issues: (1) How do U.S. voters effectively use these alternative rules? (2) What kind of candidates, in terms of individual preferences, is favored by which rule? (3) Which rules empirically satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives? Our results evidence that Bernie Sanders stands out as the "best" candidate in terms of individual preferences (using any standard criterion), and that evaluative voting rules such as approval voting and range voting might lead to this outcome, contrary to direct plurality and instant runoff voting (that elects Clinton) and to the official voting rule (that elected Trump). |
| Keywords: | Approval voting,range voting,instant runoff,strategic voting,US Presidential election |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01972097&r=all |
| By: | Robert Boyer (PJSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, IDA - Institut des Amériques - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Éducation nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche) |
| Abstract: | Distinctive political compromises prevailed and explained various brands of capitalism observed from WWII to the early 1990s. Is this key finding by régulation research been still valid given the wide diffusion of common structural changes since the 2000s: slow productivity in the industrialized world, overwhelming impact of finance, rise of inequalities within many Nation-States in response to deregulation, social and political polarization, open conflict between capitalism and democracy, the trading place between mature and emerging economies? These stylized facts challenge most economic theories but they can be explained by an institutionalist and historical approach that also helps in redesigning a relevant macroeconomic approach. Each capitalism brand displays specific complementarities among institutional forms and their growing interactions imply more their complementarity than their frontal competition. Consequently, all capitalisms have been transformed but they do not converge towards a canonical configuration. The rise of nationalist movements may challenge the present international relations but they should not underestimate the economic and social costs of their protectionist strategy. |
| Keywords: | Capitalism variety,Institutional complementarity,Global finance,Internationalization,Deregulation,National and international inequality,Capitalism and democracy,International relations |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01908095&r=all |
| By: | Mathieu Martin; Zéphirin Nganmeni (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we focus on a result stated by Bräuninger that the fi nagle point is within the Ɛ-core in a spatial voting game with Euclidean individual preferences. Through a counterex- ample with 7 players, we show that Bräuninger's result is not valid. |
| Keywords: | Spatial voting, majority game, dominance, core, fi nagle. |
| JEL: | C62 C70 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2019-03&r=all |
| By: | Suchon, Rémi (University of Lyon 2); Villeval, Marie Claire (CNRS, GATE) |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory experiment we test the interaction effects of status and group identity on interpersonal trust. Natural group identity is generated by school affiliation. Status (expert or agent) is awarded based on relative performance in a math quiz that is ex ante less favorable to the subjects from one group. We find that "promoted" trustors (individuals from the disadvantaged group that nevertheless achieve the status of expert) trust less both in-group and out-group trustees, compared to the other members of their group. Rather than playing against the effects of natural group identity, status promotion singles-out individuals. In contrast, trustworthiness is not affected by status and there is no evidence that interacting with promoted individuals impacts trust or trustworthiness. |
| Keywords: | trust, status, group identity, social mobility, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D91 J62 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12086&r=all |
| By: | Ennser-Jedenastik, Laurenz; Köppl-Turyna, Monika |
| Abstract: | The rise of populist radical right parties represents one of the most dramatic shifts in European party systems of the past decades. Although it has been established that the populist radical right's core appeal centers around issues of immigration and multiculturalism rather than economic matters, there has been a debate in the literature about the role of socioeconomic factors as a driver of PRRP success. We focus on two strands of argument relating to the welfare state and its impact on PRRP support. On the one hand, generous social policy regimes may mitigate the adverse economic effects of globalization and thus make workers less vulnerable to the appeal of populist radical right parties (the inoculation hypothesis). On the other hand, generous welfare regimes may make voters more concerned about increased numbers of low-skilled immigrants entering a country and potentially claiming benefits paid for largely by the taxes and contributions of the native population (the welfare chauvinism hypothesis). Our results suggest several channels through which the welfare state affects votes for the PRRP. Firstly, social protection seems to moderate economic vulnerability: in countries with higher relative redistribution and/or poverty prevention, the economically vulnerable are less likely to vote for the PRRP. Secondly, the direct effect of social welfare measures on the populist vote is positive when considering individual voters' positions. Thirdly, a stronger welfare state contributes to increasing the salience of the immigration platform for voting decisions. As a result, voters in high-redistribution countries are more likely to vote for the PRRP if they have a more moderate view on migration. |
| Keywords: | Populism,Right-Wing Populism,Welfare State,Party Systems,Europe,Social Protection |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:agawps:16&r=all |
| By: | Isabelle Lebon (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Antoinette Baujard (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Frédéric Gavrel (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Herrade Igersheim (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Jean-François Laslier (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In two laboratory surveys run in France during the 2014 European Elections, we asked the participants to provide their personal evaluations of the parties in terms of ideological proximity, and asked how they would vote under three proportional, closed-list voting rules : the (official) single-vote rule, a split-my-vote rule, and a list-approval rule. The paper analyzes the relation between opinions and vote, under the three systems. Compared to multi-vote rules, the single-vote system leads to voters' decisions that are more often strategic but also more often sincere. Sincere voting and strategic voting therefore appear to be more consistent than contradictory. Multi-vote rules allow the voter to express complex behavior, and the concepts of "sincere" and "strategic" voting are not always sufficient to render this complexity. |
| Keywords: | Laboratory experiment,Proportional systems,Contextualized experiment,Approval voting,Cumulative voting,Strategic voting |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01943903&r=all |
| By: | Luca Corazzini (University of Venice); Christopher Cotton (Queen's University); Tommaso Reggiani (Masaryk University) |
| Abstract: | When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk miscoordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. We explore such considerations by extending the threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute to an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. We experimentally study the effects of the intermediary on contributions and successful public good funding. Results show that delegation increases overall contributions and public good success, but only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct funding received from donors to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary is detrimental, resulting in lower contributions, a higher probability of miscoordination, and lower payoffs. |
| Keywords: | Delegation, threshold public goods, public goods experiment, fundraising, charitable giving, donor strategy |
| JEL: | C91 C92 H40 H41 L31 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qed:wpaper:1410&r=all |
| By: | Mathieu Martin; Zéphirin Nganmeni; Craig A. Tovey (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA) |
| Abstract: | We introduce a dominance relationship in spatial voting with Euclidean preferences, by treating voter ideal points as balls of radius δ. Values δ > 0 model imprecision or ambiguity as to voter preferences, or caution on the part of a social planner. The winning coalitions may be any consistent monotonic collection of voter subsets. We characterize the minimum value of δ for which the δ-core, the set of undominated points, is nonempty. In the case of simple majority voting, the core is the yolk center and δ is the yolk radius. Thus the δ-core both generalizes and provides a new characterization of the yolk. We then study relationships between the δ-core and two other concepts: the Ɛ-core and the finagle point. We prove that every fi nagle point must be within 2.32472 yolk radii of every yolk center, in all dimensions m ≥ 2. |
| Keywords: | Spatial voting, dominance, core, yolk, fi nagle. |
| JEL: | C62 C70 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2019-02&r=all |
| By: | Klenio Barbosa; Fernando V. Ferreira |
| Abstract: | We study the causes and consequences of patronage in Brazilian cities since the country’s re-democratization. We test key mechanisms – fiscal rules, accountability, political ideology, and rent-seeking – and estimate the consequences of patronage for public finances. Our data consist of the universe of public sector employees merged with their party affiliations, and a dynamic regression discontinuity design is applied to disentangle patronage from the growing political participation. The short-term patronage effect is large, with winning political coalitions increasing their shares of public sector workers and wages by 4 and 6 percentage points, respectively, during a mayoral term. Part of this effect lasts longer than a decade, with winning coalitions also occupying civil servant jobs that perform service-oriented tasks. This political occupation of government jobs is not associated with ideology, though. Instead, lack of accountability and rent-seeking are the primary driving forces, while reliance on intergovernmental transfers only increases patronage for smaller cities. Higher patronage does not affect the size of local governments, but it changes the composition of expenditures: hiring politically connected workers crowds out, almost one-to-one, non-affiliated employees. Overall, patronage accounted for more than half of the dramatic increase in public sector political employment since the Brazilian re-democratization. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H70 J45 M5 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25501&r=all |
| By: | Tuccio, Michele; Wahba, Jackline; Hamdouch, Bachir |
| Abstract: | This paper focuses on the impact of international migration on the transfer of political and social norms. Exploiting recent and unique data on Morocco, it explores whether households with return and current migrants bear different political preferences and behaviours than non-migrant families. Once controlling for the double selection into emigration and return migration, findings suggest that having a returnee in the household increases the demand for political and social change, driven by returnees mostly from Western European countries, who have been exposed to more democratic norms at destination. However, we find a negative impact of having a current migrant on the willingness to change of the left-behind household, driven by migrants to non-West countries, where the quality of political and social institutions is lower. Our results are robust to also controlling for destination selectivity. |
| Keywords: | International migration,Political change,Transfer of norms,Morocco |
| JEL: | D72 F22 O15 O55 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:309&r=all |