nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2019‒01‒21
eleven papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Comparing Voting Methods: 2016 US Presidential Election By Herrade Igersheim; François Durand; Aaron Hamlin; Jean-François Laslier
  2. Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique By Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente,Inês Vilela
  3. Media Construction of LGBT Prides in Russia: Framing Dynamics and Frame Resonance By Kseniia Semykina
  4. Measuring the Competitiveness of Elections By Gary W. Cox; Jon H. Fiva; Daniel M. Smith
  5. How Do Households Allocate Risk? By Christoph Engel; Alexandra Fedorets; Olga Gorelkina
  6. Touch Thee Not: Group Conflict, Caste Power, and Untouchability in Rural India By Dasgupta, Indraneel; Pal, Sarmistha
  7. Does equity induce inefficiency? An experiment on coordination By Mamadou Gueye; Nicolas Querou; Raphaël Soubeyran
  8. Network Neutrality Regulation in Brazil: An Economic Sociology Approach and the Challenges After the FCC's Decision By Schmidt Iaskio, Emerson Leonardo; Falch, Morten; Shima, Walter Tadahiro
  9. Natural Disasters, Moral Hazard, and Special Interests in Congress By Ethan Kaplan; Jörg L. Spenkuch; Haishan Yuan
  10. The Origins of Common Identity: Evidence from Alsace-Lorraine By Sirus Dehdari; Kai Gehring
  11. Double Majority and Generalized Brexit: Explaining Counterintuitive Results By Werner Kirsch; Wojciech S{\l}omczy\'nski; Dariusz Stolicki; Karol \.Zyczkowski

  1. By: Herrade Igersheim (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); François Durand (Nokia Bell Labs [Paris-Saclay]); Aaron Hamlin (Center for election science); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Before the 2016 US presidential elections, more than 2,000 participants participated to a survey in which they were asked their opinions about the candidates, and were also asked to vote according to different alternative voting rules, in addition to plurality: approval voting, range voting, and instant runoff voting. The participants were split into two groups, a first one facing a short set of four candidates (Clinton, Trump, Johnson and Stein), and a second one facing a long set of nine candidates (the previous four plus Sanders, Cruz, McMullin, Bloomberg, and Castle). The paper studies three issues: (1) How do U.S. voters effectively use these alternative rules? (2) What kind of candidates, in terms of individual preferences, is favored by which rule? (3) Which rules empirically satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives? Our results evidence that Bernie Sanders stands out as the "best" candidate in terms of individual preferences (using any standard criterion), and that evaluative voting rules such as approval voting and range voting might lead to this outcome, contrary to direct plurality and instant runoff voting (that elects Clinton) and to the official voting rule (that elected Trump).
    Keywords: Approval voting,range voting,instant runoff,strategic voting,US Presidential election
    Date: 2018–12
  2. By: Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente,Inês Vilela
    Abstract: The political resource curse is the idea that natural resources can lead to the deterioration of public policies through corruption and rent-seeking by those closest to political power. One prominent consequence is the emergence of conflict. This paper takes this theory to the data for the case of Mozambique, where a substantial discovery of natural gas recently took place. Focusing on the anticipation of a resource boom and the behavior of local political structures and communities, a large-scale field experiment was designed and implemented to follow the dissemination of information about the newly-discovered resources. Two types of treatments provided variation in the degree of dissemination: one with information targeting only local political leaders, the other with information and deliberation activities targeting communities at large. A wide variety of theory-driven outcomes is measured through surveys, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and georeferenced administrative data about local con- flict. Information given only to leaders increases elite capture and rent-seeking, while infor- mation and deliberation targeted at citizens increases mobilization and accountability-related outcomes, and decreases violence. While the political resource curse is likely to be in play, the dissemination of information to communities at large has a countervailing effect.
    Keywords: Natural Resources, Curse, Natural Gas, Information, Deliberation, Rent-seeking, Mozambique.
    JEL: D72 O13 O55 P16
    Date: 2019–01
  3. By: Kseniia Semykina (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: The article analyses representation of LGBT-movement activity, namely Saint Petersburg LGBT prides, in Russia. Framing theory, which views the media as an arena in which groups of interest promote their frames, or interpretations of the discussed issue, is used. Frames juxtapose elements of the text in such a way as to provide the audience with a scheme to perceive the message. Social movements are viewed as a group of interest that introduces new frames in the public deliberation. Two types of frames can be distinguished, namely collective action frames and status quo frames. In this study, usage of two collective action frames were examined (equality frame and victim frame), and two status quo frames (morality frame and propaganda of homosexuality). Additionally, the sources of quotes used in news stories were analyzed. The study focuses on articles dedicated to Saint Petersburg LGBT prides in years 2010-2017 in the most popular local Internet websites. The analysis shows that the coverage of LGBT prides can be divided into two distinct periods: 2010–2013 and 2014–2017. In the first period, LGBT activists dominated the coverage, quoted about twice more actively than government officials. Equality and victim frames were prevalent. In the second period, activists were cited significantly less often, with the propaganda of homosexuality frame dominating in the discourse. However, contrary to findings of previous studies on social movement representation, across the whole period under consideration LGBT activists were quoted more actively than government representatives. This finding calls for further exploration of the conditions which allowed for such coverage in the context of political heterosexism and homophobia.
    Keywords: framing, media, LGBT prides, Russia, Saint-Petersburg
    JEL: L
    Date: 2018
  4. By: Gary W. Cox; Jon H. Fiva; Daniel M. Smith
    Abstract: The concept of electoral competition plays a central role in many subfields of political science, but no consensus exists on how to measure it. One key challenge is how to conceptualize and measure electoral competitiveness at the district level across alternative electoral systems. Recent efforts to meet this challenge have introduced general measures of competitiveness which rest on explicit calculations about how votes translate into seats, but also implicit assumptions about how effort maps into votes (and how costly effort is). We investigate how assumptions about the effort-to-votes mapping affect the units in which competitiveness is best measured, arguing in favor of vote-share denominated measures and against vote-share-per-seat measures. Whether elections under multimember proportional representation systems are judged more or less competitive than single-member plurality or runoff elections depends directly on the units in which competitiveness is assessed (and hence on assumptions about how effort maps into votes).
    Keywords: competitiveness, measurement, electoral systems, mobilization, turnout
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2018
  5. By: Christoph Engel; Alexandra Fedorets; Olga Gorelkina
    Abstract: Individuals often have to decide to which degree of risk they want to expose others, or how much risk to accept if their choice has an externality on third parties. One typical application is a household. We run an experiment in the German Socio-Economic Panel with two members from 494 households. Participants have a good estimate of each other’s risk preferences, even if not explicitly informed. They do not simply match this preference when deciding on behalf of the other household member, but shy away from exposing others to risk. We model the situation, and we find four distinct types of individuals, and two distinct types of households.
    Keywords: risk preference, household, reticence to expose others to risk, trade-off between individual and foreign risk preference
    JEL: C45 D13 D81 D91
    Date: 2018
  6. By: Dasgupta, Indraneel (Indian Statistical Institute); Pal, Sarmistha (University of Surrey)
    Abstract: We investigate the impact of community power on the practice of untouchability in rural India. We model two-dimensional simultaneous group conflict over social norms, wherein an upper and backward (OBC) caste Hindu bloc contests the 'scheduled' castes (SCs) over the extent to which behavioural norms within the village should legitimise untouchability, even as it seeks to impose Hindu values/rituals on non-Hindus. We find that any increase in the collective resource endowment (power) of this bloc will increase the likelihood of an upper caste or OBC Hindu household practising untouchability. An increase in that of SCs, or, more interestingly, of Muslims and Christians, will reduce it. Strikingly, a marginal redistribution of resources from OBCs to upper castes may reduce it as well. Identifying a community's power with a multiplicative combination of its population share and land share, we find support for these hypotheses in data from the India Human Development Survey 2011-12.
    Keywords: caste, social norm, ritual purity, discrimination, untouchabilitly, land redistribution, caste power, India
    JEL: D72 D74 J71 J78 Z1
    Date: 2018–12
  7. By: Mamadou Gueye (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Nicolas Querou (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier); Raphaël Soubeyran (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier)
    Abstract: In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to analyze the relationship between equity and coordination success in a game with Pareto ranked equilibria. Equity is decreased by increasing the coordination payoffs of some subjects while the coordination payoffs of others remain unchanged. Theoretically, in this setting, difference aversion may lead to a positive relationship between equity and coordination success, while social welfare motivations may lead to a negative relationship. Using a within-subject experimental design, we find that less equity unambiguously leads to a higher level of coordination success. Moreover, this result holds even for subjects whose payoffs remain unchanged. Our results suggest that social welfare motivations drives the negative relationship between equity and coordination success found in this experiment. Moreover, our data suggest that the order of treatment matters. Groups facing first the treatment with high inequality in coordination payoffs, then the treatment with low inequality in coordination payoffs, reach the Pareto dominant equilibrium more often in both treatments compared to groups playing first the treatment with low inequality in coordination payoffs, then the treatment with high inequality in coordination payoffs.
    Keywords: coordination game,difference aversion,equity,effciency,social welfare motivation
    Date: 2018–12–07
  8. By: Schmidt Iaskio, Emerson Leonardo; Falch, Morten; Shima, Walter Tadahiro
    Abstract: Why different groups have different opinions on network neutrality? Can a group impose their opinion to others and have their claims respected by the regulatory authorities? This paper aims to present some insights about the network neutrality regulation in Brazil and discuss the challenges after the FCC's decision in the United States regarding network neutrality. It is hypothesized that there are conflicting groups and that such groups will seek, in the open discussions, to impose their calculation devices. The process of implementation and regulation of the Brazilian Civil Landmark of the Internet is a conflict arena, in which the actors could present their world views and their calculation devices.
    Keywords: Network neutrality,Regulation,FCC
    Date: 2018
  9. By: Ethan Kaplan; Jörg L. Spenkuch; Haishan Yuan
    Abstract: We exploit the precise timing of natural disasters to provide empirical evidence on the connection between electoral accountability and politicians’ support for special interests. We show that, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the evening news substantially reduce their coverage of politics. At the very same time, members of Congress become more likely to adopt the positions of special-interest donors as they vote on bills. Our findings are consistent with standard theories of political agency, according to which politicians are more inclined to serve special interests when, for exogenous reasons, they are less intensely monitored.
    Keywords: natural disasters, moral hazard, toll-call voting, special interests, Congress
    Date: 2018
  10. By: Sirus Dehdari; Kai Gehring
    Abstract: The quasi-exogenous division of the French regions Alsace and Lorraine after the Franco-Prussian War allows us to provide evidence about group identity formation within historically homogeneous regions. Using several measures of stated and revealed preferences spanning over half a century, we show that being exposed to occupation and repression for many decades caused a persistently stronger regional identity. The geographical RDD results are robust across all specifications. We document two mechanisms using data on regional newspapers and regionalist parties. The differences are strongest for the first two age cohorts after WWII and associated with preferences for more regional decision-making.
    Keywords: group identity, regional identity, identity formation, persistence of preferences, homogenization policies, assimilation, Alsace-Lorraine
    JEL: D91 H70 N40 Z19
    Date: 2018
  11. By: Werner Kirsch; Wojciech S{\l}omczy\'nski; Dariusz Stolicki; Karol \.Zyczkowski
    Abstract: A mathematical analysis of the distribution of voting power in the Council of the European Union operating according to the Treaty of Lisbon is presented. We study the effects of Brexit on the voting power of the remaining members, measured by the Penrose--Banzhaf Index. We note that the effects in question are non-monotonic with respect to voting weights, and that some member states will lose power after Brexit. We use the normal approximation of the Penrose--Banzhaf Index in double-majority games to show that such non-monotonicity is in most cases inherent in the double-majority system, but is strongly exacerbated by the peculiarities of the EU population vector. Furthermore, we investigate consequences of a hypothetical "generalized Brexit", i.e., NN-exit of another member state (from a 28-member Union), noting that the effects on voting power are non-monotonic in most cases, but strongly depend on the size of the country leaving the Union.
    Date: 2018–12

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