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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Fabi\'an Riquelme; Pablo Gonz\'alez-Cantergiani; Gabriel Godoy |
| Abstract: | The binomial system is an electoral system unique in the world. It was used to elect the senators and deputies of Chile during 27 years, from the return of democracy in 1990 until 2017. In this paper we study the real voting power of the different political parties in the Senate of Chile during the whole binomial period. We not only consider the different legislative periods, but also any party changes between one period and the next. The real voting power is measured by considering power indices from cooperative game theory, which are based on the capability of the political parties to form winning coalitions. With this approach, we can do an analysis that goes beyond the simple count of parliamentary seats. |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1808.07854&r=cdm |
| By: | Eric Arias; Horacio Larreguy; John Marshall; Pablo Querubín |
| Abstract: | Effective policy-making requires that voters avoid electing malfeasant politicians. However, as our simple learning model emphasizing voters’ prior beliefs and updating highlights, informing voters of incumbent malfeasance may not entail sanctioning. Specifically, electoral punishment of incumbents revealed to be malfeasant is rare where voters already believed them to be malfeasant, while information’s effect on turnout is non-linear in the magnitude of revealed malfeasance. These Bayesian predictions are supported by a field experiment informing Mexican voters about malfeasant mayoral spending before municipal elections. Given voters’ low expectations and initial uncertainty, as well as politician responses, relatively severe malfeasance revelations increased incumbent vote share on average. Consistent with voter learning, rewards were lower among voters with lower malfeasance priors, among voters with more precise prior beliefs, when audits revealed greater malfeasance, and among voters updating less favorably. Furthermore, both low and high malfeasance revelations increased turnout, while less surprising information reduced turnout. |
| JEL: | D72 D73 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24888&r=cdm |
| By: | Alan de Bromhead (Queen's Management School); Alan Fernihough (Queen's Management School); Enda Hargaden (Department of Economics, University of Tennessee) |
| Abstract: | Electoral reforms in 1918 nearly tripled the number of people eligible to vote in Ireland. Following the reforms - the largest franchise extensions in UK history – the previously obscure Sinn Féin party secured 73 of Ireland's 105 seats, an outcome that presaged a guerrilla war and ultimately independence from the United Kingdom. This paper examines the relationship between the franchise extension and the election results. We find little evidence of a connection between the two. New female voters appear less likely to have supported Sinn Féin. New male voters were slightly more likely to vote for Sinn Féin, but the magnitude of this effect was small and statistically insignificant. In fact, non-voting appears particularly high for both groups of new voters. Our results suggest that the extension of the franchise cannot explain Sinn Féin's victory. We conclude their electoral success was more likely driven by a change of heart on behalf of the Irish electorate, rather than a change in its composition. |
| Keywords: | Voting; Elections; Ireland; Sinn Féin |
| JEL: | D72 N44 N94 |
| Date: | 2018–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ten:wpaper:2018-02&r=cdm |
| By: | Han-Xin Yang; Zhen Wang |
| Abstract: | In previous studies of spatial public goods game, each player is able to establish a group. However, in real life, some players cannot successfully organize groups for various reasons. In this paper, we propose a mechanism of reputation-driven group formation, in which groups can only be organized by players whose reputation reaches or exceeds a threshold. We define a player's reputation as the frequency of cooperation in the last $T$ time steps. We find that the highest cooperation level can be obtained when groups are only established by pure cooperators who always cooperate in the last $T$ time steps. Effects of the memory length $T$ on cooperation are also studied. |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1802.01253&r=cdm |
| By: | Adrian Hillenbrand (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | Group tasks are often organized by a list: group members state their willingness to contribute by entering their names on a publicly visible, empty list. Alternatively, one could organize the group task by starting with a full list: every group member is already entered on the list and non-cooperators have to cross out their names. Indeed, strong behavioral differences are observed when comparing (otherwise identical) environments with empty and full lists in a laboratory experiment with repeated interaction. Cooperation in the empty list is high in early periods, but is decreasing. In the full list, cooperation starts low, but is actually increasing, surpassing cooperation in the empty list treatment in later periods. Two factors, diffusion of responsibility and unraveling of cooperation seem to drive the results. |
| Keywords: | Cooperation; Institutions; Coordination; Framing; Experiment; Volunteer’s Dilemma |
| JEL: | C71 C73 C92 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2018_01&r=cdm |
| By: | Facundo Piguillem (EIEF); Alessandro Riboni (Ecole Polytechnique) |
| Abstract: | Most fiscal rules can be overridden by consensus. We show that the possibility of override does not make fiscal rules ineffectual. Fiscal rules can lead the party in power to offer spending concessions to the opposition to avoid their application. Since fiscal rules determine the outside option in case of disagreement, the opposition uses fiscal rules as “bargaining chips”. This reduces the incentive for inefficient debt accumulation. We analyze three standard fiscal rules: government shutdown, budget balance and mandatory spending, and show that when political polarization is high, a government shutdown provision maximizes the bargaining power of the opposition and leads to a sizeable reduction of debt. When the degree of polarization is low, a balanced budget rule is preferable. Mandatory spending eliminates the incentive to over-accumulate debt by reducing political risk. However, it gives a considerable advantage to the initial incumbent, generating large and persistent static inefficiencies. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed018:732&r=cdm |
| By: | Mathias Dolls; Nils Wehrhofer |
| Abstract: | We present the first evidence on public attitudes towards two prominent euro area reform proposals (European Unemployment Benefit Scheme and Sovereign Insolvency Procedure) and assess potential impediments to their implementation by means of a randomized survey experiment in Germany. We find that there is a low willingness among German voters to accept fiscal risk-sharing through common unemployment insurance, while a sovereign insolvency procedure aimed at strengthening market discipline is supported by a majority of the electorate. Our randomized treatments confronting survey participants with potential adverse effects of the reforms lead to significant downward shifts in approval rates. Altruism, cosmopolitanism, political preference and income are important predictors of support for the reform proposals. We also show that there is a striking contrast between the low level of support for transfers to other euro area member states and a broad acceptance of inner German transfers. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:econwp:_11&r=cdm |
| By: | Dario Madeo; Chiara Mocenni |
| Abstract: | Cooperative behavior in real social dilemmas is often perceived as a phenomenon emerging from norms and punishment. To overcome this paradigm, we highlight the interplay between the influence of social networks on individuals, and the activation of spontaneous self-regulating mechanisms, which may lead them to behave cooperatively, while interacting with others and taking conflicting decisions over time. By extending Evolutionary game theory over networks, we prove that cooperation partially or fully emerges whether self-regulating mechanisms are sufficiently stronger than social pressure. Interestingly, even few cooperative individuals act as catalyzing agents for the cooperation of others, thus activating a recruiting mechanism, eventually driving the whole population to cooperate. |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1807.07848&r=cdm |
| By: | Ignacio Lago (Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra); André Blais (Department of Political Science, University of Montréal) |
| Abstract: | We explore how the uniformity of electoral swings in the district vote within countries is affected by the level of economic and political decentralization. We rely on district-level data from OECD countries in two consecutive elections before and after the Great Recession to show that as regional governments exert more influence over the central government, districts deviate less from the overall pattern of change in support of the national incumbent party. The causal mechanism accounting for the effect of decentralization on dynamic nationalization is examined with individual panel data from national elections in Canada and Spain. |
| Date: | 2018–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1804&r=cdm |
| By: | Aaron A. Moore (The University of Winnipeg) |
| Abstract: | Following pressure from some sectors of civil society, the Province of Ontario passed a law in 2016 allowing municipalities to use ranked ballots to elect mayors and councillors. This change in provincial regulation, and the dialogue and debate that led to the policy change, raise important questions about the nature of municipal electoral systems in Canada. Changing an electoral system can improve voter turnout and alter electoral outcomes for the better. However, no change to an existing electoral system will address all the perceived flaws within an existing system. Change may, in fact, introduce new and unintended complications to elections and voting. Understanding the nature of different electoral systems is a necessary step when contemplating change or the status quo, as is being able to articulate clearly the objectives one hopes to achieve through electoral reform. Ultimately, proponents of change must understand that the objectives they hope to achieve through electoral reform may not be universal, and that different objectives may actually conflict with one another. This paper is intended to introduce and discuss the variety of components that constitute a municipal electoral system so that proponents for change, supporters of the status quo, and individuals simply wishing to expand their knowledge of democratic institutions may be better informed about the potential and consequences of electoral reform at the municipal level. |
| Keywords: | electoral reform; municipal elections |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mfg:perspe:20&r=cdm |
| By: | Norris, Pippa (Harvard U) |
| Abstract: | Doubts about the legitimacy of the 2016 U.S. elections continue to reverberate and deepen partisan mistrust in America. The perfect storm followed Republican allegations of fake news and massive voter fraud, Democratic complaints of voter suppression and gerrymandering, discontent with the way that the Electoral College anointed the presidential candidate who lost the popular vote, compounded by Comey's interventions and intelligence reports of Russian meddling. These issues raise the broader question: how serious do any perceived electoral flaws usually have to be to raise doubts not just about the process and results--or even the legitimacy of the declared winner--but about democracy itself? Do ordinary people actually care most about the quality of their elections (input legitimacy) or are they more concerned with the pocket-book economy of jobs, growth, and taxes (output legitimacy) and/or are attitudes shaped by partisan cues (the winners-losers thesis)? And how do attitudes vary among electoral winners and losers? To understand these issues, Part I outlines the theoretical and conceptual framework. Part II describes the evidence used to investigate these issues drawing upon cross-national data from the World Values Survey 6th wave in 42 diverse societies and from the 7th wave U.S. survey, as well as expert indices measuring the quality of elections. Part III establishes the key cross-national findings. Part IV presents the US results. Part V summarizes the key findings and overall implications, demonstrating that doubts about electoral integrity undermine general satisfaction with how democracy works. Paper for the panel on 'Election dynamics in the developing world' at the American Political Science Association annual convention, Boston, 4.00-5.30pm on Saturday 1 September 2018. |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp18-022&r=cdm |
| By: | Leopoldo Fergusson; Horacio Larreguy; Juan Felipe Riaño |
| Abstract: | We develop a model of the politics of state strengthening undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public good provision. The model suggests that, when politically challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents may oppose investing in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model’s implications using policy decisions that reflect local state capacity choices, and a difference-in-differences identification strategy that exploits a national shock that threatened the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party’s hegemony in the early 1960s with varying intensity across the various Mexican municipalities. |
| Keywords: | State capacity, political competition, land allocation |
| JEL: | D72 D73 |
| Date: | 2018–08–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000518:016517&r=cdm |
| By: | MAVROZACHARAKIS, EMMANOUIL; DIMARI, GEORGIA |
| Abstract: | : The euro crisis has threatened the balance of social structures, through the impoverishment of the middle class, in almost all countries of the Old Continent. This trend has not only posed a threat to social cohesion, but it also threats the very nature of the so-called Western-style Democracy. The reason for this is that there is a class that has always been a "cushion" that absorbs both the vibrations of competition and the confrontation of the social elite with the socially weak, offering the latter the ability to overcome their misery. In most capitalist economies, the middle class label is based on an economic definition that is largely based on a lifestyle that is based on a certain economic robustness and endurance. With the deepening of the crisis, however, the diversity of the middle class not only has it been jeopardized, but rather, it has gradually been replaced by a new demographic category called the prekariat. This new category consists of a group of people once in the middle class and currently marginalized. All of this leads to generalized uncertainty and totally unstable political attitudes, with intense mobility at the extremes. The rapid rise of right and left-wing populism is an aspect of the threatened subjugation of the middle class strata. The consequences for societies when their layered center is lost are obvious and significant. |
| Keywords: | middle class; prekariat; decommissioning of middle class; elevator effect. |
| JEL: | A10 H20 H3 H4 H40 H41 H5 H50 H51 H52 H53 H54 H55 I0 I1 I2 J0 J00 J01 J1 Z00 |
| Date: | 2018–07–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:88462&r=cdm |
| By: | Mauro Caselli; Andrea Fracasso; Silvio Traverso |
| Abstract: | We study whether and to what extent the electoral dynamics in Italy over the 1994-2008 period can be explained by the development of economic factors associated with globalization. To measure the level of exposure to globalization for local labor markets, our main unit of analysis, we use the intensity of import competition from China and the presence of immigrants. Looking at parties’ political positions and employing an estimation strategy that accounts for endogeneity and time-invariant unobserved effects across local labor markets, we find that both immigration intensity and exposure to import competition from China have contributed positively to the electoral outcomes of far-right parties, whereas only the former has produced a positive effect on the votes of right-wing and traditionalist/authoritarian/nationalist parties. On the other hand, neither of them has had an effect on far-left parties. Moreover, electoral turnout has responded negatively to an increased presence of migrants. While the above effects seem to work through the mediation of labor markets, the results suggest that other mechanisms at the level of local communities are also at play. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:econwp:_10&r=cdm |
| By: | Eduardo Levy Yeyati; Lorena Moscovich; Constanza Abuin |
| Abstract: | To extend the existing literature on political polarization beyond the traditional setup (an ideologically well-defined two-party setup), we run survey experiments in the great Buenos Aires area of Argentina to explore the role of leader and party endorsement in shaping public opinion over policies, in a context of a weak and ideologically elusive party system dominated by strong personalistic leaders. We find evidence of a significant (leader as well as party) endorsement effect, regardless of the degree of ex ante polarization (so that sponsorship may introduce polarization on ex ante unpolarized issues). In addition, we document asymmetries relative to party and leader (some leaders have larger polarizing effects than others; negative identification with a leader seems to prevail over positive identification) and the ineffectiveness of co-sponsorship and "against-character" endorsement to broaden policy support. |
| Keywords: | Policy preferences, political decisions, leader endorsement, party labels, weak party systems |
| Date: | 2017–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udt:wpgobi:wp_gob1_2017_10&r=cdm |
| By: | Norris, Pippa (Harvard U) |
| Abstract: | This study considers the evidence for 'demand-side' theories seeking to explain the outcome of the Brexit referendum and subsequent divisions in UK politics. Economic theories suggest that the Leave decision was driven mainly by the 'left-behinds' in jobs or wages, such as those living in struggling communities in the North of England, the Midlands, and Wales. By contrast cultural accounts emphasize political attitudes and values, including long-term British suspicion about the European Union project, public disgust with the political class at Westminster, anxiety about the effects of the refugee crisis and migration from other EU countries, and opposition to the government's austerity cuts. These theories can also be regarded as complimentary rather than rivals, for example if economic deprivation catalyzed resentment about immigrants and the rejection of open borders. To examine these issues, Part I sets out the electoral context and historical background in the run up to Brexit--and its implications for party competition in the UK. Drawing upon a larger book-length study, Part II sets out the arguments based on economic and cultural theories about the British electorate. Part III describes the evidence from the British Election Study panel surveys, which allows us to examine the factors dividing supporters in the Leave and Remain camps in the 2016 Brexit referendum, as well as those predicting support for UKIP from 2015-17. Part IV examines the impact of demographic control factors like age and sex, indicators of economic grievances, and the cultural profile of voters in their authoritarian and populist values, as well as their attitudes towards the Europe Union, immigration, and left-right ideology. The conclusion in Part V considers developments since Brexit and their implications for the future of populism in the UK. The main advocate of Brexit, UKIP, succeeded in attaining this goal, but then failed to achieve a decisive break through as a parliamentary party. Yet authoritarian-populism remains alive and well in post-Brexit Britain, absorbed into the bloodstream of the body politic, disrupting and dividing both major parties. |
| Date: | 2018–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp18-021&r=cdm |