nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2018‒07‒23
nine papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of Social Norms By Kenju Kamei
  2. Voting as a War of Attrition By Kwiek, Maksymilian; Marreiros, Helia; Vlassopoulos, Michael
  3. Herd Behavior in FDA Committees: A Structural Approach By Melissa Newham; Rune Midjord
  4. Electoral Institutions and Intraparty Cohesion By Matakos, Konstantinos; Savolainen, Riikka; Troumpounis, Orestis; Tukiainen, Janne; Xefteris, Dimitrios
  5. Measuring Majority Tyranny: Axiomatic Approach By Aleksei Yu. Kondratev; Alexander S. Nesterov
  6. Sociology of Social Movements – Main Approaches By Kazenin, Konstantin; Koroleva, Maria
  7. Interactive Information Design By Frédéric Koessler; Marie Laclau; Tristan Tomala
  8. Signaling through public antitrust enforcement: A Generalization By Madhuparna Ganguly; Rupayan Pal
  9. Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy in Collective Decisions By Yukio Koriyama; Ali Ozkes

  1. By: Kenju Kamei (Durham University Business School)
    Abstract: One of the important topics in public choice is how people’s free-riding behavior could differ by group size in collective action dilemmas. This paper experimentally studies how the strength of third party punishment in a prisoner’s dilemma could differ by the number of third parties in a group. Our data indicate that as the number of third party punishers increases in a group, the average punishment intensity per third party punisher decreases. However, the decrease rate is very mild and therefore the size of total punishment in a group substantially increases with an increase in group size. As a result, third party punishment becomes a sufficient deterrent against a player selecting defection in the prisoner’s dilemma when the number of third party punishers is sufficiently large. Nevertheless, when there are too many third party punishers in a group, a defector’s expected payoff is far lower than that of a cooperator due to strong aggregate punishment, while some cooperators are even hurt through punishment. Therefore, the group incurs a huge efficiency loss. Such over-punishment results from third party punishers’ conditional punishment behaviors: their punishment intensity is positively correlated with their beliefs on the peers’ punitive actions. Some possible ways to coordinate punishment among peers even when group size is very large, thus enabling the efficiency loss to be mitigated, are also discussed in the paper.
    Keywords: experiment, cooperation, third party punishment, dilemma, group size effect
    JEL: C92 D72 D78 H41
    Date: 2018–04
  2. By: Kwiek, Maksymilian (University of Southampton); Marreiros, Helia (Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Porto); Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton)
    Abstract: We study communication in committees selecting one of two alternatives when consensus is required and agents have private information about their preferences. Delaying the decision is costly, so a form of multiplayer war of attrition emerges. Waiting allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences and may help to select the alternative correctly more often than simple majority. In a series of laboratory experiments, we investigate how various rules affect the outcome reached. We vary the amount of feedback and the communication protocol available to voters: complete secrecy about the pattern of support; feedback about this support; public communication; and within-group communication. The feedback no-communication mechanism is worse than no feedback benchmark in all measures of welfare - the efficient alternative is chosen less often, waiting cost is higher, and thus net welfare is lower. Our headline result is that adding communication restores net efficiency, but in different ways. Public communication does poorly in terms of selecting the correct alternative, but limits the cost of delay, while group communication improves allocative efficiency, but has at best a moderate effect on delay.
    Keywords: voting, intensity of preferences, supermajority, conclave, war of attrition, communication
    JEL: C78 C92 D72 D74
    Date: 2018–06
  3. By: Melissa Newham; Rune Midjord
    Abstract: Many important decisions within public and private organizations are based on recommendations from expert committees and advisory boards. A notable example is the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's advisory committees, which make recommendations on new drug applications. Previously the voting procedure for these committees was sequential, however, due to concerns of herding and momentum effects the procedure was changed to simultaneous voting. Exploiting a novel dataset of more than ten thousand votes cast by experts in the FDA committees under both sequential and simultaneous voting, we estimate a structural model that allows us to measure the magnitude and importance of informational herding. We show that experts, voting on important scientific questions, are susceptible to herd behavior; on average 46% of the members take into consideration the sequence of previous votes when casting their vote, 17% of these voters actually herd i.e. change their vote from what they would have voted if ignoring the preceding votes.
    Keywords: Herd behavior, expert committees, structural estimation, FDA, pharmaceuticals
    JEL: D72 D82 D83 D91 I10 I18
    Date: 2018
  4. By: Matakos, Konstantinos; Savolainen, Riikka; Troumpounis, Orestis; Tukiainen, Janne; Xefteris, Dimitrios
    Abstract: We study parties' optimal ideological cohesion across electoral rules, when the following trade-off is present: A more heterogenous set of candidates is electorally appealing (catch-all party), yet, it serves policy-related goals less efficiently. When the rule becomes more disproportional, thus inducing a more favorable seat allocation for the winner, the first effect is amplified, incentivizing parties to be less cohesive. We provide empirical support using a unique data-set that records candidates' ideological positions in Finnish municipal elections. Exploiting an exogenous change of electoral rule disproportionality at different population thresholds, we identify the causal effect of electoral rules on parties' cohesion.
    Keywords: electoral systems, ideological heterogeneity, party cohesion, policymotivated parties, proportional representation, regression discontinuity design, Local public finance and provision of public services, C21, C72, D02, D72,
    Date: 2018
  5. By: Aleksei Yu. Kondratev (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Alexander S. Nesterov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: We study voting rules with respect to how they allow or limit a majority to dominate minorities. For this purpose we propose a novel quantitative criterion for voting rules: the quali ed mutual majority criterion (q; k)-MM. For a xed total number of m candidates, a voting rule satis es (q; k)-MM if whenever some k candidates receive top k ranks in an arbitrary order from a majority that consists of more than q 2 (0; 1) of voters, the voting rule selects one of these k candidates. The standard majority criterion is equivalent to (1=2; 1)-MM. The standard mutual majority criterion (MM) is equivalent to (1=2; k)-MM, where k is arbitrary. We nd the bounds on the size of the majority q for several important voting rules, including the plurality rule, the plurality with runo rule, Black's rule, Condorcet least reversal rule, Dodgson's rule, Simpson's rule, Young's rule and monotonic scoring rules; for most of these rules we show that the bound is tight.
    Keywords: Majority tyranny, single winner elections, plurality voting rule, plurality with runo , instant runo voting, mutual majority criterion, voting rules
    JEL: Z
    Date: 2018
  6. By: Kazenin, Konstantin (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Koroleva, Maria (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))
    Abstract: In the sociology of social movements, it is common to distinguish three main paradigms - the paradigm of collective behavior, the paradigm of collective action and the paradigm of new social movements. Within the evolution of these paradigms, there has been a shift from the notion of social movements as a manifestation of the dysfunction of the social system to the understanding that it's an integral part of its normal functioning; from the emphasis on the rigid organizational design of the movement to uncovering the potential of its informal character. In Russia, this scientific heritage is actively used in the analysis of civil society.
    Date: 2018–06
  7. By: Frédéric Koessler (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Marie Laclau (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Tristan Tomala (GREGH - Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC - HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, HEC Paris - Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales)
    Abstract: We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When the set of messages available to each designer is finite, such games always admit subgame perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information about independent pieces of information, every equilibrium of the direct game (in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states) is an equilibrium with larger (possibly infinite) message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, pure strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal form game. In an infinite-horizon multi-period extension of information design games, a feasible outcome which Pareto dominates a more informative equilibrium of the one-period game is supported by an equilibrium of the multi-period game.
    Keywords: statistical experiments,splitting games,sharing rules,information design,Bayesian persuasion
    Date: 2018–05
  8. By: Madhuparna Ganguly (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research); Rupayan Pal (Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research)
    Abstract: This note shows that the argument of Saljanin(2017) [Saljanin, 2017. "Signaling through public antitrust enforcement" , Economics Letters 169, 4 - 6] that public antitrust enforcement complements private investment is robust to allowing public investment in antitrust enforcement to be productive. However, unlike as in the case of unproductive public investment, over investment in public antitrust enforcement does not necessarily signal that the government is pro-competition: in pooling equilibria either only the anti-competition government or both types of government over invests, whereas in the separating equilibrium only the pro-competition government over invests.
    Keywords: Private and public enforcement, Signaling, Antitrust
    JEL: H1 H4 K1 L1 L4
    Date: 2018–04
  9. By: Yukio Koriyama (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - X - École polytechnique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Ali Ozkes (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)
    Abstract: We study the implications of structural models of non-equilibrium thinking, in which players best respond while holding heterogeneous beliefs on the cognitive levels of others. We introduce an inclusive cognitive hierarchy model, in which players are capable of projecting the self to others in regard to their cognitive level. The model is tested in a laboratory experiment of collective decision-making, which supports inclusiveness. Our theoretical results show that inclusiveness is a key factor for asymptotic properties of deviations from equilibrium behavior. Asymptotic behavior can be categorized into three distinct types: naïve, Savage rational with inconsistent beliefs, and sophisticated.
    Keywords: collective decision-making,bounded rationality,cognitive hierarchy,information aggregation
    Date: 2018–06

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