nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2018‒04‒09
twelve papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Terrorism, Colonialism and Voter Psychology: Evidence from the United Kingdom By Jamal Bouoiyour; Refk Selmi
  2. How public perception towards party (dis)unity a ects the introduction of primaries By Moskalenko, Anna
  3. Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? By Tjaša Bjedov; Simon Lapointe; Thierry Madiès; Marie Villeval
  4. Individual Differences and Contribution Sequences in Threshold Public Goods By Schüssler, Katharina; Schüssler, Michael; Mühlbauer, Daniel
  5. Why an EU Referendum? Why in 2016? By Becker, Sascha O; Thiemo Fetzer
  6. Dismantling the "Jungle": Migrant Relocation and Extreme Voting in France By Paul Vertier; Max Viskanic
  7. Guns, Environment, and Abortion: How Single-Minded Voters Shape Politicians' Decisions By Laurent Bouton; Paola Conconi; Francisco Pino; Maurizio Zanardi
  8. De Facto Power, Democracy, and Taxation: Evidence from Military Occupation during Reconstruction By Mario Chacon; Jeffrey Jensen
  9. Effects of Municipal Mergers on Voter Turnout By Lapointe, Simon; Saarimaa, Tuukka; Tukiainen, Janne
  10. Deliberation in Committees : Theory and Evidence from the FOMC By Alessandro RIBONI; Francisco RUGE-MURCIA
  11. A bottom-up approach to environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis By Johannes Friedrich Carolus; Nick Hanley; Søren Bøye Olsen; Søren Marcus Pedersen
  12. A theory of cooperation in games with an application to market socialism By John E. Roemer

  1. By: Jamal Bouoiyour (CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour); Refk Selmi (CATT - Centre d'Analyse Théorique et de Traitement des données économiques - UPPA - Université de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour)
    Abstract: Extant theory suggests that terrorist groups strategically plan their attacks around elections. This study investigates the impact of terrorism on voting behavior in the United Kingdom (UK). To address endogeneity concerns related to the possibility that terrorism may be a response to the elections results, we have conducted an instrumental variables approach that relies on the political participation of Commonwealth-origin migrant voters, taking into account the fact that the strength of the Commonwealth's commitment to its principles and values-including the promotion of human and political rights, tolerance, respect for diversity, coexistence, equity and fairness-may affect terror dynamics. In other words, we have connected terrorism to colonial policies and practices. In fact, the colonial rulers had established effective application of economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights which would contribute to the success of counter-terrorism strategies. The results indicate that terrorism significantly affects the electorate's preferences. We have also found that the vote of the right-wing party is likely to be higher in localities near the home base of a terror incident and in localities adjacent to international borders, and lower in cities with a noticeable percentage of Muslims. The current UK economic conditions do not work to the advantage of the right-wing party. The results are statistically significant and robust across a multitude of model specifications and differing measures of terrorism.
    Keywords: Terrorism,Colonialism,Voter behavior,Elections, United Kingdom
    Date: 2018–01–18
  2. By: Moskalenko, Anna
    Abstract: Abstract Political parties are increasingly adopting more inclusive candidate selection methods by introducing primary elections. This paper identi es motives of this change, as well as decision makers leading to this introduction. We view a party as a coalition of factions, composed by a party elite and a dissenting faction. By developing a game- theoretical model of interplay between the party elite and the dissenting faction, we fi nd that the primaries are introduced in two scenarios: (1) when the party elite fi nd itself in a weak position under the credible threat of the dissidents to leave the party and (2) when there is a high cohesion between both factions and the party elite itself takes the initiative in introducing primaries. Keywords: Political parties, Primaries, Party split, Party factions, Candidate selection, intra-party politics. JEL Classi fication Number: D71, D72
    Keywords: Partits polítics, Eleccions primàries, 32 - Política,
    Date: 2017
  3. By: Tjaša Bjedov (Swiss Distance Learning University); Simon Lapointe (VATT - Government Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki - VATT); Thierry Madiès (University of Fribourg); Marie Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes. Abstract: Using a laboratory experiment with nested local and global public goods, we analyze the stability of global groups when individuals have the option to separate, according to the degree of decentralization of decision-making. We show that increasing the number of decisions made at the local level within a smaller group reduces the likelihood that individuals vote in favor of a break-up of the global group. Voting for a break-up of the global group is more likely when global group members are less cooperative and local group members are more cooperative. Reinforcing local group identity has no impact on votes.
    Keywords: Break-up of groups,decision rights, voting behavior, public goods
    Date: 2018–01–24
  4. By: Schüssler, Katharina (LMU Munich); Schüssler, Michael (LMU Munich); Mühlbauer, Daniel (function(HR))
    Abstract: Following the notion that organizations often face public good dilemmas when collective action is needed, we use a real-time provision-point mechanism to experimentally explore the process of achieving cooperative equilibria. Specifically, besides exploring group outcomes, we identify individual antecedents for the timing of the contribution to the public good. In addition, we study the role of different situational factors for sustaining high rates of cooperation: information about others\' actions and the number of individuals necessary for public good provision. We find that contribution and implementation rates are relatively high, with only a moderate decline over time, and that social value orientation as well as several personality traits help to explain the observed contribution sequences.
    Keywords: provision-point mechanism; real-time protocol; personality traits;
    JEL: C92 D70 H41
    Date: 2018–03–26
  5. By: Becker, Sascha O (University of Warwick); Thiemo Fetzer (University of Warwick)
    Abstract: The outcome of the UK’s Brexit Referendum has been blamed on political factors, such as concerns about sovereignty, and economic factors such as migration, and trade integration. Analyses of the cross-sectional referendum voting pattern cannot explain how anti-EU sentiment built up over time. Since UKIP votes in the 2014 EU Parliament elections are the single most important predictor of the Vote Leave share, understanding the rise of UKIP might help to explain the role of political and economic factors in the build-up of Brexit. This paper presents new stylized facts suggesting that UKIP votes in local, national and European elections picked up dramatically in areas with weak socio-economic fundamentals, but only after 2010, at the expense of the Conservatives, and partly also Labour. The timing suggests that the Government’s austerity measures might have been a crucial trigger that helped to convert economic grievances into UKIP votes, putting increasing pressure on the Conservatives to hold the EU Referendum.
    Keywords: Political Economy ; Austerity ; Globalization ; Voting ; EU
    JEL: R23 D72 N44 Z13
    Date: 2018
  6. By: Paul Vertier; Max Viskanic
    Abstract: Can a small scale inflow of migrants affect electoral outcomes? We study whether the relocation of migrants from the Calais “Jungle” to temporary migrant-centers (CAOs) in France affected the results of the 2017 presidential election. Using an instrumental variables approach that relies on the size of holiday villages present in municipalities, we find that the presence of a CAO reduced the vote share increase of the far-right party (Front National) by about 15.7 percent. These effects, which dissipate spatially and depend on city characteristics and on the size of the inflow, point towards the contact hypothesis (Allport (1954)).
    Keywords: political economy, voting, migration, EU, France, migrants
    JEL: C36 D72 J15 P16 R23
    Date: 2018
  7. By: Laurent Bouton; Paola Conconi; Francisco Pino; Maurizio Zanardi
    Abstract: We study how electoral incentives affect policy choices on secondary issues, which only minorities of voters care intensely about. We develop a model in which office and policy motivated politicians choose to support or oppose regulations on these issues. We derive conditions under which politicians flip-flop, voting according to their policy preferences at the beginning of their terms, but in line with the preferences of single-issue minorities as they approach re-election. To assess the evidence, we study U.S. senators' votes on gun control, environment, and reproductive rights. In line with our model's predictions, election proximity has a pro-gun effect on Democratic senators and a pro-environment effect on Republican senators. These effects only arise for non-retiring senators, who represent states where the single-issue minority is of intermediate size. Also in line with our theory, election proximity has no impact on senators' decisions on reproductive rights, because of the presence of single-issue minorities on both sides.
    Keywords: Electoral incentives, Environment, Gun control, Reproductive Rights
    JEL: D72 I18 Q00
    Date: 2018
  8. By: Mario Chacon; Jeffrey Jensen (Division of Social Science)
    Abstract: The extension of the franchise to former slaves in the post-Civil War American South provides a unique case to study the fiscal consequences of democratization. Black suffrage was not determined internally but was a consequence of military defeat and externally enforced by the U.S. Army during Reconstruction. We employ a triple-difference model to estimate the joint impact of enfranchisement and federal enforcement on taxation. We find that occupied counties where black voters comprised larger shares of the electorate levied higher taxes compared to similar non-occupied counties. These counties then experienced a comparatively greater decline in scal revenues in the decades following the end of Reconstruction. We also demonstrate that in these occupied counties, black politicians were more likely to be elected, and political murders by white supremacist groups were less likely. These fi ndings provide evidence on the key role of federal troops in limiting political capture by Southern elites.
    Date: 2018–01
  9. By: Lapointe, Simon; Saarimaa, Tuukka; Tukiainen, Janne
    Abstract: We study the effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout in a difference-in-differences framework, using data from a wave of municipal mergers in Finland in 2009. Analysing two pre-merger elections and three post-merger elections, spanning a total of 17 years, we find that municipal mergers decrease voter turnout by 4 percentage points in the long run in the relatively small municipalities compared to similar small municipalities that did not merge. As the average turnout rate prior to merging in this group was around 69%, this is a substantial effect. We also find that virtually nothing happens to turnout in the municipalities that were relatively large within their merger. Furthermore, mergers are associated with a decrease in voters’ political efficacy and turnout decreases more in those municipalities that experience larger decreases in efficacy.
    Keywords: Difference-in-differences, jurisdiction size, municipal mergers, voter turnout, C23, D72, H70,
    Date: 2018
  10. By: Alessandro RIBONI; Francisco RUGE-MURCIA
    Abstract: This paper develops a model of committee decision-making where members of different expertise deliberate and share private information prior to voting. The model predicts that members truthfully reveal their private information and are willing to "change their minds" as a result of deliberation. The predictions of the model are evaluated using data from the Federal Open Market Committee.
    Keywords: deliberation, voting, mind-changes
    JEL: D7 E5
    Date: 2018
  11. By: Johannes Friedrich Carolus (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Nick Hanley (University of Glasgow, Institute of Biodiversity, Animal Health & Comparative Medicine); Søren Bøye Olsen (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Søren Marcus Pedersen (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: Cost-Benefit Analysis is a method to assess the effects of policies and projects on social welfare. CBAs are usually applied in a top-down approach, in the sense that a decision-making body first decides on which policies or projects are to be considered, and then applies a set of uniform criteria to identifying and valuing relevant cost and benefit flows. This paper investigates the possible advantages, prerequisites and limitations of applying CBA in what may be considered an alternative, “bottom-up”. Instead of starting out with a pre-defined policy option, the suggested approach begins with the underlying environmental problem, and then assesses costs and benefits of various strategies and solutions suggested by local and directly affected stakeholders. For empirical case studies concerning two river catchments in Sweden and Latvia, the bottom-up CBA approach utilises local knowledge, assesses plans which are not only developed for local conditions but are also likely to be more acceptable to local society, and sheds additional light on possible distributional effects. By not only benefitting from, but also supporting participative environmental planning, bottom-up CBA is in line with the growing trend of embedding stakeholder participation into environmental policy and decision-making.
    Keywords: Environmental Planning, Stakeholder Approach, Participatory Approaches, Ecosystem Services, Water Framework Directive, Catchment Management
    JEL: B41 D61
    Date: 2018–02
  12. By: John E. Roemer (Dept. of Political Science & Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
    Abstract: Economic theory has focused almost exclusively on how humans compete with each other in their economic activity, culminating in general equilibrium (Walras) and game theory (Nash). Cooperation in economic activity is, however, important, and is virtually ignored. Because our models influence our view of the world, this theoretical lacuna biases economists’ interpretation of economic behavior. Here, I propose models that provide micro-foundations for how cooperation is decentralized by economic agents. It is wrong, in particular, to view competition as decentralized and cooperation as organized only by central diktat. My approach is not to alter preferences, which is the strategy behavioral economists have adopted to produce cooperation, but rather to alter the way that agents optimize. Whereas Nash optimizers view other players in the game as part of the environment (parameters), Kantian optimizers view them as part of action. When formalized, this approach resolves the two major failures of Nash optimization from a welfare viewpoint -- the Pareto inefficiency of equilibria in common-pool resource problems (the tragedy of the commons) and the inefficiency of equilibria in public-good games (the free rider problem). An application to market socialism shows that the problems of efficiency and distribution can be completely separated: the dead-weight loss of taxation disappears.
    Keywords: Kantian equilibrium, cooperation, tragedy of the commons, free rider problem, market socialism
    JEL: D50 D60 D70
    Date: 2018–03

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