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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Bhattacherjee, Sanjay; Sarkar, Palash |
| Abstract: | This work shows that weighted majority voting games occur in cryptocurrencies. In particular, two such games are highlighted. The first game, which we call the Rule Game, pertains to the scenario where the entities in the system engage in a voting procedure to accept or reject a change of rules. The second game, which we call the Attack Game, refers to the scenario where a group of entities in a cryptocurrency system can form a coalition to engage in double spending. For the Rule Game we provide analysis to argue that the Coleman’s preventive power measure is the appropriate tool for measuring a player’s influence in the game while for the Attack Game, we define a notion of stability based on the notion of minimal winning coalitions. For both the Rule Game and the Attack Game, we show how to analyse the games based on a snapshot of real world data for Bitcoin which is presently the most popular of all the cryptocurrencies. |
| Keywords: | Voting games, Cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, preventive power, stability |
| JEL: | C15 C71 D72 D74 Y10 Y20 Y80 |
| Date: | 2017–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83592&r=cdm |
| By: | Christian Longhi (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur) |
| Abstract: | The paper aims to identify the forms and dynamics of the organizational structures of high-tech clusters overtime. Since Markusen (1996), it is well acknowledged that diversity is an emergent property of clusters, but the interactions between local and non-local actors of the clusters are difficult to trace because of lack of relevant data. The cluster policies developed to fix the network failures between the heterogeneous actors – large and small firms, universities, research institutes – of the current processes of innovation provide new information opportunities. In France, Competitiveness Clusters work as a “factories of project”; the information they produce on collective R&D projects applying for subsidies provides a proxy of local and non-local relations of the clusters. Social network analysis is used to infer the organizational structure of the collective learning networks and trace their dynamics. The case studies considered are Sophia-Antipolis and Rousset, two high tech clusters which belong to the same Competitiveness Cluster, ‘Secure Communicating Solutions’ in the Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur Region. The paper highlights the decoupling of the two clusters overtime as a consequence of distinctive organizational structures. The diversity of the dynamics of the collective learning networks which emerges through the analysis of the collective R&D projects in the two high tech clusters shows that knowledge creation and innovation can follow different paths and questions the public policies implemented. |
| Keywords: | Innovation, Collective Learning Networks, Competitiveness Cluster, Social Network Analysis, Rousset,Cluster Policy, Sophia Antipolis |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01675684&r=cdm |
| By: | Van Effenterre, Clémentine (Harvard Kennedy School) |
| Abstract: | This article examines the hypothesis that having daughters polarises male politicians' attitudes toward abortion rights. Using French and U.S voting records, I estimate that having daughters decreases support for abortion law by 25% for right-wing congressmen in France, and increases support for Democrats by 12%. I find similar behavioural patterns for voters using electoral surveys. Robustness checks confirm that this result is not an artefact of family stopping rules. I rationalise these findings in a model predicting that fathers with paternalistic preferences adopt a more polarised political position on abortion when they have a daughter rather than a son. |
| Keywords: | voting, polarisation, gender, political behaviour, attitudes, abortion |
| JEL: | D72 D83 J16 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11177&r=cdm |
| By: | Nathan Nunn; Nancy Qian; Jaya Wen |
| Abstract: | We present findings that document one way in which a society's culture can affect political outcomes. Examining an annual panel of democratic countries over six decades, we show that severe economic downturns are more likely to cause political turnover in countries that have lower levels of generalized trust. The relationship is only found among democracies and for regular leader turnover, which suggests that the underlying mechanism works through leader accountability and the electoral process. Moreover, we find that the effects of trust on turnover are greatest during years with regularly-scheduled elections, and within democracies with a parliamentary system, a fully free media, and greater stability. The estimates suggest that generalized trust affects political institutions by influencing the extent to which citizens attribute economic downturns to the mistakes of politicians. |
| JEL: | D72 P16 P51 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24187&r=cdm |
| By: | Zhe Zhang; Louis Putterman; Xu Zhang |
| Abstract: | We study trust and willingness to cooperate among and between Uyghur and Han college students in Xinjiang, China, where tensions exist between the two ethnic groups. We conduct an incentivized laboratory-style decision-making experiment in which within and between group interactions occur among identifiable participants without traceability of individual decisions. We find that members of each ethnicity show favoritism towards those of their own ethnicity in both trust and cooperation and that communication enhances inter- ethnic cooperation significantly. We also find that Uyghur and Han subjects behave differently in their willingness to cooperate relative to trust, although both trust and trustworthiness positively correlate with willingness to cooperate on the individual level. |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2018-4&r=cdm |
| By: | Akira Okada (Kyoto University) |
| Abstract: | We present a non-cooperative sequential bargaining game for side payments contracting. Players voluntarily participate in negotiations. If any player does not participate, then renegotiation will take place in the next round, given an on-going contract. We show that if the stop- ping probability of negotiations is sufficiently small, then there exists an efficient Markov perfect equilibrium where all players immediately par- ticipate in negotiations and agree to the Nash bargaining solution. The efficiency result is strengthened by the asymptotically efficient one that in every Markov perfect equilibrium, all players participate in negotia- tions through a process of renegotiations in the long run with probability one. Finally, we illustrate international negotiations for climate change as an application of the result. |
| Keywords: | Coase theorem, contract, efficiency, externality, Nash bar- gaining solution, non-cooperative bargaining, side payments |
| JEL: | C71 C72 C78 |
| Date: | 2018–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:983&r=cdm |
| By: | Alexander Hijzen (OECD); Pedro S. Martins (Queen Mary University of London); Jante Parlevliet |
| Keywords: | employment, industrial relations, social dialogue |
| JEL: | J5 P52 |
| Date: | 2018–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:elsaab:199-en&r=cdm |
| By: | Maryam Farboodi; Gregor Jarosch; Guido Menzio |
| Abstract: | We propose a theory of intermediation as rent extraction, and explore its implications for the extent of intermediation, welfare and policy. A frictional asset market is populated by agents who are heterogeneous with respect to their bargaining skills, as some can commit to take-it-or-leave-it offers and others cannot. In equilibrium, agents with commitment power act as intermediaries and those without act as final users. Agents with commitment trade on behalf of agents without commitment to extract more rents from third parties. If agents can invest in a commitment technology, there are multiple equilibria differing in the fraction of intermediaries. Equilibria with more intermediaries have lower welfare and any equilibrium with intermediation is inefficient. Intermediation grows as trading frictions become small and during times when interest rates are low. A simple transaction tax can restore efficiency by eliminating any scope for bargaining. |
| JEL: | D40 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24171&r=cdm |
| By: | Lee, Neil; Morris, Katy; Kemeny, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Popular explanations of the Brexit vote have centred on the division between cosmopolitan internationalists who voted Remain, and geographically rooted individuals who voted Leave. In this paper, we conduct the first empirical test of whether residential immobility – the concept underpinning this distinction – was an important variable in the Brexit vote. We find that locally rooted individuals – defined as those living in their county of birth – were 7 percent more likely to vote Leave. However, the impact of immobility was filtered by local circumstances: immobility only mattered for respondents in areas experiencing relative economic decline or increases in migrant populations |
| Keywords: | Brexit; globalisation; mobility; populism |
| JEL: | D72 J61 R23 |
| Date: | 2018–01–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:86367&r=cdm |