nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2017‒10‒29
fifteen papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Ethical Voting in Multicandidate Elections By Bouton, Laurent; Ogden, Benjamin
  2. Electoral Externalities in Federations - Evidence from German Opinion Polls By Xenia Frei; Sebastian Langer; Robert Lehmann; Felix Rösel
  3. Why Should Majority Voting Be Unfair? By Breitmoser, Yves; Tan, Jonathan H.W.
  4. Repeat Voting: Two-Vote May Lead More People To Vote By Sergiu Hart
  5. Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre and Post Brexit Context By Toumasatos, Evangelos; Steinshamn, Stein Ivar
  6. The White Working Class and Voter Turnout in US Presidential Elections, 2004-2016 By Stephen Morgan; Jiwon Lee
  7. Can Power-sharing Foster Peace? Evidence From Northern Ireland By Mueller, Hannes Felix; Rohner, Dominic
  8. "Favoritism and Flooding: Clientelism and Allocation of River Waters" By Sabrin Beg
  9. On the viability of energy communities By Abada, I.; Ehrenmann, A.; Lambin, X.
  10. A public R&D resource allocation model for 5G mobile industry in Korea By Kim, Suwon; Nam, Chan-gi; Lee, Sangwoo; Kim, Seongcheol
  11. Cooperation through Coordination in Two Stages By Todd R. Kaplan, Bradley J. Ruffle, Ze'ev Shtudiner
  12. Team vs. Individual, Hypothesis Testing vs. Model Selection, and the Minimax Model By Yoshitaka Okano
  13. Reconciling intergenerational conflicts with imaginary future generations By Keishiro Hara; Ritsuji Yoshioka; Masashi Kuroda; Shuji Kurimoto; Tatsuyoshi Saijo
  14. Beyond perfect substitutability in public good games: heterogeneous structures of preferences By Marion Dupoux
  15. Group Influence in Sharing Experiments By Daniela Di Cagno; Werner Güth; Marcello Puca; Patrizia Sbriglia

  1. By: Bouton, Laurent; Ogden, Benjamin
    Abstract: We study the behavior of ethical voters in multicandidate elections. We consider two common electoral rules: plurality and majority runoff. Our model delivers crisper predictions than those of the pivotal voter model. An equilibrium always exists, and is unique for a broad range of parameter values. There are two types of equilibria: (i) the sincere voting equilibrium (voters vote for their most-preferred candidate), and (ii) Duverger's Law equilibria (two candidates attract all the votes). These never coexist. We identify the features of an election that favor sincere voting. Consistent with evidence, incentives to vote sincerely are stronger under majority runoff.
    Keywords: Ethical Voting; Group-based Voting; Majority Runoff Rule; Multicandidate Elections; Plurality Rule
    JEL: C72 D72
    Date: 2017–10
  2. By: Xenia Frei; Sebastian Langer; Robert Lehmann; Felix Rösel
    Abstract: Party performance in state and federal elections is highly interdependent. Federal elections impact regional voting dynamics and vice versa (electoral externalities). We quantify the extent of simultaneous electoral externalities between two layers of government. We apply vector autoregressions with predetermined variables to unique opinion poll data for the German state of Berlin and the federal level in Germany. State voting intentions for the state and for the federal parliament are the endogenous variables; the federal election trend is treated as predetermined. Our results suggest that shocks in federal parliament voting intention impact state parliament voting intention, but – as a new finding – to the same extent also vice versa. Externalities account for around 10% to 30% of variation at the other level of government. The effects differ across parties. Electoral externalities are less pronounced for the conservative party, but increase in times of government. The opposite holds true for left-wing parties.
    Keywords: elections, opinion polls, time series, party vote shares, federalism
    JEL: D72 H77 C32
    Date: 2017
  3. By: Breitmoser, Yves (Humboldt University Berlin); Tan, Jonathan H.W. (Nottingham University)
    Abstract: The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In theory, it inequitably favors the proposer, and paradoxically, it disadvantages voters further if they are inequity averse. In practice, however, outcomes are equitable. The present paper analyzes data from a novel experimental design to identify the underlying social preferences. Our experiment compares one-shot and indefinite horizon versions of random-proposer majority bargaining (the Baron-Ferejohn game) which allow us to disentangle behaviors compatible with altruism, inequity aversion, and reference dependent altruism. Most subjects are classified as reference-dependent altruists, around 10% are inequity averse. Subjects are egoistic when their payoff is below their reference point, they become efficiency concerned when satisfied, and the reference point is either the ex ante expectation or the opponent\'s payoff. Finally, we successfully test RDA out-of-sample on a number of distribution and bargaining games from three seminal social preference experiments.
    Keywords: bargaining; voting; experiment; social preferences; quantal response equilibrium;
    JEL: C72 C78 D72
    Date: 2017–10–26
  4. By: Sergiu Hart
    Abstract: A repeat voting procedure is proposed, whereby voting is carried out in two identical rounds. Every voter can vote in each round, the results of the first round are made public before the second round, and the final result is determined by adding up all the votes in both rounds. It is argued that this simple modification of election procedures may well increase voter participation and result in more accurate and representative outcomes.
    Date: 2017–10
  5. By: Toumasatos, Evangelos (SNF - Centre for Applied Research at NHH); Steinshamn, Stein Ivar (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics)
    Abstract: In this paper we apply the so-called partition function approach to study coalition formation in the North-east Atlantic mackerel fishery in the presence of externalities. Atlantic mackerel is mainly exploited by the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Two games are considered. First, a four-player game where the UK is still a member of the EU. Second, a five-player game where the UK is no longer a member of the union. Each game is modelled in two stages. In the first stage, players form coalitions following a predefined set of rules. In the second stage, given the coalition structure that has been formed, each coalition choose the economic strategy that maximises its own net present value of the fishery given the behaviour of the other coalitions. The game is solved using backward induction to obtain the set of Nash equilibria coalition structures in pure strategies, if any. We find out that the current management regime is among the stable coalition structures in all eight scenarios of the four-player game, but in only one case of the five-player game. In addition, stability in the five-player game is sensitive to the growth function applied and the magnitude of the stock elasticity parameter.
    Keywords: Mackerel dispute; straddling fish stock; brexit; games in partition function form; externalities; coalition formation; coalition structure stability
    JEL: C71 C72 Q22 Q57
    Date: 2017–10–18
  6. By: Stephen Morgan (Cornell University); Jiwon Lee (Johns Hopkins University)
    Abstract: Through an analysis of the 2004, 2008, 2012, and 2016 Current Population Surveys, as well as the 2004 through 2016 General Social Surveys, this article investigates class differences and patterns of voter turnout for the last four US presidential elections. After developing some support for the claim that a surge of white working-class voters emerged in competitive states in 2016, a portrait of class differences on political matters among white non-Hispanic eligible voters between 2004 and 2016 is offered to consider the consequences of this compositional shift. These latter results are consistent with the claim that racial prejudice, anti-immigrant sentiment, concerns about economic security, and frustration with government responsiveness may have led many white working-class voters to support an outsider candidate who campaigned on these themes. However, these same results give no support to the related claim that the white working class changed its positions on these matters in response to the 2016 primary election campaign or in the months just before the general election.
    Keywords: voter turnout, presidential elections, class
    JEL: J15 D72 D63
    Date: 2017–10
  7. By: Mueller, Hannes Felix; Rohner, Dominic
    Abstract: In the absence of power-sharing, minority groups in opposition have powerful incentives to substitute the ballot with the bullet. In contrast, when power is shared among all major groups in society, the relative gains of sticking to electoral politics are larger for minority groups. After making the theoretical argument, we provide in the current paper an empirical analysis of the impact of power-sharing at the local level, making use of fine-grained data from Northern Ireland's 26 local district councils over the 1973-2001 period. We find that power-sharing has a sizable and robust conflict-reducing impact.
    Keywords: conflict; elections; Northern Ireland; Peace; Power-Sharing; Terrorism
    JEL: C26 D72 D74
    Date: 2017–10
  8. By: Sabrin Beg (Department of Economics, University of Delaware)
    Abstract: Political favoritism is commonly documented in developing democracies, demonstrated by better outcomes in favored regions. There is little understanding of the mechanisms driving such allocation of resources. I demonstrate favoritism in the allocation of agricultural resources, which eventually affect agricultural production. I use close elections to get random variation in a region's alignment with the political party in power and find that water may be diverted to favor areas aligned with the ruling party. Water availability is in favor of upstream districts and against downstream districts when upstream districts are aligned with the ruling party. The opposite is true when downstream regions are aligned with the ruling party. As a result of this favoritism, floods (or droughts) are less likely to occur in downstream regions, and agricultural yields are better there when the ruling party has incentives to favor them. I argue that the ruling party's influence over autonomous agencies that control water allocation allow them to favor their constituents.
    Keywords: Favoritism, Clientelism, Conflict, Environment, Irrigations, Dams
    JEL: O15 Q25 D72 R11
    Date: 2017
  9. By: Abada, I.; Ehrenmann, A.; Lambin, X.
    Abstract: Following the development of decentralized production technologies, energy communities have become a topic of increased interest. While the potential benefits have been described, we use the framework of cooperative game theory to test the ability of such communities to adequately share the gains. Indeed, despite the potential value created by such coalitions, there is no guarantee that they will be viable: a subset of participants may find it profitable to exit the community and create another one of their own. We take the case of a neighborhood, having access to a limited resource e.g. a shared roof or piece of land which they can exploit if they invest in some renewable production capacity. By joining the community, participants also enjoy aggregation gains in the form of reduced network fees. We find conditions depending on the structure of renewable installation costs, on the magnitude of the aggregation effect and coordination costs and, most importantly, on the chosen sharing rule, under which the whole energy community is stable. Efficiency could require the intervention of a social planner or a change in network tariff structures.
    Keywords: Energy communities, Cooperative game theory, Decentralized power production, Consumer participation, Micro-grids
    JEL: C71 Q42 Q48 Q55 Q21
    Date: 2017–10–18
  10. By: Kim, Suwon; Nam, Chan-gi; Lee, Sangwoo; Kim, Seongcheol
    Abstract: 5G needs to be viewed as a request for network upgrade driven by demands for innovative services, not only by demands for enhanced mobile networks per se. The R&D plan of the Korean government has been discordant with the vision of 5G, maintaining the tradition of sector- or issue-based R&D project support. This study proposed a strategic decision model for the 5G mobile industry, focusing on public R&D resource allocation, in response to the call for a revision of the ICT policy framework in Korea. The proposed model employed a criteriabased, quantitative, and comprehensive approach, using the AHP method, and an expert survey was conducted. The results showed that service platform is the critical layer that deserves priority in strategic public R&D resource input. Also, the ICT experts in Korea formed a consensus that upgrading physical networks per se is not the main driver of the next generation mobile industry, which verified the validity of the model.
    Keywords: 5G mobile,R&D,resource allocation,analytic hierarchy process,policy revision
    Date: 2017
  11. By: Todd R. Kaplan, Bradley J. Ruffle, Ze'ev Shtudiner (Wilfrid Laurier University)
    Abstract: Efficient cooperation often requires coordination, such that exactly one of two players takes an available action. If the decisions whether to pursue the action are made simultaneously, then neither or both may acquiesce leading to an inefficient outcome. However, inefficiency may be reduced if players move sequentially. We test this experimentally by introducing repeated two-stage versions of such a game where the action is individually profitable. In one version, players may wait in the first stage to see what their partner did and then coordinate in the second stage. In another version, sequential decision-making is imposed by assigning one player to move in stage one and the other in stage two. Although there are fewer cooperative decisions in the two-stage treatments, we show that overall subjects coordinate better on efficient cooperation and on avoiding both acquiescing. Yet, only some pairs actually achieve higher profits, while the least cooperative pairs do worse in the two-stage games than their single-stage counterparts. For these, rather than facilitating coordination, the additional stage invites attempts to disguise uncooperative play, which are met with punishment.
    Keywords: experimental economics, cooperation, efficiency, two-stage games, turntaking
    JEL: C90 Z13
    Date: 2017–09–30
  12. By: Yoshitaka Okano (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology)
    Abstract: We report results of an experiment comparing team and individual behavior in a two-player zero-sum game, and assess the predictive power of the minimax model. Based on hypothesis testing, the play of teams is consistent with the minimax hypothesis in the first half of the experiment, but the play of teams in the second half, and that of individuals in both halves are not. Based on model selection, the aggregated behavior of teams in the first half is best fitted by a belief-based learning model, whereas that of teams in the second half and that of individuals in both halves are best fitted by the minimax model. At the decision-maker level, the minimax model is best for about half of the teams and individuals.
    Keywords: Minimax, team decision-making, model selection, learning
    JEL: C72 C92
    Date: 2017–10
  13. By: Keishiro Hara (Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University); Ritsuji Yoshioka (Yahaba Town, Iwate Prefecture); Masashi Kuroda (Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University); Shuji Kurimoto (Graduate School of Engineering, Osaka University); Tatsuyoshi Saijo (Research Institute for Future Design, Kochi University of Technology)
    Abstract: Coping with intergenerational conflicts is one of the fundamental keys to building a sustainable society. However, current decision-making systems tend to be inclined towards the preferences of present generations, simply because future generations do not yet exist and therefore cannot participate in present day negotiating processes. In this paper, with an aim towards reconciling possible intergenerational conflicts, we present the first attempt at creating a participatory intergenerational deliberation practice by creating “imaginary future generation†groups to represent future generations and negotiate with present generation groups regarding future visions and associated decision making. To accomplish this, a series of workshops were organized in a local municipality in Japan in which participating imaginary future generation groups and present generation groups first deliberated separately, and then worked together, to form a consensus over prioritizing policy measures associated with their separate visions of the municipality in 2060. We then analyzed deliberation and consensus-building processes used and observed a stark contrast in deliberation styles and priorities between the groups. For example, imaginary future generation group measures were primarily characterized by utilizing existing local resources while the present generation groups aimed more at solving current problems. Notably, the consensus-building processes resulted in choosing more than half of measures originally proposed by the imaginary future generation groups, thereby indicating that decision-making preferences had shifted to future generations. We contend that our approach, which is based on introducing imaginary future generation groups as stakeholders, could provide indicators towards coping with intergenerational conflicts via present-day decision-making processes.
    Keywords: Future design, Participatory deliberation, Imaginary future generations, Intergenerational conflicts, Consensus building
    Date: 2017–10
  14. By: Marion Dupoux (University of Gothenburg)
    Abstract: The literature on public good games is very focused on the additive separability of the values of the private and the public goods. Yet, the additive structure underlies a perfect substitutability relationship between private and public goods, which is a strong assumption. This paper studies the effect of payoff/preference structures on contributions to the public good within a voluntary contributions experiment in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. Within the structure of substitutability, I find that subjects free-ride more often when they interact with subjects of the other type (complementarity) for whom it is optimal to contribute. Introducing such a heterogeneity may provide a method for the identification of free-riders. Nonetheless, an advantageous inequality aversion emerges as well. This means that under perfect substitutability, subjects tend to dislike earning too much compared to their group member whose payoffs underlie complementarity, a more constraining structure.
    Keywords: public good game, substitutability/complementarity, structure of payoffs, free-riding, inequality
    JEL: C71 C90 C92 D70 H41
    Date: 2017–10
  15. By: Daniela Di Cagno; Werner Güth; Marcello Puca; Patrizia Sbriglia
    Abstract: We experimentally study how group identity and social influence affect proposers and recipients in Ultimatum and Impunity Games. To induce group identity and social effects, we assign individuals to different color groups and inform them about the median choice of their own group. When testing the relevance of this social signal for intentions and decisions we distinguish uni- and bi-dimensional behavior, the latter to let individuals select on which rule of conduct of the others to condition own behavior. When disagreement and conflicting views are possible, coordinating with group behavior may be less important and individuals may prefer self-serving. The bi-dimensional design apparently allows for more variety: tracking both group medians, only one or none.Social influence significantly affects behavior in Ultimatum but has much weaker impact in Impunity experiments. Social information seems to act in two ways: as a coordination device and as a learning device. However, the marginal impact of the signal and the direction of its influence is strongly role dependent.
    Keywords: ultimatum Game, impunity game, social influence, group identity, fairness, experiments.
    JEL: C90 C91
    Date: 2017–10

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