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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Gilles Saint-Paul (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics, New York University Abu Dhabi); Davide Ticchi (Marche Polytechnic University); Andrea Vindigni (University of Genova) |
| Abstract: | If people understand that some macroeconomic policies are unsustainable, why would they vote for them in the .first place? We develop a political economy theory of the endogenous emergence of fiscal crises, based on the idea that the adjustment mechanism to a crisis favors some social groups, that may be induced ex-ante to vote in favor of policies that are more likely to lead to a crisis. People are entitled to a certain level of a publicly provided good, which may be rationed in times of crises. After voting on that level, society votes on the extend to which it will be financed by debt. Under bad enough macro shocks, a crisis arises: taxes are set at their maximum but despite that some agents do not get their entitlement. Some social groups do better in this rationing process than others. We show that public debt .which makes crises more likely .is higher, as is the probability of a crisis, the greater the level of favoritism. If the favored group is important enough to be pivotal when society votes on the entitlement level, favoritism also leads to greater public expenditure. We show that the favored group may strategically favor a weaker state in order to make crises more frequent. Finally, the decisive voter when choosing expenditure may be different from the one when voting on debt. In such a case, constitutional limits on debt may raise the utility of all the poor, relative to the equilibrium outcome absent such limits. |
| Keywords: | Political Economy,Fiscal Crises,Favoritism,Entitlements,Public Debt,In- equality,State Capacity |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01584043&r=cdm |
| By: | Daeyoung Jeong (The Bank of Korea); Semin Kim (Yonsei University) |
| Abstract: | This study identi es a set of interim self-stable decision rules. In our model, individual voters encounter two separate decisions sequentially: (1) a decision on the change of a voting rule they are going to use later and (2) a decision on the nal voting outcome under the voting rule which has been decided from the prior procedure. A given decision rule is self-stable if any other possible rule does not get enough votes to replace the given rule under the given rule itself. We fully characterize the set of interim self-stable decision rules among weighted majority rules with given weights. |
| Keywords: | Weighted majority rules, decision rules, self-stability |
| JEL: | C72 D02 D72 D82 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yon:wpaper:2017rwp-108&r=cdm |
| By: | Manjhi, Ganesh (Gargi College, Delhi University); Mehra, Meeta Keswani (Jawaharlal, Nehru University) |
| Abstract: | This paper derives the solution to differential games, when there are four sets of players, namely - two political parties (politicians), voters and a special interest group. The basic results are similar as Lambertini (2001, 2014). We find that, an open-loop equilibrium collapses to a closed-loop equilibrium. Therefore, the open-loop equilibrium is a sub-game perfect. Further, the private optimum is always higher than the social optimum in terms of the provision of the expenditure on public good. That is, if both the parties have access to public expenditure for the provision of the expenditure on public good they have the tendency to overspend and can incur higher deficits. Consequently, voters vote retrospectively to the party which overspend and results in higher fiscal deficits. Similarly, a larger private optimal regulatory benefit helps the political parties to receive higher financial contribution. Overall, the fiscal deficit in excess of certain level of threshold can create higher cost to the voters and hence the economy as the future tax and this is more so in the presence of special interest group. |
| Keywords: | Special Interest Group ; Public Good ; Fiscal Deficit ; Regulatory Benefit ; Financial Contribution ; Differential Games |
| JEL: | C73 E6 H3 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:npf:wpaper:17/206&r=cdm |
| By: | Harkin, Sean M.; Mare, Davide S.; Crook, Jonathan N. |
| Abstract: | We study the determinants of average pay across all levels of staff seniority for UK banks between 2003 and 2012. We show that pay is affected by agency problems but not by bank operating performance. Average pay does not depend on accounting outcomes at the bank level. By contrast, average pay is positively affected by the presence of a Remuneration Committee and the proportion of Non-Executives on the Board. These findings indicate that bank pay is determined by agency issues, not bank accounting performance. Our results have practical implications for bank shareholders and regulators, suggesting the need for greater transparency in governance of bank pay. |
| Keywords: | Corporate Governance, Remuneration, Bank Performance, Agency Problems. |
| JEL: | G21 G34 G35 M52 |
| Date: | 2017–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81249&r=cdm |
| By: | Bhuvanaswari Raman (Jindal Global University); Eric Denis (PARIS - GC - Géographie-cités - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - UP7 - Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Solomon Benjamin (IIT Madras - Indian Institute of Technology [Madras]) |
| Abstract: | This paper illustrates the bottom-up process of participation by which the settlers of a squatter settlement named Ponmudi Nagar (PMNGR) influenced the state agencies to legalize their occupation, access basic infrastructures and secure titles. The settlers’ experience illustrates the communities’ capabilities to mobilize with minimal or no external support, to influence the actions of government institutions through everyday engagement with different scales of government. Drawing on our fieldwork undertaken between 2012 and 2013, we discuss three key features of the bottom-up process of participation. Firstly, PMNGR settlers influenced the decision of government institutions and circumvented legal obstacles by mobilizing the opportunities as well as the ambiguities of institutional procedures, practices, and schemes. Secondly, while one central aspect of their actions is the generation of information and securing information recorded in the government registers, another dimension is pressuring the concerned institutions to create title documents for their plots. Thirdly, the settlers drew on the support of their networks in the mid-level bureaucracy and elected representatives, in their efforts to influence the actions and decisions of various public institutions. Based on our observations of a bottom-up participatory regularization process,[3] we call for more attention to the ordinary ways by which people attempt to improve their conditions without waiting for external intervention. |
| Keywords: | India,Urban studies,Slum,Land titling,everyday state |
| Date: | 2016–10–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01386462&r=cdm |
| By: | Ke WU (ETH Zurich); Spencer WHEATLEY (ETH Zurich); Didier SORNETTE (ETH Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute) |
| Abstract: | Exploiting the near-experimental conditions provided by the British Pound market in US Dollars during the Brexit vote of June 23rd, 2016, we unearth a major challenge to the Efficient Market Hypothesis. With a single factor of prior polling information, we show that the Brexit result could have been predicted with high confidence under realistic conditions, knowing only the first 20 of all 382 local voting results. However, the market was severely delayed in re flecting this fundamental information. This collective failure indicates both generic inefficiency and a specific inertia/durable bias in the market similar to herding during bubbles. |
| Keywords: | Brexit, efficient market hypothesis, response function, one factor model, prediction, market failure |
| JEL: | C51 C53 C54 C93 D72 D83 G17 |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1712&r=cdm |
| By: | Helen Micheaux (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Franck Aggeri (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In the neoliberal governmentality current, hybrid regulation captures the idea that complementary forms of public and private regulations coexist, which encourages the emergence and the participation of regulatory intermediaries in the process of policy making. Despite numerous experiments, hybrid co-regulation has received little attention and is under theorized. To understand how hybrid regulation is implemented in practice, this paper focus on the case of waste management in Europe and the concept of extended producer responsibility (EPR). In France under the EPR principle, producers created collective organizations (PROs), whereas in Germany an individual responsibility was prefered. The French case analysis and the comparison of the two systems show that, beyond their mere legal intermediary status, PROs revealed to be key actors with a significant influence on the waste sector organization and dynamics. |
| Keywords: | hybrid regulation, extended producer responsibility, recycling sector |
| Date: | 2016–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01504073&r=cdm |
| By: | Amira Rezgui (LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Télécom Bretagne - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de Analyse de l'Information - Rennes - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UR2 - Université Rennes 2, LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire); Nicolas Jullien (LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Télécom Bretagne - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de Analyse de l'Information - Rennes - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UR2 - Université Rennes 2, LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire) |
| Abstract: | Understanding the characteristics of a "good" team and members diversity affects the outcomes group in a question of growing importance for the organizations, for their competitive advantage relies more and more on innovation, produced by virtual cooperation on knowledge production. In this study, we propose a method to forecast the future quality of an online knowledge production community or online epistemic community by studying the composition of the group who initiated them (the "core members" of, in this case, an article). First, we set a team building period which is defined as the period of 120 days after article creation in order to construct this "core members" group. Second, we explore the effects on article quality of both group and member diversity. Core members' characteristics are learned from their previous behavior. The analysis is based on the French Wikipedia project. Our results show that the most important attributes of initial core member to have a high quality article are average reputation, diversity's contribution, participation, and group size. We also find no significant effects of experience diversity and reputation during the team building period. |
| Keywords: | Epistemic community,Article quality,Characteristics of the team,Core member,Wikipedia |
| Date: | 2016–10–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01532045&r=cdm |