nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2017‒06‒25
eight papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs By Engl, Florian; Riedl, Arno; Weber, Roberto A.
  2. Intensity valence By Fabian Gouret; Stéphane Rossignol
  3. Utilising the judiciary to reject the popular will? : legal mobilization after the Arab uprising in Kuwait By Ishiguro, Hirotake
  4. Social Innovation, Democracy and Makerspaces By Adrian Smith
  5. An In-Depth Analysis of the Relationship Between Policy Making Processes, Forms of Governance and the Impact of selected Labour Market Innovations in twelve European Labour Market Settings. By Marion Ellison; Vittorio Sergi; Nicola Giannelli
  6. Smart Specialisation in EU and Chile, challenges and opportunities. Towards a transcontinental policy learning dialogue methodology By Javier Gomez Prieto; Patrice dos Santos
  7. Merger and Innovation Incentives in a Differentiated Industry By Kesavayuth, Dusanee; Lee, Sang-Ho; Zikos, Vasileios
  8. Revealing the Economic Consequences of Group Cohesion By Gächter, Simon; Starmer, Chris; Tufano, Fabio

  1. By: Engl, Florian (university of cologne); Riedl, Arno (General Economics 1 (Micro)); Weber, Roberto A. (university of zurich)
    Abstract: Institutions are an important means for fostering prosocial behaviors, but in many contexts their scope is limited and they govern only a subset of all socially desirable acts. We use a laboratory experiment to study how the presence and nature of an institution that enforces prosocial behavior in one domain affects behavior in another domain and whether it also alters prosocial preferences and beliefs about others' behavior. Groups play two identical public good games. We vary whether, for only one game, there is an institution enforcing cooperation and vary also whether the institution is imposed exogenously or arises endogenously through voting. Our results show that the presence of an institution in one game generally enhances cooperation in the other game thus documenting a positive spillover effect. These spillover effects are economically substantial amounting up to 30 to 40 percent of the direct effect of institutions. When the institution is determined endogenously spillover effects get stronger over time, whereas they do not show a trend when it is imposed exogenously. Additional treatments indicate that the main driver of this result is not the endogeneity but the temporal trend of the implemented institution. We also find that institutions of either type enhance prosocial preferences and beliefs about others' prosocial behavior, even toward strangers, suggesting that both factors are drivers of the observed spillover effects.
    Keywords: public goods, institutions, spillover effect, social preferences, beliefs
    JEL: C92 D02 D72 H41
    Date: 2017–06–13
  2. By: Fabian Gouret; Stéphane Rossignol (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA)
    Abstract: This paper studies a continuous one-dimensional spatial model of electoral competition with two office-motivated candidates differentiated by their “intensity” valence. All voters agree that one candidate will implement more intensively his announced policy than his opponent. However, and contrary to existing models, the intensity valence has a different impact on the utility of voters according to their position in the policy space. The assumption that voters have utility functions with intensity valence, an assumption which has been found to be grounded empirically, generates very different results than those obtained with traditional utility functions with additive valence. First, the candidate with low intensity valence is supported by voters whose ideal points are on both extremes of the policy space. Second, there exist pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the winner is the candidate with high intensity if the distribution of voters in the policy space is sufficiently homogeneous. On the contrary, if the distribution of voters in the policy space is very heterogeneous, there are pure strategy Nash equilibria in which the candidate with low intensity wins. For moderate heterogeneity of the distribution of voters, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
    Keywords: valence, voter’s utility functions, Downsian model, spatial voting.
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2016
  3. By: Ishiguro, Hirotake
    Abstract: This study examines the role of the judiciary in the political process after the Arab Uprising, focusing on a Constitutional Court and its judgements in a case where the popular will was rejected via a judicial ruling. In particular, I will analyse a case of Kuwait where the Constitutional Court declared election void and ordered the dissolution of parliament, after the opposition had won a stable majority. This case conjures images of legal mobilization by the regime; however, considering the political context where the government and parliament were in a serious ongoing conflict, the constitutional rulings by the Constitutional Court can be evaluated as a mediator intended to ease the stalemate and prevent a fall into a more serious crisis concurrent with the political upheaval in other Arab countries.
    Keywords: Justice,Courts,Legal mobilization,Judicialization of politics,Democratization,Kuwait
    Date: 2017–03
  4. By: Adrian Smith (University of Sussex - Science and Technology Policy Research Unit (SPRU))
    Abstract: Social innovation requires a transformation in innovation practices. These transformations should be democratic. At least that is the hypothesis in this paper. Makerspaces are studied as potential sites for democratising innovation activity. Makerspaces are community-based workshops where people access the tools, skills and collaborators to design and make almost anything they wish. Makerspaces are also networked spaces for reflection and debate over design and making in society. But they are many other things too, including a place for personal recreation, entrepreneurship, and education - features of increasing interest to institutions. Makerspaces are pulled and pushed in different directions. An open innovation agenda seeks to insert makerspace creativity into global manufacturing circuits under business as usual. Others see in makerspaces an inchoate infrastructure for a commons-based, sustainable and redistributed manufacturing economy. Activists anticipate new relations in material culture and political economy. Makerspaces are thus socially innovative and not socially innovative at the same time: a site of struggle over issues of profound social significance, and hence an example of innovation democracy in action.
    Keywords: Social innovation; democracy; makerspaces; digital fabrication; commons; critical theory; technology
    Date: 2017–05
  5. By: Marion Ellison (Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh, Scotland); Vittorio Sergi (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo"); Nicola Giannelli (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo")
    Abstract: Following a comparative analysis of these processes and outcomes the paper offers the hypothesis that distinct forms and processes of policy-making, and multi-level governance particularly with regard to the continuing involvement of different levels of government and collaboration with key stakeholders (employers, trade unions and representatives of vulnerable groups) are associated with distinct impacts in terms of the resilience and inclusion of vulnerable groups within national and local labour markets settings. Critically, whilst distinct policy pathways may be characterised by institutional diversity, political culture or traditional policy styles and organisational structures; the central objectives underlying distinct policy pathways is also significant. For example whilst some policy pathways are found to be based largely upon the promotion of resilient and inclusive labour markets some policy pathways are forged entirely or largely within policy architectures and processes defined by largely by fiscal constraints and the broader aim to reduce public expenditure in the short and medium term. More specifically, such pathways may not seek or gain the support of stakeholders and publics through social dialogue, partnership and consensus therefore these pathways may be defined as requiring exclusive rather than inclusive decision making processes. In this paper we offer an analysis of the relationship between differentiated forms and processes of policy making as distinct policy pathways on the labour market resilience and inclusion of vulnerable groups in twelve national settings including Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Germany, Switzerland, Scotland, The UK, Belgium, Sweden and Slovenia.
    Keywords: policy-making, policy style, policy innnovation, governance, inclusiveness, exclusion, resilience
    Date: 2017
  6. By: Javier Gomez Prieto (European Commission – JRC); Patrice dos Santos (European Commission – JRC)
    Abstract: The Smart Specialisation approach is being an inspiratory driver of regional innovation not only within the European Union but beyond. This paper elaborates on the Policy Learning Dialogue: Smart Specialisation in EU and Chile which took place at the Joint Research Centre, Seville (21st November 2016). The article showcases policy reflections and outcomes derived from a fruitful discussion between practitioners of regional innovation strategies in EU and Chile, smart specialisation platform staff and experts. This policy dialogue was part of the activities carried out by the smart specialisation platform aiming at providing evidence-based support to policy makers and stakeholders of smart specialisation through common reflections focused on cooperation dynamics and joint learning.
    Keywords: Smart Specialisation; Policy learning dialogue; cooperation; European Union; Chile
    JEL: R5 O32 O1 O54
    Date: 2017–06
  7. By: Kesavayuth, Dusanee; Lee, Sang-Ho; Zikos, Vasileios
    Abstract: In this paper, we consider a duopoly with product differentiation and examine the interaction between merger and innovation incentives. The analysis reveals that a merger tends to discourage innovation, unless the investment cost is sufficiently low. This result holds whether or not side payments between firms are allowed. When side payments are permitted, a bilateral merger-to-monopoly is always profitable, a standard result in the literature. When side payments are not permitted, however, we show that a merger is not profitable when the efficiency of the new technology is relatively high and the investment cost is below a particular level.
    Keywords: Merger, R&D, innovation, differentiated products
    JEL: D21 L13 L41 O31
    Date: 2017–06–21
  8. By: Gächter, Simon (University of Nottingham); Starmer, Chris (University of Nottingham); Tufano, Fabio (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We introduce the concept of "group cohesion" to capture the economic consequences of ubiquitous social relationships in group production. We measure group cohesion, adapting the "oneness scale" from psychology. A comprehensive program of new experiments reveals the considerable economic impact of cohesion: higher cohesion groups are significantly more likely to achieve Pareto-superior outcomes in classic weak-link coordination games. We show that effects of cohesion are economically large, robust, and portable. We identify social preferences as a primary mechanism explaining the effects of cohesion. Our results provide proof of concept for group cohesion as a productive new tool of economic research.
    Keywords: social relationships, group cohesion, oneness, coordination, weak-link game, experiments, real groups
    JEL: C92 D03
    Date: 2017–06

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