nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2017‒05‒14
ten papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University

  1. Concurrent Elections and Political Accountability: Evidence from Italian Local Elections By Emanuele Bracco; Federico Revelli
  2. The Effects of Dominant Airlines on Open Skies Agreements By Francisco Pino
  3. The Political Economy of Program Enforcement: Evidence from Brazil By Brollo, Fernanda; Kaufmann, Katja; La Ferrara, Eliana
  4. Trump's first triumph: The US republican primaries 2016 - An analysis of socio-demographic, time-related and regional influences By Stoetzer, Matthias-Wolfgang; Gerlich, Steffen; Koesters, Jochen
  5. Infrastructure Provision, Politics and Religion: Insights from Tunisia's New Democracy By Antonio Estache; Maleke Fourati
  6. Does the Paradox of Plenty Exist? Experimental Evidence on the Curse of Resource Abundance By Andreas Leibbrandt; John Lynham
  7. Intra-household bargaining in poor countries By Jean-Marie Baland; Roberta Ziparo
  8. Do Migrants Transfer Political and Cultural Norms to Their Origin Country? Some Evidence From Some Arab Countries By Jamal Bouoiyour; Amal Miftah
  9. It Pays to Be a Man: Rewards for Leaders in a Coordination Game By Philip J. Grossman; Catherine Eckel; Mana Komai; Wei Zhan
  10. The Pen is Mightier than the Sword: How Third-party Advice or Sanction Impacts on Pro-environmental Behavior By Agnès Festré; Pierre Garrouste; Ankinée Kirakozian; Mira Toumi

  1. By: Emanuele Bracco (Lancaster University Management School); Federico Revelli (Università di Torino)
    Abstract: This paper analyses the effects of holding concurrent elections in multi-tiered govern- ment structures on turnout decision and voting behaviour, based on municipal and provincial electoral data from Italy during the 2000s. When the less-salient provincial elections are held concurrently with the highly salient municipal elections, we observe three main effects: (1) turnout increases significantly by almost ten percentage points; (2) issues that are specific of the more salient (mayoral) contest affect the less salient (provincial) contest, with mayors' fiscal decisions impacting on the vote share of provin- cial incumbents; (3) issues that are specific to the less salient (provincial) contest stop affecting provincial elections outcomes. These findings shed light on how voters acquire information on incumbent politicians, and proves that the effectiveness of an election as an accountability tool may be hindered by the concurrence with higher-stakes elections.
    Keywords: concurrent elections, turnout, political accountability, local elections, coat- tails
    JEL: D70 H70
  2. By: Francisco Pino
    Abstract: I exploit the unique institution of gender-segregated voting booths in Chile, allowing the use of actual voting data, instead of self-reported surveys, to test for gender bias among voters. I find evidence of a small but significant negative gender bias: women overall are less likely than men to vote for female candidates. The effect is mainly driven by center-right voters. Selection and candidates’ quality do not explain away the results. These results are consistent with a model in which female and male legislators vote alike, and women voters living in municipalities where traditional gender roles are more prevalent have a preference for center-right male candidates instead of female candidates.
    Date: 2017–05
  3. By: Brollo, Fernanda; Kaufmann, Katja; La Ferrara, Eliana
    Abstract: Do politicians manipulate the enforcement of conditional welfare programs to influence electoral outcomes? We study the Bolsa Familia Program (BFP) in Brazil, which provides a monthly stipend to poor families conditional on school attendance. Repeated failure to comply with this requirement results in increasing penalties. First, we exploit random variation in the timing when beneficiaries learn about penalties for noncompliance around the 2008 municipal elections. We find that the vote share of candidates aligned with the President is lower in zip codes where more beneficiaries received penalties shortly before (as opposed to shortly after) the elections. Second, we show that politicians strategically manipulate enforcement. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find weaker enforcement before elections in municipalities where mayors from the presidential coalition can run for reelection. Finally, we provide evidence that manipulation occurs through misreporting school attendance, particularly in municipalities with a higher fraction of students in schools with politically connected principals.
    Date: 2017–04
  4. By: Stoetzer, Matthias-Wolfgang; Gerlich, Steffen; Koesters, Jochen
    Abstract: On the night of November 8th 2016 Donald Trump won the US presidential election with 306 electoral votes (vs. 232 for Hilary Clinton). Most notably, all of the numerous election forecasts failed to predict Trump's victory. It was preceded by Trump's unforeseen achievement in the primaries. The main question arises "Who exactly voted for him?". In this regard we analyze the primaries of the Republican Party of 2016. Given the total failure of survey-based polls we base our empirical analysis on socio-demographic factors of the electoral constituency at county-level (2764 counties) to predict Trump's actual voting shares. The regression analyses show that a larger proportion of White Americans leads to an increasing share of votes for Trump. But there is no statistically significant impact of the share of Evangelical Protestants. By contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis that a large proportion of veterans in the population goes hand in hand with Trump's success. The study also outlines that low education, low income and a high unemployment rate have a positive impact on votes cast for Trump. However, the population density has no influence. Thus, beside the aforementioned socio-demographic variables the rural versus urban difference per se has no explanatory power. Yet, these variables together explain only 13 percent of the variance of the vote shares of Trump. The momentum effect that is, the time a primary took place in a county increases this explained variance. But in fact, state specific differences of Trump's votes are by far the most relevant factor. Thus, the regression analyses prove once more the fact that the United States of America are no homogenous country. Beside differences in income, education, employment and population density, cultural or traditional values and other deep-rooted regional disparities matter as well.
    Keywords: voting,US,primaries 2016,election,Trump,Socio-demographic influences,bandwagon,states
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2017
  5. By: Antonio Estache; Maleke Fourati
    Abstract: A recent democratic experience in Tunisia in which a religious political party, Ennahdha, took over government for 3 years, provides an opportunity to learn from the interactions between the support to religious parties and improvements in infrastructure access rates. The correlation is not simple. Ennahdha did get, initially, political credit for improvements in regions with low initial networked water connections and it did deliver to the regions where they enjoyed political support. But the support faded as access improved, reducing the political attractiveness of the sector or at least reducing it importance as compared to other concerns voters may have. For sanitation, a correlation is also noted but it is much less robust. Tunisia’s experience suggests that the reputation of religious parties to care for the unmet needs of population is, at least, partially justified. However, water seems to be a much more effective and reliable voters’ grabber than sanitation and this may penalize investment in sanitation, a matter of concern since it has significant health and environmental effects. Moreover, once voters enjoy enough access and once they have seen the overall performance of the party, they treat the party like any other
    Date: 2017–05
  6. By: Andreas Leibbrandt; John Lynham
    Abstract: There is conflicting evidence about whether abundant resources are indeed a blessing or a curse. We make use of specially designed economic experiments to investigate how resource abundance affects cooperation in the absence or presence of regulatory institutions. We observe that in the absence of regulatory institutions, there is less cooperation in groups with access to large resource pools than in groups with access to small resource pools. However, if regulatory institutions are present, we show that there is more cooperation in groups with access to large resource pools than in groups with access to small resource pools. Our findings also reveal that resource users are more willing to regulate access to abundant than to small resource pools. These findings provide causal evidence for the “paradox of plenty” and identify the causes for the pitfalls and potentials of resource wealth.
    Keywords: lab experiment; stakes; institutions; rent seeking.
    Date: 2017–04
  7. By: Jean-Marie Baland; Roberta Ziparo
    Abstract: This paper is intended to bridge the theoretical literature describing efficient intrahousehold behaviour and the development literature that collects empirical regularities pointing toward the existence of strategic decision-making among spouses. It examines the key elements of the collective model and discusses its relevance to analysing intra-household behaviour in poor countries. It explores the role that risk and uncertainty, information asymmetries, power imbalances, arranged marriages, strategic investment, gender norms, and extended households play in the attainment of efficiency.
    Date: 2017
  8. By: Jamal Bouoiyour (University of Pau); Amal Miftah
    Abstract: This paper explores some political and social consequences of international migration experience and remittance receipt in the case of Arab countries using Arab Barometer survey dataset. The main idea is to address whether persons who receive international remittances or have lived in the past in democratic host countries, namely U.S (or Canada) and Europe, can act as agents of changes. Three forms of political participation are considered comprising interest in politics, electoral participation and protest demonstration. Other indicators are taken into account including the perception of economic inequality and cultural constructions of gender in Muslim societies. We find that migration and remittance receipt have a positive influence on the political participation and interest of migrants and families who remain in the country of origin and receive remittances. Moreover, our estimates show that migration experience of male migrants strengthens their likelihood to vote, to be more interested in politics, to perceive the economic inequality as well as to encourage the veiling in their home countries. However, they seem less engaged in a protest demonstration.
    Date: 2017–05–18
  9. By: Philip J. Grossman; Catherine Eckel; Mana Komai; Wei Zhan
    Abstract: We address followers’ gender-based perception of leader’s effectiveness. Our experiment’s design removes factors that might affect leadership success, such as risk-taking and competitiveness. We employ a repeated weakest-link coordination game; 10 periods without a leader and 10 periods after the leader makes a short, “scripted” speech advising followers on how to maximize earnings. Followers then choose a costly bonus for the leader. The leader’s gender is the only variable that changes across sessions. Followers are more likely to heed the advice of the male leaders, are less likely to ascribe success to female leaders, and reward male leaders more.
    Keywords: Leadership, Gender, Coordination Game
    JEL: C92 J71 J16
    Date: 2017–04
  10. By: Agnès Festré (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Pierre Garrouste (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Ankinée Kirakozian (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS); Mira Toumi (Université Côte d'Azur, France; GREDEG CNRS)
    Abstract: It is recognized widely that incentives can influence the cooperation of individuals in the provision of public goods. The aim of this study is to adapt a public good game (PGG) to the environmental issue of waste management. We report an experiment where the players have to cooperate in order to reduce the cost of waste sorting treatment. We consider a traditional PGG involving groups with four players. A fifth player representing the third-party is introduced in the incentivized treatments. The third-party can provide advice about the desired individual contribution (Advice Treatment), or can punish collectively non-cooperative behaviors by increasing the tax rate (Sanction Treatment). Furthermore, participants are asked to perform an effort task to increase their given initial endowments. A social preferences measure is introduced in the form of a social value orientation (SVO) test. We find that initially, both advice and the threat of sanction significantly increase the average individual contribution level. However, once the sanction is applied, we find it has no significant effect in increasing cooperation, rather the contrary. Also, we find results in line with Becker (1974)'s altruism hypothesis that high income individuals contribute more in absolute value than low income individuals only under the threat of a sanction.
    Keywords: Waste sorting, Laboratory experiment, Advice, Sanction, Pro-social behavior
    JEL: Q53 C91 D03
    Date: 2017–05

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