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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Blattman, Christopher; Emeriau, Mathilde; Fiala, Nathan |
| Abstract: | A Ugandan government program allowed groups of young people to submit proposals to start skilled enterprises. Among 535 eligible proposals, the government randomly selected 265 to receive grants of nearly $400 per person. Blattman et al. (2014) showed that, after four years, the program raised employment by 17% and earnings 38%. This paper shows that, rather than rewarding the government in elections, beneficiaries increased opposition party membership, campaigning, and voting. Higher incomes are associated with opposition support, and we hypothesize that financial independence frees the poor to express political preferences publicly, being less reliant on patronage and other political transfers. |
| Keywords: | cash transfers; employment; field experiment; labor market programs; partisanship; Political behavior; poverty; Uganda; voting |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11718&r=cdm |
| By: | Felix Koelle (Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences, University of Cologne) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate spillover effects of affirmative action policies in tournaments on subsequent team performance and the willingness to work in teams. In three different team environments, we find that such policies in form of gender quotas do not harm performance and cooperation within teams, and do not weaken people’s willingness to work in teams. Our results, thus, provide further evidence that gender quotas can have the desired effect of promoting women without harming efficiency. |
| Keywords: | Affirmative action; teams; gender; performance; cooperation; selection; experiment |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2016-20&r=cdm |
| By: | Andrew F. Daughety (Vanderbilt University); Jennifer F. Reinganum (Vanderbilt University) |
| Abstract: | We develop a model of individual prosecutors (and teams of prosecutors) and show how, in equilibrium, team-formation can lead to increased incentives to suppress evidence (relative to those faced by a lone prosecutor). Our model assumes that each individual prosecutor is characterized by a variable that captures that individual's level of tradeoff between a desire for career advancement (by winning a case) and a disutility for unjustly convicting an innocent defendant by suppressing exculpatory evidence. We assume a population of prosecutors that is heterogenous with respect to this tradeoff rate, and each individual's tradeoff rate is their own private information. A convicted defendant may later discover the exculpatory information; a judge will then void the conviction and may order an investigation. If the prosecutor is found to have violated the defendant's Brady rights (to exculpatory evidence), this results in penalizing the prosecutor. The payoff from winning a case is a public good (among the team members) while any penalties are private bads. The anticipated game between the prosecutors and the judge is the main focus of this paper. The decision to investigate a sole prosecutor, or a team of prosecutors, is determined endogenously. We show that the equilibrium assignment of roles within the team involves concentration of authority about suppressing/disclosing evidence. |
| Keywords: | Evidence suppression, prosecutorial misconduct, disclosure, team organization |
| JEL: | K0 D8 |
| Date: | 2017–01–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:van:wpaper:vuecon-sub-17-00001&r=cdm |
| By: | Pastrana, Cleofe S.; Lagarto, Marites B. |
| Abstract: | Bottom-up budgeting (BUB) is a mechanism implemented to institutionalize and incentivize grassroots participation, as represented by civil society organizations, in the planning and budgeting of their respective cities or municipalities. This paper assesses how the various participatory steps were conducted and how the selected subprojects from the previous budgeting round was being implemented. Specifically, this paper focuses on three local government units in Camarines Sur, with various levels of development and participation in government programs. The assessment was conducted by observing the BUB activities of the study sites, conducting interviews and focus group discussions, and validating findings against secondary data. Findings on the general usefulness of the BUB, its current guidelines, and interaction with corollary government programs were highlighted, along with recommendations. |
| Keywords: | Philippines, poverty reduction, local governance, grassroots, bottom-up budgeting (BUB), Camarines Sur, participatory budgeting, civil society organizations (CSOs) |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:phd:dpaper:dp_2016-25&r=cdm |
| By: | Solé-Ollé, Albert; Viladecans-Marsal, Elisabet |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how local governments adjust their spending, savings and taxes in response to a temporary revenue windfall generated by a housing boom and how they cope with the inevitable shortfall that appears during the bust. We focus on Spanish local governments given the intensity of the last housing boom-bust experienced there and the large share of construction-related revenues they obtain. We find, first, that just a small share of the boom windfall was saved, with revenues being used primarily to increase spending (above all, current spending) and (to a lesser extent) to cut taxes. Second, we find that the failure to save during the boom is higher in places with less informed voters and more contested elections. Third, we also examine the what happens during the bust, and find that these governments had to cut abruptly their spending (above all, capital), raise taxes, and allow deficits to grow. Finally, in places wit less informed voters and more contested elections local governments had more trouble in adjusting during the bust, and they tend to rely more on spending cuts than on tax increases. |
| Keywords: | tax volatility,forward-looking behaviour,voter information |
| JEL: | E62 H72 R5 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:zewdip:17001&r=cdm |